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The Personal Note.
I A Letter to my critics—those who sit in University
Halls and wonder what a woman knows about law any-
way, wonder what value a collection of such let-
ters could be to the man of business, the man in
the profession, or the man of the street, and
surely question the ability of the man's family,
particularly the female portion of his household,
to absorb, to understand, or be helped by abstract
knowledge of legal principles.
1. The world situation.
2. The attitude in our country.
3. The present day condition and for it a reason.
4. A possible remedy.
5. An appeal to open mindedness and co-operation.
Let us look upon a lawyer. In the beginning of
life we see him fumbling and raking amidst the rub-
bish of writs, indictments, pleas, ejectments, en-
fifed illatebration and one thousand other lignum
vitae words which have neither harmony nor meaning.
When he gets into business, he often foments more
quarrels than he composes, and enriches himself at
the expense of impoverishing others more honest
and deserving than himself. Besides, the noise and
fume of Courts and the labour of inquiring into and
pleading dry and difficult cases have very few
charms in my eyes. The study of law is indeed an
avenue to the more important offices of the 3tate
and the happiness of the human society is an object
worth the pursuit of any man. But the acquisitions
of these important offices deDends upon many cir-
cumstances of birth and of fortune, not to mention
capacity, which I have not, and I can have no hopes
of being useful that way.
Excerpt from a letter of John Adams
written to William Cushing in 1756,
from "A History of the American Bar"
by Charles Warren.

1To My Critics .
Dear People,
Crime is rampant, economic need lies on every hand,
everywhere peoples are hysterical, war and rumors of war lie
about us, the youth of our own country finds little ahead,
and we wonder if American civilization is decadent, and if
we, too, are passing the way of Greece and Rome. It is not
a pleasant picture that the years have drawn for us and
whether we face a brighter tomorrow our finest thinkers can
hardly determine.
The temper and philosophy of the American people
have helped to keep us steady, but I wonder if the same
temper and philosophy are not preventing us from working
shoulder to shoulder for a better day? We are not reformers,
in fact we are not keen about reformers, and they who would
prate about the Decline of the West are in our estimation
not to be taken too seriously.
The man and woman of intelligence honestly be-
lieves, as does the man of less education that our institu-
tions
—
political, legal, social—are rotten, but the same
individual rarely sees that he himself has any responsibil-
ity.
Economists have argued learnedly as to the causes
which have brought the present conditions, but most of them
have forgotten the basic cause—lack of character—and an
appreciation of values. Selfishness and greed and ignorance

2have laid us low, and only sane knowledge, homely honesty,
and a recognition of spiritual values can restore us.
There is no justice you say! Law helps the rich,
and crushes the poor, law is but a tool of the crooked.
You would do away with the law, you would scrap the Consti-
tution, you would eliminate lawyers and judges.
There is no good thing which in the hands of the
unscrupulous cannot be made a tool of darkness. If law is
the tool of the crooked might it not be because of an igno-
rant laity? An ignorant community is a fat pasture for the
cleverly trained, unscrupulous lawyer. We, the victims,
are at fault; our educational training leaves much to be
desired. We instruct children in every subject except those
which would best fit them to live and to serve. We allow
iuroressionable youth in our secondary schools and colleges
to come under the leadership and training of men and women
whose one ideal in life is to get by, whose idea of success
is "to be smart" in the accepted sense.
I know I am old fashioned, out of date, hopelessly
idealistic, but I still believe there is a way back. Char-
acter would be the foundation stone in my educational system.
Something more would I demand of teachers than degrees. I
go from place to place lecturing in my subject and I am
appalled at the ignorance which prevails in the realm of law.
Men and women know not the simplest things, things which
would be protection to them. So many times students come

3from law courses far worse off than when they entered. They
have been poisoned by those who would tell them how to accom-
plish murder and the finest gift of the ages has been dragged
through the mud and mire of some evil, clever mind and then
presented to the youth of our land.
In the pages which follow I have tried to present
simple truths in simple language, truths which will perhaps
surprise you and protect you, truths which could be given
even in the grades, and I have not scratched the surface of
the possibilities of letters of this kind. May they make
you realize that if there is "no justice" it is because, we,
the people, would have it so.
Yours very truly,

A Letter to Lawyers . but not of my writing .
1. Your opportunities.
2. The need of a good conscience.
3. Rules of conduct.
4. The challenge.
The distresses of the people are now great,
but if we examine particularly we shall find them
owing in a great measure to the conduct of some
practitioners of law. . . . Why this intervening
order? The law and evidence are all the essen-
tials required, and are not the judges with the
jury competent for these purposes?. . . .
The question is whether we will have this
order so far established in this Commonwealth as
to rule over us. . • . The order is becoming con-
tinually more and more powerful. . . . There is a
danger of lawyers becoming formidable as a combined
body. The people should be guarded against it as
it might subvert every principle of lav/ and estab-
lish a perfect aristocracy. • . • This order of
men should be annihilated. ... No lawyers should
be admitted to speak in court, and the order be ab-
olished as not only a useless but a dangerous body
to the public.
Excerpt from a letter of Benjamin Austin,
"an able pamphleteer and Anti-Federalist
politician of Boston," who wrote, in
1786, under the name of "Honestus," and
whose letters had a widespread influence,
from HA History of the American Bar," by
Charles Warren.

4Words of Cotton Mather in 1710 .
Gentlemen:
Your Opportunities to do Good are such, and so
Liberal and Gentlemanly is your Education. . . .that Pro-
posals of what you may do cannot hut promise themselves
an Obliging Reception with you. 'Tis not come to so sad
a pass that an Honest Lawyer may, as of old the Honest
Publican, require a Statute merely on the Score of Rarity.
A Lawyer should be a Scholar, but, Sirs, when
you are called upon to be wise, the main Intention is that
you may be wise to do Good. ... A Lawyer that is a Knave
deserves Death, more than a Band of Robbers; for he pro-
fanes the Sanctuary of the Distressed and Betrayes the
Liberties of the People. To ward off such a Censure, a
Lawyer must shun all those Indirect Ways of making Haste
to be Rich, in which a man cannot be Innocent; such ways
as provoked the Father of Sir Mathew Hale to give over the
Practice of the Law because of the Extreme Difficulty to
preserve a Good Conscience in it.
Sirs, be prevailed withal to keep constantly a
Court of Chancery in your own Breast. • . . This piety
must Operate very particularly in the Pleading of Causes.
You will abhor, Sir, to appear in a Dirty Cause. If you
discern that your Client has an Unjust Cause, you will
faithfully advise him of it. You will be Sincerely de-
sirous that Truth and Justice may take place. You will

5speak nothing which shall be to the Prejudice of Either. You
will abominate the use of all unfair Arts to Confound Evidence,
to Browbeat Testimonies, to Suppress what may give Light in
the Case. . • • There has been an old Complaint, That a Good
Lawyer seldom is a Good Neighbor. You know how to Confute it,
Gentlemen, by making your Skill in the Law, a Blessing to your
Neighborhood. You may, Gentlemen, if you please, be a vast
Assession to the Felicity of your Countreys. . • . Perhaps
you may discover many things yet wanting in the Law; Mischiefs
in the Execution and Application of the Laws, which ought to
be better provided against; Mischiefs annoying of Mankind,
against which no Laws are yet provided. The Reformation of
the Law, and more Law for the Reformation of the World is
what is mightily called for.
From an address by Cotton Mather.
"History of the American Bar" by
Charles Warren. The Law: Business
or Profession? Julius H. Cohen Pg. 112.

The Historical Background—because of its very antiquity
law deserves our respect and devotion.
I, Letters to my southern friend of the inquiring mind .
1. July 4th and the birth of a nation.
3. The common law of which we talk.
3. The Keeper of the King's Conscience and the
part he played.
4. The last word, the "Amen, H as it were, of the
law.
II A Letter to my friend 1 s son now in Dartmouth .
1. To one who would study law.
The Law: it has honored us; may we honor it.
Daniel Webster.

6July 4th and The Birth of a. Nation .
Dear Laura,
Last night I went to sleep amid the beauty of Sky
Rockets, Roman Candles, Red Fire and Wonder Wheels down on
the beach and was awakened this morning to hear the occa-
sional cracker that doubtless warmed the heart of some small
boy in this community. It was a well ordered July 4th cele-
bration,- fathers and small sons and daughters playing to-
gether, but tonight I am back in the crowded section of the
Hill where many months of my life are spent, where pennies
handed out by devoted fathers are few, where youngsters re-
joice in noise untold,- and where small fire crackers would
seem beneath the dignity of so many of the urchins. Nothing
less than giant crackers would satisfy their craving for ex-
citement. Poor youngsters, what a starved existence is theirs
in many cases. Yet, though they know it not, narrow, con-
gested streets, hot brick sidewalks have so long been their
heritage that away from them all they would be ill at ease
and unhappy. With all of our boasted laws about children and
child labor we still have much to do in our Commonwealth, and
I am rabid enough to believe that until we legislate on mar-
riage along lines now abhorrent to some we cannot reach a
solution. Unfortunately, too many of our people have no up-
ward look, no desire to give their children "a better bringing
up than his had been or hers", no desire for better things
except in a limited material way. Yet I do contact some

7marvellous young people, beautiful in body and spirit, who
have come out of unsavory places. They have been chiefly of
foreign birth whose parents have kept the gleam, and remem-
bered the ideals of olden and finer civilizations than ours.
But, Laura, I don't intend to go off on this tangent. Sleep
is just impossible and my mind is working along the line of
the morrow's news. Already I can see the items,- this child
burned, another killed, another blinded,- the outcome of a
mistakened patriotism. July 4, 1776 seems a long way into
the shadowing past, yet that date separated our legal as
well as our political institutions and is the clevage date
for our common law.
Do you know what I mean by our common law?
Continued on the morrow,

The Common Law of Which We Talk,
Dear Laura,
Massachusetts is a common law state. I say it
with pride for the great mass of common law, dating from an-
tiquity and used by the English people through the centuries,
"became a part of our inheritance when we severed connections
with the mother country.
I like to think of common law as crystallized pub-
lic opinion, growing out of customs and the human tendency
to react to a given situation as predecessors reacted. Do
you see what I mean when I say that common law has rigidity
because of the force of precedent? We who like to think in
legal phraseology often speak of the doctrine of "stare
decisis". That means the same thing. Dig up your rusty
Latin and what have you but the admonition, "Let the judg-
ment stand" • I like to think of the old common law judges
handing down decisions in harmony with the earlier holdings.
But you say that means no progress. No, but because it
through the years was largely unwritten it was ever adaptable
and a judge of the modern spirits could interpret the common
law in the light of growing needs.
Common law seems much more democratic, much more
sturdy and fine than the civil law of the continents, the
codes of the Emperors, all of which trace their beginning to
the Justinian Code of Roman days. I • m glad I don't practice
or teach in a code state. By the way, New York is a code

9state for she has attempted to codify all of her common law.
I'm thinking that she will still be busy at it when Gabriel
sounds the final call.
Again I must leave this until the morrow.
Devotedly yours,
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The Keeper of the King* s Conscience and the Part He Played.
Dear Laura,
When we say that we took over the common law of
England July 4, 1776 we also include the system of Equity
which had become gradually fastened upon England from the
days of Edward III. You see people in those days were like
litigants today; there was always some one dissatisfied with
the decision of the court of common pleas, and redress was
sought from the King. He, of course, could do no wrong and
his disposition of the case would be final.
He sought to do equity until the time came when
litigants were so many that he turned the work over to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who became the keeper of the
king's conscience; he, too, could do no wrong. Chancery
courts, or equity courts as we call them sprang into exist-
ence. Both of those terms I know you have heard.
The Chancellors were men educated on the continent
and therefore learned in Roman law. So the system which was
then engrafted on to the common law of England was quite dis-
tinct and apart. Gradually in England the equity courts took
over cases involving equitable parties, husband and wife,
partners, trustees and cestuis; equitable subject matter, as-
signments, trusts, mortgages; equitable remedies, injunctions,
decrees for specific performance, reformation or cancellation
of instruments, rights of contribution, exoneration, subro-
gation. Some day I'll tell you more of their meaning, but
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note they are all Latin words in origin. We follow England's
plan, still using however in our state the two forms of plead-
ing, common law and the equitable pleading, England no longer
does
.
The equity pleading is interesting,- the petition
ends in prayer, a prayer for specific and general relief.
If you will permit your imagination to run riot you will un-
derstand that no one would approach his sovereign except in
the role of a humble petitioner praying for such relief as
the sovereign in mercy and justice might grant. I am still
glad the prayer remains with us in law I No branch of the
law today is so filled with the spirit of progress and modern
interpretation as is the field of equity.
Good night, friend mine,
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The Last Word
,
the "Amen" . as it were , of the Law.
Dear Laura,
You asked me in your note if all our law came from
the common and equity law of England. I would remind you of
that noisy body on Beacon Hill,- the so-called Great and
General Court engaged in the business of making laws. Much
do they add to our trouble as well as to our progress for
they are responsible for statute law, the law which is the
last word, the "Amen", as it were.
Statutory law either over- turns, reaffirms or meets
new situations. To illustrate briefly, every aeroplane is
actually a trespasser. Did you ever think of that? It is a
trespasser because it penetrates your close, that invisible
wall which surrounds your land from the center of the earth
to the zenith of the skies above. Think of the law suits
which could be started daily had not the legislature seen fit
to pass a law establishing the non liability of aeroplanes,
except in case of low flight or special injury inflicted.
There the statute has met a new situation.
Charles Clark, our minister's son, was hauled into
court last week for driving on the left hand side of the road.
All the family are predicting ray Waterloo for the same of-
fense. Personally, I am cherishing a secret belief that
Charles is not telling all he knows. However, perhaps I shall
change my mind some day. The "Gertie Glooms" say I will, for
I do love the center of the road when all ahead is clear, the
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view is so much better I It has always been a part of our com-
mon law that vehicles should drive to the right, but in order
to be doubly sure a statute presents the same ruling. Here
the statute merely reaffirms the common law.
Now for an example where the statute has overturned
the common law 1 Years ago, to be exact, before 1842 in our
state, a woman married the man of her choice and brought to
his home as her choicest possession a fine old mahogany
bureau. Next time you are at the Beacon Hill house look at
it in the room which I love so well on the second floor and
where I spend so many happy hours in study. I like to think
that this ancient ancestor of mine rubbed and polished its
wood to the soft satin glow of today and that many a time and
oft she admired its lovely grain and packed her treasures in
its spacious drawers.
Well, the man died, and to her horror she learned
that beloved bureau was a part of his estate and must be
sold. Money she had, and she bought back her bureau, feeling
that she had come near losing a very precious thing. However,
in time she married again and the experience of the past was
forgotten. This time financial reverses came and when he
died she awoke to a realization that the bureau again was in
danger of passing into stranger 1 s hands. However, through
labor and effort she earned its price and redeemed it again.
It was not many years before another suitor sought
her hand, but she drew away coldly and said, "Young man, I
prefer to keep my bureau". And I'm selfishly glad she did,
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because, if she had married, it probably would never have
found its way to me and without it the room would be quite
incomplete. As I sit and watch the fire light reveal its
beauty I know that I feel anew the emotions which must have
stirred the heart of Elizabeth Malcom Cook, my great, great
grandmother.
Such a thing could not happen today for the
Married Woman's Statute was passed in 1842. We may marry
today and our earthly possessions will remain our own prop-
erty; likewise our debts and obligations will not pass to the
shoulders of our husbands. You see after all there was some
justice. In those days he took the bitter with the sweet.
We are told that in the days of Queen Elizabeth, when the
women gambled more than they do today, and it is bad enough
now, it was customary for women of the nobility to marry on
the eve of execution, condemned criminals. A nice arrange-
ment, for don't you see that when he went to the gallows on
the morrow all her debts went with him? If he chanced to be
pardoned it probably wasn't so good, because although she had
no debts perchance she had something more troublesome, a
husband '.
Laura, I have rambled in these letters further than
I intended but when one gets to writing about the Beginnings
of Things there is much to be said. I haven't told you any-
thing about the lesser sources of law and I'd like to tell
you more if I may some day. I recall how much we enjoyed
Kiplings "Puck of Pooks Hill" that summer we read it together,
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and so for that reason I feel sure that were I able to tell
it attractively you would enjoy with me the hidden forces
which have emerged in our legal institution, faulty as they
are.
And all these, because of the Fourth I
Devotedly yours,
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To One Who Would Study Law.
Dear Elmer,
Shall you, or shall you not study law? I hardly
know how to advise. As I have watched you grow up, seen your
interests, capabilities, and studious tendencies, I have
often thought that you had much to bring to the law] You
have a mind which is keen, analytical, logical. You also
have loved to argue and to delve deeply into the reasons of
things. I believe that you would enjoy the study of law, and
I think you would be keen about its practice; I'm not.
In many fields have I delved, but never have I
found a subject so fascinating as this one, a subject which
so absorbed every fibre of my being and which demanded such
complete devotion. Frankly, if you go into the law, you will
marry it; it will occupy no secondary place in your thoughts
or in your reading. Upon your decision rests your future.
I shall never forget the day I finally decided to
give it of my best. I had taken some courses in law without
any thought of making it my life work, had become intensely
interested, had prepared some lectures for a correspondence
school and finally had been advised by a lawyer to go into
the field. My one desire was to get far away from people,
from things, to think the problem through. I took the car
and drove to Scituate. There out on the rocks with the vast
expanse of ocean ahead and human beings far away, I fought
my way to a decision. I had a good teaching position, was
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on tenure, my future was fairly well assured; I liked my work
and was happy. I had studied long years, nights as well as
days. Should I give it all up and start anew? I wasn't
afraid of that, but I was afraid that my mind would meet a
blank wall, that I would get beyond my ability, and that I
would fail. Somehow I came to appreciate that one never did
reach the limit of his ability and, like the house with the
golden windows, the ability line ever moved forward. I re-
called the old Biblical quotation, "Behold I have set before
thee an open door."
It has been a long road, but a glorious adventure
and I am glad I left the well-trodden pathway. I shall never
be a great trial lawyer, but I believe that I am proving my
worth as a law teacher. I used to think I must do more and
more trial work and that I was cowardly if I disliked it.
Now I know how foolish was that attitude. Today my desire is
to build up an organization which will be a complete unit,
and, Elmer, I have one of which I am most proud. Some day I
will tell you more of it.
If you decide to study law, you will study not less
than twenty-eight subjects and their scope is sufficiently
broad to meet every demand of your intelligence. There are
the exact mathematical subjects where two and two make four,
Bills and Notes, Partnership, Bankruptcy, Corporation Law,
Massachusetts Practice. There are the subjects which mirror
the progress of thought in Jurisdiction, Equity, Trusts.
There are the subjects rich in the heritage of the past,
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Future Estates; story-book subjects, Common Carriers and
Bailments; subjects rich in history, Constitutional Law; sub-
jects which are full of pathos and tragedy, Criminal Law, and
to some extent, Domestic Relations; subjects closely allied
to daily living, Torts and Contracts; subjects which remind
us that though dead, we live on, Wills, Probate.
Elmer, I have only suggested the wealth of the
field and because there are many subjects, there are many
opportunities for service. Probably the trial lawyer is in
the minority but I imagine that that is the field which ap-
peals to you, and because you have character, note I put
character first, ability, willingness to sacrifice, I believe
that you may go far in this profession if you decide to make
it yours.
I shall look forward to hearing from you.
With greatest interest,

C Letters to Business Men and Women and we are all included.
I The subj ect of Contracts—what we should know and we
should know much for life is made up of contract-
ual relations.
1. The subject outlined for the benefit of those
who would gain further knowledge.
"Bel-ah-iddina and Belshunu, sons of Bel — and
Hat in, son of Bazuau, spoke unto Bel-nadin-shurau,
son of Murashu, thus: As concerns the gold ring
set with an emerald, we guarantee that for twenty
years the emerald will not fall out of the gold
ring. If the emerald should fall out of the gold
ring before the end of twenty years, Bel-ah-iddina,
Belshunu, and Hat in shall pay unto Bel-nadin-shumu
an indemnity of ten mana of silver. Thumb-nail
mark of Bel-ah-iddina, Belshumu and Hat in instead
of their seal. M
A contract made in reign of King
Artaxertes (464-424 B.C.), more than
2,300 years ago. It was inscribed
on a baked brick dug up in the ruins
of the ancient City of Nippur,
Babylon.
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Contracts t -Express and Implied .
Dear Mr. Carr:
I understand very thoroughly how you feel and how
hard it is not to be bitter in the situation in which you find
yourself. All these years you have remained at home and have
worked upon the farm and helped to make the place what it is
today, while your brothers and sisters have gone out into the
world and have found apparently, opportunities more agreeable
to them. Now with the passing of your father their unwilling-
ness to allow you anything for the years of work which you
have put upon the property does seem tremendously unfair.
Unfortunately, in our State, when one works for the
family, unless there is an express agreement to the contrary,
he is not entitled to any specific compensation and for that
reason were you to bring suit against the Estate to recover
at the rate of $20 a week over the past twenty years, I feel
that you would lose out. We often say that even when there
is no express contract there can be recovery upon an implied
one if the individual can answer "yes" to at least four ques-
tions.
First, has he rendered a benefit?
Second, has he rendered it in expectation of pay?
Third, was the other person aware of the expectation?
Fourth, was the other party silent in face of facts which
called upon him to speak?
If you will meet these questions fairly you will answer the
first, yes, for you have rendered benefit upon benefit. On
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the second question I am not so sure, perhaps you will say
that you have rendered services in expectation of pay some
time, but I doubt if you have looked upon it as yielding you
a definite weekly income. Your father, fine man that he was,
was a man of the old school who really would have felt that
it was the duty of his child or children to remain at home as
long as he needed them and that in providing you in these
years with the necessaries of life, the home roof, abundance
of food and companionship, that he was doing all that you
could possibly expect. If the answer is "no", to the third
question, it follows that the answer to the last question is
also, "no".
Legally, I do not believe you have an opportunity
to recover; morally, you should. It appeals to me that any
lawyer who takes your case should take it with one idea in
mind,- that of attempting to make your brothers and sisters,
who now today have more of this world* s goods because of their
opportunity to get out, to desire not only justice but
generosity.
Try not to be too bitter over the situation and to
believe that after all there are eternal values that are of
greater importance than dollars and cents. I know of nothing
in the world that so thoroughly reveals human nature as the
acid test of fifteen cents.
Cordially yours,
Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370;
Graham v. Stanton, 177 Mass. 321;
Butler v. Butler, 235 Mass. 22.

Was the Offer Accepted ?
Dear Mr, Riley:
Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to
Mr. Norris. It tells me exactly what I expected it would.
You wrote him that you would like to sell him your tractor
for $75 • His letter accepting your offer was mis sent to
Plymouth through no fault of his and therefore delayed in
delivery to you. In the meantime you sold the tractor to
some one else and Mr. Norris thinks that you are liable to
him for breach of contract. You surely are, and you may be
glad that this is but a friendly test case.
You see when he mailed his acceptance that moment
the contract was complete. Your offer was by letter - you
expected him to reply by letter - and when the letter was
properly stamped, directed and mailed within a reasonable
time a contract at once came into being and even though
you had never received the letter if he could prove his
statements, you would still be liable.
Next time say, "if I hear from you by Thursday I
will sell, etc." or say, "Upon receipt of your reply I'll
consider the deal closed." He who makes an offer can al-
ways protect himself by the proper wordinp- of his offer,
but if he doesn't Massachusetts finds a contract with the
mailing of the acceptance rather than upon its receipt as
long as it is a proper acceptance, i.e. properly stamped
and mailed, made according to the terms of the offer,

unconditional, absolute, within the time specified, or if
none is specified, within a reasonable time, to the place
specified and in the manner specified.
Treat Mr, Norris to the dinner he demands and
consider yourself lucky that he is your friend and not your
enemy.
Hastily,
Tobin v. Taintor, 229 Mass. 174;
Taylor v. The Merchants 1 Fire Ins. Co.,
9 How. (U.S.) 390.

An Offer or an Invitation To Deal
Dear Frances,
This morning I walked down Tremont Street and
enjoyed as I ever do the store windows. In Leonard 1 s win-
dows they had some very attractive and inexpensive dresses
and I went in to see if I could get something for you to
give Louise. While I was there a young woman asked to see
a certain dress in the window, and the girl showed her one
priced $9.75. The woman immediately called attention to
the fact that the tag in the window said $5.75, and it
did.
The buyer was called and she was much disturbed
over the error. The woman was most disagreeable • She
would have the dress at ;?5.75, or she would expose their
crooked methods, etc., etc. Finally, the buyer told her
wearily that she could have the dress in the window for
$5.75 and the woman bore a triumphant air. However, the
dress in the window was size 36 and the woman needed a 42.
Again the battle raged. I was afraid the buyer was going
to give in and stand the loss from her slender earnings as
I knew she would have to do. I dropped my handkerchief at
a convenient spot, and managed to say to her, "Don't give
in." She squared her shoulders and vanquished the enemy
who departed with threats involving reports to the Better
Business Bureau.
Then I had a chance to tell the girl that window
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displays are, after all, but invitations to deal, that the
offer comes from the customer and that no contract liability
arises until the store accepts the offer.
So many times seeming offers are not offers after
all, and people insist on rights they do not possess. We
have discussed this point so often that I knew you would be
interested in its practical application.
Hastily,
Smith v. Gowdy, 8 Allen 566;
Montgomery v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89;
Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316;
Ashcroft v. Butterworth, 136 Mass. 511.
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The Price We Pay When ^e Fail to Read the Fine Print
Dear Evan,
How many times I think of the one -pipe furnace you
and Ada bought the first year of your marriage and of the
stunt we put over on the concern when we had it dumped on
their door step in the early hours of the morning. Evan,
you were fortunate. When I think of that iron-clad contract
you so blithely signed without reading, and the things they
could have done to you, I feel that the fifteen dollars you
lost was but a mere bagatelle.
Recently I heard of a case which will interest you.
A man bought a truck for $1600 on a conditional sales agree-
ment, $100 down and the same amount to be paid each month.
The contract provided that in case of default of any payment
that the company could repossess itself of the car, and that
all payments made would be forfeited. In addition to these
provisions which are to be found in all conditional sales
agreements was another, namely that any unpaid balance
should be considered as liquidated damages and be due and
owing the company.
The man paid $1200, met with business reverses,
had to give up the truck which the company sold for $800.
Then the man had money left him and the company sued him for
"400 and recently got a judgment for that amount, so out of
the one truck they took in jp2400.
Dreadful? Yes. Who was to blame? No one except
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the man who signed the contract without reading it and un-
derstanding its meaning. The courts are not here to make
the contracts; their business is to enforce the contracts as
made.
Concerns know that people do not read the printed
material and they deliberately discourage any one who would,
by putting in print so fine that a magnifying glass is
needed
.
Preach the gospel of never signing on the dotted
line until one knows fully what he has done 1
Am I unkind to remind you of other days?
Forgive me,
O'Reilly's Case, 258 Mass. 205;
McKenney v. B. & M. , 274 Mass. 217;
Fornseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 533.
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Offer
.
Acceptance , Revocation .
Dear Lawrence:
So after all you didn't purchase Mr. Green's Essex,
which he has so tenderly taken care of this past year I There
is no question hut it was an excellent "buy. I am sorry that
you didn't get it but you really have no come hack against
Green even though you say you are peeved and are seeking re-
venge.
It is true he did make you an offer,- the car for
$350 and a week in which to think the proposition over,- but
Lawrence, you never accepted that offer,- although you tried
hard enough to do so,- before it had been revoked by the
sale of the car to another. Without an acceptance there can
be no contract, and without a contract, no rights can arise.
You are infuriated because he had given you a week
in which to make up your mind, and because you didn't want
him to think you too anxious you decided to keep him guess-
ing throughout the week. Little did you realize that he
was under no obligation to keep that offer open a week un-
less there had been a seal upon the writing or you had paid
him something to keep it open,- we call it an option.
The law says that an offer can be accepted until
it has been revoked and had you succeeded in getting him on
the telephone Wednesday afternoon of the seventh day and
told him that you were ready to take the car, before he had
told you of its prior sale, a contract would have resulted.
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If these had . een the facts you would have been able to sue
him for breach of a contract had you so desired and you
would have been entitled to money damages.
Even when not able to get him on the telephone if
you had gone directly to the house and not stopped enroute
at the Post Office and there seen the car in question in the
possession of Rollins who told you of his recent acquisition
you still might be able to get damages for breach of con-
tract. As it is I fear you are wholly out of luck, for you
can neither get the car or damages
.
The offer which Green made to you ho revoked when
he sold the car to Rollins. He surely took a chance when he
didn't notify you personally for knowledge that an offer has
been revoked has to be brought home to the offeree prior to
his attempted acceptance to prevent a contract arising. How
ever, you did learn of the sale, even though indirectly and
that was enough to prevent you from accepting, for no longer
was there an offer to accept.
Better luck next time.
Sincerely,
Sears v. Eastern R.R., 14 Allen 433;
Spencer v. Merrimac, 342 Mass. 170;
Benton v. Springfield Y.M.C.A., 170 Mass. 534.
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All About Seals and the Significance of the Attached Wafer
Dear Junior,
The little red wafer with the letters "L.S." that
you picked up in the office the other day is what we call a
seal. There was a time when hoys didn't learn to read and
write unless they were intended for the church. If theirs
was to he a life of fighting, the ability to write would he
of little value and that accomplishment was left to the
clergy. In fact there was a time when a man accused of a
crime would plead "the benefit of the clergy" if he could
read and write to escape punishment, and he would escape,
too. The chief punishment was death and men who could read
and write were so few that the government felt their lives
should not be taken.
But to go back, because there were times when even
a fighter needed to express his binding assent, the custom
grew up of impressing the signet ring into the soft sealing
wax affixed to the paper and the seal had come into exist-
ence. That old custom to some extent is still with us.
You have seen mother seal her letters, haven't you, and Hope
has the signet ring that was mine years ago.
The sealing wax crumbles so badly that after a
time legal documents were sealed with wafers similar to the
one you took from the office last week. The letters "L.S."
stand for "locus sigilli," the place of the seal. There are
some papers which according to the law must be sealed; for

example, all deeds conveying lands, mortgages, bonds, re-
leases. But even though the instrument does not require a
seal if one is placed upon it, it changes the force of the
instrument.
People are not obliged to use the little red seal
or the sealing wax. They can use any attached wafer or
today, in Massachusetts, they are permitted to simply write
that the instrument is a sealed instrument and that is
sufficient.
I think I shall have to begin to teach you law.
Devotedly yours,
G. L. Ch. 4, s. 7, cl. 29;
stricken out by Act of 1929, Ch. 377.
(Today one may recite that the instrument
is sealed and omit the attached wafer.)
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Did You Promise to Pay the Debt of Another ?
Dear Mr. Lewis,
We all appreciate how generous you have been and
how many poor families you have helped through these days
of cold and hunger and suffering. At the same time, I
don't think you should be imposed upon, and personally I
feel that Hawkins intends to do just that
.
When I was in the store this afternoon, I couldn't
help but overhear your conversation. I know that you felt
he was acting in good faith and that he really meant it when
he said he would pay for the groceries furnished the desti-
tute family down the street. Perhaps he did mean it but I
have had some dealings with him that make me suspicious.
Let me ask you some questions. You never expect
to look to the Maguire family for a single penny, do you?
You are looking solely to Hawkins on that bill, aren't you?
If you will keep these two points in mind, you are safe, but
if the need ever arose and you testified that you had hoped
the Maguires would pay, but if they couldn't, you had ex-
pected Hawkins to make good, you would lose out. Why?
Because the promise to pay the debt of another since 1676,
because of the Statute of Frauds, passed in the reign of
Charles II to prevent fraud and perjury, has to be in
writing. As long as you deal only with Hawkins, it makes no
difference whether the promise is oral or written, but if
you are looking to both, then to hold Hawkins, his promise
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must be in writing.
I just wanted to say this to you, that you might
understand your position.
Truly yours,
Swift v. Pierce, 13 Allen 136;
Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 248 Mass. 499;
Hill v. Raymond, 3 Allen 540.
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Mysterious Facts about Checks you Receive
Dear Doctor Preetag,
I do sympathize with you "because you are my
friend, and I'd like to tell you to go out and make that
patient of yours pay the rest of that bill, but man, I
can't. Even if your charge was reasonable for an appendi-
citis operation—and I'll take your word for that--why
didn' t you get in touch with me before you ever cashed
that check marked "in full of account"? I'm sorry, but in
my estimation you are plain "stuck" and you better charge
the matter up to profit and loss--chiefly loss—and forget
it.
You tell me that when Jones came to you he really
was in dire need and that no charge was discussed, but that
you got him speedily to the hospital and on the operating
table and that he owes his life to your prompt measures.
That all sounds well, Mr. Surgeon, but probably after he got
your bill for $1000, he didn't thank you for saving his
life. I doubt if he would value it so high.
Forgive me, I am sorry, but don't you see that
till was what we would term as unliquidated? There is,
you'll confess, no set price for operations. I suppose
doctors, like lawyers, charge whatever the traffic will
bear, and unless there is an agreement, an understanding be-
forehand, as to the amount of the bill, it cannot be said to
be liquidated. On the other hand, if you went into a garage
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and bought U. S. tires, there would he a liquidated bill,
for whether you asked the price or not, you would under-
stand that you would be charged the going price. Do you
see the difference?
I know that you rely particularly on the letter
that you got from Jones in which he says that your charge
is outrageous, but ends up by promising to pay. Again, I'm
sorry, but that promise is no good. He gained nothing as a
result of his promise, the operation was all over, and suc-
cessful, and he was still a going concern. If he had made
the promise while the fateful knife was poised in midair,
the result would be wholly different. Then you could say
that you operated on him because of his promise, and as a
result of his promise he gained freedom from pain, health
and a renewed interest in life. But all these things he
had when he reluctantly promised to pay, and his promise is
worthless as far as you are concerned. Evidently, he
changed his "yes" to "no." The check for $400 marked in
full of account proves that women are not the only ones who
change their minds. Here is where you made your mistake.
Because the amount was unliquidated you could cash that
check only by accepting its terms. If you were not willing
to take $400, instead of #1000, you should have returned
the check. Note if the amount had been liquidated, as in
case of a bill for tires, you could have cashed the check
safely and then proceeded to collect the balance. I am
sorry to disappoint you legally, but if Mr. Jones will not
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add to the installment, don't carry the case to court if my
statement of the facts is correct. Just don't walk into
that trap again. It is a trap that many do fall into.
One of the lawyers in the next office did the very
same thin^ a month ago. He had sent a bill of ^150 to a
client and had received a red-hot letter and check for $75
which was plainly marked "In full payment." He, too, got
hot and went out and cashed the check immediately, then
came back to the office and indulged in a charming fit of
temper, and told everybody what he was going to do. I
didn't say a word. Poor man, he had had enough for one
day, but the case of Attorney vs. White will not clutter
up the Superior Court docket for many a day. He'll come to
after he looks up some law on the subject.
Sincerely yours,
Conant v. Evans, 202 Mass. 34;
Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto
Supply Co., 216 Maes. 204.

36
If an Additi onal Sum Was Promised . What Then?
Dear Addie,
Don*t get excited. I don't know why men sometimes
feel that a woman is lacking in ordinary business sense.
The carpenter told you that he would build the sun
porch for $175 according to the specifications and now he
has demanded an extra $50 and in order to get the work done
you have told him you would pay it when you could. And you
are sick!
Addie, he can't collect one penny from you over
the 3175 if you do not choose to give it. He has already
agreed to do that work for one price, and under the circum-
stances your promise to pay the additional sum is without
consideration. Take my word for it that you will not be
bound
.
This particular carpenter has a reputation for
this particular kind of a stunt but for once we are not
going to let him get away with it.
Cheer up.
Devotedly, your lawyer,
Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway, 307 Mass. 184:
Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22;
Feinberg v. Adelman, 260 Mass. 143.
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Contracts of an Infant
Dear iiivelyn,
For a few moments this morning I was really afraid
that you might have gotten yourself into an unfortunate
predicament by trying to be kind to those ne'er-do-wells,
the Grosses, but when you told me that you were but eighteen
my fears vanished, and I really meant what I said when I
told you you could safely forget the entire matter and dis-
miss it from your mind. It was worth years of hard work to
see your expression change from one of complete unhappiness
to one of hope, but I am afraid that as the day has pro-
gressed you have doubted me at times, so I am going to put
down in black and white the legal principles upon which you
may safely rely
—
principles which, by the way, could easily
be presented in every high school throughout our land to the
youth of America and prevent just such suffering as you have
been undergoing for the last six months.
I can understand, Evelyn, why you could not talk
with your grandparents. They are of the old, old school, in-
tolerant of the mistakes of youth, but surely there was some
one who could have prevented these weeks of fear. Plow many
pounds have you lost, and all because you feared that any
moment the radio was turned on you would hear your name
announced as one who didn't pay her bills, as one who owed
$23.75 for a set of dishes, probably by this time used as
weapons of warfare in the Gross household. A firm who
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indulges in that kind of threat deserves to be reported to
some Better Business Bureau, if such a thing exists in the
locality.
In Massachusetts no boy or girl becomes of age
until the day before his twenty-first birthday. Many people
think that girls become of legal age at eighteen, but that
is only for one purpose. A girl after eighteen may marry
without her parents' consent, but her contracts entered into
at that time are no more binding than before. When I say
binding, I simply mean that she cannot be made liable for
them, unless they involve necessaries, until she reaches her
twenty-first birthday, and then only if she ratifies them
—
that is, acknowledges her willingness to stand by them or
in some way benefits under them. To illustrate, if she bought
a car and after she reached twenty-one she either promised
to pay for it or without any promise continued to drive the
car, she would become liable for the price.
Dishes for the Gross family by no stretch of imag-
ination could be considered a necessary for you. Some day,
if you are interested, I'll tell you more about necessaries,
but I haven't time today. Mrs. Gross did a despicable thing
when she came into the post office and asked you to sign
that paper. Why did you believe her when she told you that
you were but witnessing her signature? Did you ever know
any member of that family to tell the truth? What you were
actually signing, Evelyn, was a promise to pay for the dishes
which she was ordering if she did not. Of course the print
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was fine and hard to read, but regardless of that fact,
Evelyn, never sign anything you have not read. I can almost
say, "Don't sign it after you have read it," for frequently
the language is so technical that the average person is not
greatly enlightened after he has waded through it. I criti-
cize very severely any firm that has to put its contract in
print so fine as to discourage people from reading it or who
feel called on to use language so technical that a Philadelphia
lawyer is needed to interpret it. I know at once that their
products will not stand the test. However, as long as we are
ignorant we are excellent fodder for their gristmill.
I am sorry that you have suffered in silence all
this time. I wish I could have found you sooner and detected,
as I did today, that there was something quite wrong with
the world, but I do not think you will hear from them again.
I have sent a letter pointing out bits of law which they
thoroughly know, but which they do not think you know, telling
them your age, asserting your intention under the circum-
stances of avoiding any liability. Technically we speak of
it as disaffirming the contract, but in plain English it
means telling the concern that you know you are not liable
under the law, that you don*t intend to be liable and shall
never pay a penny. You may receive one more letter as a
final gasp of a dying concern. If you do, let me have it
and 1*11 decide whether it is worth another postage stamp.
Sincerely yours,
Tracy v. Brown, 265 Mass. 163.
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The Infant and His Necessaries
Dear Evelyn,
Thanks for the note; I am only too glad to have
been able to help. Inasmuch as almost a month has passed,
I doubt if you ever hear from the firm again and that chapter
is probably closed.
You say you are curious to know what "necessaries"
are. "/ell, they are the things we really have to have to
continue to live—food, clothing, shelter, and for their fair
value even the infant may be held personally liable if the
store keeper sold them to him really expecting him to pay
and there was no one else who was ready and willing to pur-
chase the article for the minor. The term is more or less
elastic, because what would be a necessary for one would not
have to be a necessary for another—one f s station in life
determines to a certain extent. There is an old English
case where a diamond ring was considered a necessary for an
Oxford student whose father was a member of Parliament, but
last week I talked with a jeweller in Middleboro and he was
disgusted enough because he had sold an engagement ring to
a minor who, by the way, had lied about his age. The minor
had given the ring to the girl, and she had disappeared and
with her the ring! What could Mr. Hunt do? Nothing, as far
as I can see. That diamond was not a necessary; the boy was
a minor even though he was a member of the Ananias Club, and
he could avoid his contract and evidently intended to do so.
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If he had had the ring he could have been forced to return
it for the law's protection of the minor does not permit
him to both repudiate and keep the goods. That would go too
far—farther than is necessary for his protection, but if he
has not the ring he still can disaffirm, and he was doing it
all right.
I always surprise people when I tell them that
money is not a necessary. They immediately mentally commit
me to Danvers, but truly it is not. Robinson Crusoe on his
lonely island would have starved to death will all the gold
of the world. If I am ever to recover money given to a minor,
I must see that it is definitely expended for a necessary. I
loaned a girl last winter money for her school tuition, but
I confess I was careful to pay the tuition myself, rather than
give the girl the money for it. That was foolish, because
I know the particular girl will pay, but I suppose I was
merely unconsciously following my legal training. Education
may be a necessary, you see.
The reason why the law requires a minor to meet
at least to a fair amount the bills for necessaries, is a
logical one. If he could not validly contract for these
things it is conceivable that he might actually suffer for
the needs of daily living, because no person might care to
take a chance on his moral integrity where there was no legal
responsibility.
Do you think the law is too kind to its youth? I
don't think so, Evelyn. Take your case, for example, a real
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injustice would have been worked out, iivelyn, if you had
not been able to side step responsibility. On the other
hand, there is no good thing which is not at times put to
a bad use. The trouble is not with the law, but in the char-
acter of people. Many years ago I went to a certain near-by
high school to teach and was surprised to learn that the
law course had been dropped the year before. Finally the
principal told me why. The instructor had been a "Smart
Aleck" type of person who figured on "getting by" in life.
Note that such people rarely "get far." He had taught his
students some of the things I have told you, but he inspired
them with the desire to "put over" things, and they bettered
his teachings until the store keepers in the city rose up
in arms. As a result, the law course was discontinued. I
resent such teaching. Law is one of the finest subjects that
any person can study; its principles work out substantial
justice and equity when used by those possessing character
and ethical standards, but in the hands of crooks, it becomes
an undesirable weapon. Shall we criticize the law or the
people who use it to obtain their selfish ends? Until people
realize the need of both character and knowledge we are in
a bad way.
Devotedly yours,
Moskow v. Marshall, 271 Mass. 302;
Pierce Co. v. Wallace, 251 Mass. 383;
Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Mete. 559.
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Married Women and Their Contracts
Dear Mrs . Durant
,
The Workman's Compensation Act provides for compen-
sation for employees under contracts of hire whose injuries
arise out of and in the course of their employment. You ask
me about your young friend who worked in her husband's shoe
store for eighteen dollars a week and was injured by falling
from the ladder while getting shoes.
I am sorry, but she cannot recover from the Insur-
ance Company in which he insured his employees. To be an
employee, a contract is necessary and in our state a wife
cannot contract with her husband. Technically, therefore,
she cannot be an employee and so is without redress.
Some states permit contracts between husbands and
wives, but not ours.
She loans him money and he gives her a promissory
note and it is no good.
They agree to live apart and she promises not to
pledge his credit to an amount greater than $35 a week. The
promise is worthless.
Supposedly the man and wife are partners. He gives
a firm note, and she has all the money, but she can't be sued
on the note because a partnership is a contract and she can-
not be a partner with her husband.
Today, with all people except her husband, she can
contract freely but there was a time when a married woman
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could not contract at all except for her personal services
and then he could collect her wages.
Your friend had better work for some one else
beside her husband.
Sincerely yours,
Humphrey^ Case, 227 Mass. 166;
Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen 127;
Barbour v. Sampson, 266 Mass. 160;
Jordan Marsh v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245.

45
That Sunday Contract
Dear John,
Yes, I can tell you the law, and I can also tell
you another law known as a moral law.
I sav/ you two people engaged in earnest conversa-
tion after church Sunday and I also saw you go flying past
the house in the blue roadster later in the day so I sur-
mised that you people had been doing a little business on
Sunday.
So he agreed to sell you the car for #65 and told
you that the tires and battery were new. He was good enough
to give it to you then and there so you could take Myrtle to
ride that afternoon and you agreed to pay him on Tuesday.
Now you have discovered that the tires are poor and the bat-
tery of little worth, and you have been told that inasmuch
as it was a Sunday contract that you don't have to pay for
the car. What can I tell you?
Plenty, dear Sir! Your contract was made on
Sunday, it is no good. If you wanted to sue him because the
tires are poor and the battery punk, you couldn't. Nor can
he sue you for the price for our courts are not here to aid
wrongdoers. If he hadn't delivered the car to you until
Monday, he could have sued you for the fair value, and made
you liable on an implied contract for the fair value because
he could have ignored everything done on Sunday. But when
he was good enough to deliver the car to you on Sunday, he
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lost all rights. He cannot sue you in either contract, or
tort, or replevin.
How joyful do you feel? Don't take advantage of
your position, John. If he lied about tires and battery
have it out with him and then pay him a fair price for the
roadster. Legally you are not bound, morally you are, and
this is one of the things which must be left to that interior
forum known as man's conscience.
I know you will do the square thing.
Depending on you,
Mann v. United Motor Co., 226 Mass. 495;
Ladd v. Rogers, 11 Allen 209;
Bradley v. Rea, 14 Allen 20.
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Do You Bet ? Take Heed
Dear Gertrude,
Recently the death of Mr. Fraser appeared in the
paper. Do you recall the Fraser girls who were in our class
in High School? Their father was a professional gambler and
I have thought of them so often since I have been in the
field of law.
There is a statute on our books which enables an
individual who loses a bet to recover the amount from the
winner in an action of contract anytime within three months.
Should the loser fail to take advantage of the statute any
other person could recover three times the amount in an ac-
tion of tort after the expiration of the three months* pe-
riod.
Comparatively few cases have arisen under the
statute. I presume there is honor among gamblers and their
families, but I have thought frequently of the girls since
I have known of the law and wondered about their lives pnd
home conditions. V/ill they grieve over his death or feel
a sense of relief?
More anon,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 137, s. 1, 2;
Cole v. Groves, 134 Mass. 471;
Reed v. Stewart, 129 Mass. 407;
Kemp v. Hammond Hotel, 226 Mass. 409.
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With the Money Lenders .
Dear Miss Fiske:
I was exceedingly interested when you asked me to
speak to the Boston Teachers, particularly along the line of
"Money Borrowing". I judge that you, like myself and other
professional people, have had the experience of receiving
every so often a most attractive piece of mail, in fact one
which would suggest even a wedding announcement before it is
opened. However, a perusal of its contents always reveals
grave solicitation on the part of some concern as to whether
or not we will be able to finance our summer vacation or to
purchase the particular luxury which we much desire, and the
offer to put into our hands the wherewithal under conditions
and rates so attractive as to be alluring to the individual
who has little knowledge along this line, is frequently most
misleading.
Many years ago when I came out of Normal School one
of the students found a position in a nearby city, and we all
rejoiced that so good an opening had apparently come to her
for we knew that she had had many financial problems. It was
not more than a year later that I learned that she had killed
herself and I could not understand what had led her to that
desperate step until I found that she had gotten into the
clutches of money loaning sharks to the point that she was
borrowing money to pay interest on interest due and the burden
had just become too great.
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People do not realize in Massachusetts that these
money loaning companies who loan small suras can legally charge
a rate that is equal to 36$ a year. Their advertising materi-
al is couched in very attractive terms and the nominal 3$ that
they mention does not carry the thought to the average person
that that means 3$ a month, which sum multiplied by twelve
means 36$ a year
.
If only teachers and other professional people who
are the chief victims of these concerns could be made to un-
derstand that it would be far better to go without the desired
luxury or to borrow from some desirable business friend, I
think we could do much to lessen the present evil.
Thank you for the invitation to speak before the
Boston Teachers. I shall be very glad to stress this point
along with others that may be of value.
Cordially yours,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Oh. 140, s. 90, 96, 103
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Parties Who May Sue And b_e_ Sjiejl
Dear Ada,
Whom do you suppose I recently met? Louise Hunt
and her young son. He is a cunning little youngster but when
she told me that his name was Benjamin, I must have looked
surprised. She told me that an old friend of her husband,
Benjamin Schweitzer by name, had promised to give the baby
.$2000 for a college education if the child was named for him.
Very interesting, but pathetic for the youngster I thought.
Possibly I dislike the name more than I should. Do you re-
member Benjamin Simonds who used to torment us so when we
were kids? Probably my antipathy for the name dates back
many years.
I asked Louise if the money had been paid over and
she hesitated and said they were rather worried, and they
were wondering if small Benjamin could sue for the money if
the need arose.
Massachusetts follows the old English idea very
strictly that only those persons may sue who are contracting
parties. Many states allow a person for whose benefit a
contract is made to sue upon it, but we do not. There was
the case of the woman whose husband couldn't go by the corner
saloon on pay nights and finally the employer agreed with
the man that he would hold back a part of his wages each
week for his wife. When the employer didn't pay over the
promised sums, she was not able to recover regardless of the

fact that the contract was made for her benefit.
Even in this state however, we have recognized a
few exceptions to the general rule and among the number is
the right of a child to sue on a contract made for his bene
fit by a near relative. Small Benjamin may, by his father
as his next friend, be a party plaintiff in a case against
Benjamin Schweitzer. He certainly is entitled to 12000 if
he must bear that name through life.
Are you people still enjoying these legal letters
or are you just being polite?
Lovingly yours,
Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317;
Gardner v. Dennison, 217 Mass. 492.
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Liable or Not Liable?
Dear Frances:
Do you recall the teacher who came to the beach
last summer that I might prepare him for the Boston Examina-
tions in Law? Frankly I feel that I must be an exceedingly
poor teacher for I failed to put across the simplest of
points, namely, that if one enters into a contract one is
going to be liable if he breaches it.
Early in October he conceived the idea that he
needed a course in physical training and so he searched out
an organization which in consideration of three hundred
dollars paid over a period of six months, would give him the
use of the gymnasium two afternoons a week during the winter,
certain massage treatments, and the advice of an attending
physician.
He was so enthusiastic that he paid one hundred
dollars on the spot and agreed to pay the balance on the
fifteenth of December. He expected in the course of a few
weeks to be made over physically. However, the demands of
daily teaching, the home needs and responsibilities caused
him to postpone enjoying the advantages of membership and he
has never yet attended a single class. He didn't pay the
two hundred dollars due in December and for some time he has
received unpleasant letters from a collection agency which
insists that he owes two hundred dollars plus interest and
he, poor man, was sure that I could not only save him from
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further expense, but that I could also get back the one
hundred dollars with which he so freely parted. Now I am
wondering if I ever did teach any law.
I fear I told him rather brutally that he was
stuck and that in all probability they would collect the
additional two hundred dollars and the interest and he has
decided that there is no justice. I have tried but I can-
not make him see that he entered into a binding contract,
that the organization is ready and willing to fulfill its
promises and that if he has not chosen to partake of the
benefits that await him that that is not their responsibil-
ity. He has talked with the doctor who is quite willing,
note the generosity, to extend his membership but not will-
ing, to cancel his liability. I shouldn't think he would
be. Ke knows Mr. X has money. He naively remarked that he
shouldn't think that any doctor would be so small as to
insist on holding him, and I told him that any doctor who
was unable to make a living out of a legitimate practice
and who was forced to run such an establishment would know
quite thoroughly his legal rights and that possibly this was
a bit of law which he would learn in the school of exper-
ience. He simply looked grieved and thinks of me as most
unsympathetic. I fear I am just that!
Disgustedly yours,
Homer v. Shaw, 177 Mass, 1;
Turell v. Anderson, 244 Mass. 200.
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When A Contract is Performed but The Contract is Not
Dear Mother,
Father has really nothing to worry about. The sit-
uation is unpleasant and litigation is a thing to be avoided,
but there are times when it is unnecessary to be melted down
for the tallow trade as George Eliot expressed the idea.
In Massachusetts if one does not perform the exact
terms of the contract, he is not entitled to the contract
price but if he has acted in good faith, he has a remedy.
'Jfhen Father substituted maple flooring for oak in the Burnett
house, he was not deliberately violating the terms of the
contract. The Lumber Company will testify that they had none
and could get none at that particular time and time was of
the essence.
When an individual acts in good faith, and Father
did, he is entitled to the fair value of his services, and
as long as he does not sue on the express contract that he
did not perform but sues on an implied one, all is well.
Don't let him worry over this. Personally, I think Burnett
is talking loudly for effect and I don't believe he will
ever let the case go to trial.
Try to think of it as one of life's minor colli-
sions. After all, they leave us still unscathed.
This is written hastily, but with much love,
Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181;
Bowen v. Kiuball, 203 Mass. 364.
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The Law Knows Not the Word Impossible
Dear Frances,
Can you imagine a woman eighty-three, who has had
little of the world's goods, passing on with these words,
"It has been a great show." They were uttered with much
reverence and I shall never forget them. Wouldn't we like
to be able to feel and say the same thing when all is over?
I don't believe Olive Ball ever acknowledged the
existence of the word "can't." She was ever forcing the
iron to swim, ever putting over stunts which others felt
impossible. She would put iron into the souls of those about
her.
Why did I think of her tonight? All day I have
been facing people who believed things impossible and with
the word impossible sought a legal excuse, but the lav; knows
not the word.
Mr. A, a contractor, had the house all but com-
pleted and it was destroyed by fire. Is he excused? No.
The completion is not impossible; he must stand the expense
of rebuilding.
Mr. B hired a house and agreed to deliver it in
good condition at the expiration of the lease. It was struck
by lightning and destroyed. Is he excused? No. He still
may return it in good condition.
Mr. C took a yacht for the summer and contracted
to return it in the condition in which he received it,
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reasonable wear and tear excepted. It was destroyed by a
typhoon in southern waters. Is he excused? No. If he re-
turns not the boat, he must return the money equivalent.
Mr. D had a safe as security which he was to re-
turn upon the payment of the debt. Thieves broke in and
stole it. The debt has been paid. Is he excused? No.
Money damage must make the debtor whole.
And so the story goes. Mr. E was to deliver lum-
ber from Finland. The World 7/ar make it impossible. Was he
excused? Not from paying damages for breach of contract.
The law knows not the word impossible. Olive Ball
knew no such word in her life, and I'd like to have it said
of me some day.
In thoughtful mood,
Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 275;
Scofield v. Barowsky, 249 Mass. 1;
Magnan v. Fuller, 222 Mass. 530.

CONTRACT SUMMARY
A contract is an agreement resulting in an obligation enforceable
by law. It may be express , when the parties actually state the terms
to each other; implied , when without specifying all the terms, they
indicate by their conduct a common intention to contract.
A Formation of Contracts
I Agreement . - usually reached by an offer on one side and an
acceptance on the other.
1. The offer may consist of a promise or an act; it must be
definite
•
2. The acceptance may be by a promise, or an act; but the ac-
ceptance must be in the form contemplated by the offeror.
3. The offer must be communicated either by words or conduct.
4. The acceptance ordinarily should be communicated.
5. Care must be taken to be sure that the communication con-
stitutes an offer, that it is not a mere invitation to
deal, or statement of intention.
6. Acceptance by mail or telegram dates from the time of mail-
ing or telegraphing if it is a proper acceptance.
7. The acceptance should be absolute, unconditional, identical
with the terms of the offer, in the manner specified,
within the time specified, and not a counter offer.
8. An offer may be revoked at any time before it has been ac-
cepted.
9. The revocation of an offer takes effect when it is received.
10. Death revokes an offer without communication of the fact of
death to the offeree.
11. Death does not revoke a contract except for personal serv-
ices.
12. An offer under seal cannot be revoked.
13. An offer may be made to an individual, to a group of indi-
viduals, or to the public, but no contract results until
it is accepted by a definite individual with knowledge
of the offer. It must be revoked in as public a manner
as it is made •
14. An offer lapses without specific notice of revocation when
the time specified has passed, or, if no time is spec-
ified, within a reasonable time.
II Proper Form , - certain contracts, though possessing the other ele-
ments necessary to make a valid contract, must be in a particular
form to be enforceable
•
1. Contracts under seal , - some contracts derive their validity
from the fact that they are under seal, and not from the
fact of agreement or obligation,
a. The following should be under seal:
(1) Conveyances of land, - deeds, mortgages, leases.
(2) Bonds
(3) Covenants
(4) Releases

b. Facts concerning sealed instruments
:
(1) Delivery is necessary.
(2) Statements set forth in such instruments are con-
clusive against the parties making them.
(3) A sealed contract merges all prior simple con-
tracts, whether written or oral.
(4) The right of bringing suit is barred after twen-
ty years.
(5) Ordinarily no consideration for an agreement
under seal is necessary.
2. Contracts in writing because of the Statute of Frauds . - a
statute passed in 1677, during the reign of Charles II to
prevent fraud and perjury, - reenacted in nearly all
states in this country,
a. Fourth Section ;- No action shall be brought upon an
oral contract:
(1) To charge an administrator or executor upon
a special promise to pay out of his own
estate •
(2) To charge a person to answer for the debt,
default or misdoings of another.
(3) To charge a person upon an agreement made
upon consideration of marriage.
(4) To charge a person upon a contract for the
sale of lands or any interest in or con-
cerning them.
(5) To charge a person upon an agreement that is
not to be performed within one year.
(6) To charge a person upon a promise to pay a
debt discharged by bankruptcy or barred by
the statute of limitations. G.L. c. 259,
s.3j G.L. c. 259, s.13.
(7) To charge a person upon a promise to make a
will. May 17, 1888. G. L. c. 259, s.5.
(8) To charge a person upon representations of
credit.
b. Seventeenth Section
:
-
(l) This section may be satisfied in any one of
three ways, - acceptance and receipt, earn-
est or part payment, written memorandum.
c. The Vfriting which will satisfy either section of the
Statute
.
(1) The promise, contract, or agreement or some mem-
orandum of it must be in writing.
(a) Signed by the party to be charged or his
agent; and must indicate at least the
other party.
(b) It must express the substance of the con-
tract with reasonable certainty.
(c) It need not be delivered or intended as a
• memorandum and it may be made any time
prior to suit.
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III Consideration . - a change of legal status.
1. Any valuable consideration will support a contract
regardless of the relative value of the goods or
services exchanged except:
a. In case of an exchange of money values when
inadequacy of consideration is a defense, or
b. In Equity where specific performance will not
be granted if the consideration is unjust or
inadequate •
2* Consideration may consist of a promise, an act, or
an agreement to forbear from doing any act which
one can legally do.
a. In Massachusetts an agreement to forbear suit
must always be proven.
3. Doing what one is bound to do is as a rule no con-
sideration.
a. Such a promise often takes the form of part
performance of an obligation in considera-
tion of a release of the remainder, - not
good unless:
(1) the release is under seal, or
(2) it represents a compromise of an un-
liquidated claim, or
(3) something additional to the original
obligation is done or promised.
b. Similar questions arise in promises for ad-
ditional compensation for work already con-
tracted to be done.
Generally
(1) one furnishes no consideration when he
agrees to do for a larger sum what he
has already agreed to do for a smaller
sum.
(2) According to the N. Y. rule one has the
right either to perform or to respond
in damages, and if one gives up his
right to respond in damages he thereby
furnishes consideration for the addi-
tional amount.
(3) Massachusetts holds to the first rule
on the theory that one must perform
and has no right to respond in dam-
ages. However, there is an attempt
to find in this state a substitution
of a new contract for the old.
4. Consideration must be definite, though it may be con-
ditional .
a« The test is whether the acceptance imposes
any obligation on the acceptor.
5« Consideration must be present or future, not past.
6. In Massachusetts only those who are parties to the
consideration may sue according to the general rule
.

TV Capacity of parties.
1, Contracts of infants are either valid, or voidable
a. Valid contracts
vl) An infant is liable for the fair value
of his necessaries.
(a) Circumstances determine what shall
be necessaries, but necessaries
must concern the infant's person
and not his estate.
(b) Money itself is not a necessary
unless expended under the direc-
tion of the lender for neces-
sarie s
.
b. Voidable contracts
(1) The infant has the right to ratify or
disaffirm his voidable contracts.
(a) Ratification to be binding should
be made at maturity. Knowledge
that the infant could avoid is
not essential to make ratifica-
tion good.
(b) Mere acknowledgment of a debt does
not constitute ratification, but
a promise to pay may be either
written or oral, in this state.
(c) Lapse of time after coming of age
coupled with enjoyment of the
proceeds of the contract, is
sufficient to warrant an infer-
ence of ratification.
(d) Silence after coming of age will
constitute ratification in sit-
uations involving continuous
rights and duties.
(2) Both executory and executed contracts
may be disaffirmed, but executed con-
tracts as to real estate can be
avoided only when the minor becomes
of age
.
(a) In Massachusetts if the infant
still has the consideration he
must return it, but if he no
longer has it the other party is
without a remedy.
2. Contracts of insane persons stand on about the
same plane as contracts of an infant.
a. An insane person is liable for necessaries,
and the term is extended to include nec-
essaries for his estate as well as his
person.
b. The contracts of an insane person may be
avoided by himself if he becomes sane, by
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his guardian, or by his heirs and represen-
tatives after his death.
c. Knowledge of insanity by the other contracting
party is immaterial in this state.
d. If there has been an adjudication of insanity
all contracts are void.
3. At common law the contract of a married woman , ex-
cept for personal services, was absolutely void,
and not merely voidable, even for necessaries.
Various statutes define her position today,
a. She may freely contract with all except her
husband. G. L. c. 209, s.2.
b # She is jointly liable with her husband for
necessaries furnished to herself or family
with her knowledge up to $100 in each case
if she has property to the amount of £2,000
or more. G. L. c. 209, s.7.
c. Gifts of personal property and conveyances of
real estate between husband and wife shall
be valid to the same extent as if they were
sole except that no such conveyances of
real estate shall have any effect until re-
corded. G. L. c. 209, s.3.
d. If she is engaged in business she should file
a married woman's business certificate in
the city clerk's office, otherwise her hus-
band will be liable for her business debts
and her personal property used in the busi-
ness will be subject to his debts. G. L.
c. 209, s.3.
V Reality of Consent, - requires a real meeting of the minds
of the parties.
1. Mistake , - covers only such mistakes as are made
without misrepresentation or fraud.
a. Mistake on the part of one party will not or-
dinarily avoid a contract; if the minds have
really met it is not necessary that either
should get what he thinks he is getting.
b. Mistakes which will justify recission.
(1) A mistake as to the nature of the trans-
action.
(2) A mistake as to the identity of the per-
son with whom the contract is made when
such identity is material.
(3) A mistake as to the subject matter of
the contract if it be a mistake as to
the existence or identity of the sub-
ject matter, or a mistake as to the
nature of a promise, which mistake is
known to the other party,
(a) A mistake as to the value of the
subject matter does not make the
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contract voidable.
(4) A mistake of law does not generally jus-
tify annulment, but a mistake as to the
law of a foreign state is considered as
a mistake of fact rather than one of
law.
2. Misrepresentation
a. An innocent misrepresentation will not ordina-
rily serve as a basis for avoidance unless
the misrepresentation is itself incorporated
as a condition of the contract,
b. Whenever there is a special relationship of
confidence between the parties, as between
guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary,
principal and agent, and whenever one party
expressly or by necessary circumstances re-
lies upon another for accurate statements,
as in case of insurance, an innocent mis-
representation will justify the other party
in repudiating the contract even at law.
3. Fraud . - always justifies the repudiation of a con-
tract. The following elements must be proved:
a. A misrepresentation of a material existing
fact, which includes concealment when there
is a duty of disclosure;
b» Made with a knowledge of its falsity, or with
reckless disregard of truth or falsity, or
of the person's own knowledge, when in fact
he had no such knowledge;
c. With the intent that the representation shall
be acted upon by the other party;
d. And it was acted upon by such party to his
damage •
4. Duress and 5. Undue influence operate to make im-
possible a real consent to the contract.
a. Duress is actual violence or imprisonment or
threatened violence or imprisonment by which
a person is forced to enter into a contract
against his will. It must be inflicted on
the contracting party or on a near relative.
(1) Even though obtained under duress a
creditor cannot be deprived of a set-
tlement of a genuine claim. The debtor
has done no more than he was legally
bound to do.
b. Undue influence is a species of fraud, an
abuse of confidence by one in trust rela-
tionship or in authority, by taking advan-
tage of another's weakness of mind. It
must amount to a dominion over the will of
the person so influenced so as to destroy
his free agency.
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VI Le gality of Subject Matter, - an agreement does not re-
sult in a valid contract if its object is illegal.
1* Illegal contracts divide into four general classes:
a. Contracts violating the rights of the state
(1) A contract made in violation of a stat-
ute which prohibits the doing of an act
and imposes a penalty.
(2) A contract made between persons of war-
ring countries.
(a) If made prior to war, - suspended.
(b) If made during war, - void.
(3) A contract involving the violation of
the laws of another state or nation.
b. Contracts violating the rights of the public.
(1) A contract made and completed on Sunday.
(a) If goods in pursuance of a Sunday
contract are delivered on a week
day there can be recovery on the
basis of an implied contract, but
not on the basis of the express
contract made on Sunday, or the
seller may replevy the goods.
(2) Wagering contracts. See G. L. c. 137,
s.l
.
(3) Contracts tending to injure public ser-
vice in election or appointment of of-
ficials.
(4) Assignment of salaries not yet earned
by public officials.
(5) Agreements tending to obstruct justice.
(a) Stifling prosecution.
(b) Ousting courts of justice; this
results when legal liability is
to be determined solely by a
board of referees.
(c) Maintenance and champerty.
(6) Contracts in restraint of trade.
(a) Upheld if reasonable even if un-
limited in time and space.
c. Contracts violating the rights of the indi-
vidual.
(1) Involving a breach of trust.
(2) Involving fraud of creditors
(a) Any agreement whereby one credi-
tor is to receive more than
other creditors is unenforceable.
(b) In Massachusetts such agreement
renders the whole composition
void and other creditors can re-
cover their entire claim.
(3) Publication of libels.
d. Contracts violating public sentiment.
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(1) Agreements involving i/nmorality
(2) Interference with marriage.
(a) Restrictions which apply to second
marriages are valid
(b) Marriage brokerage contracts are
illegal.
B Operation of Contracts.
I Conflict of Laws.
1. The law of the place where the contract is made, generally
governs its validity and interpretation. To the rule
there are exceptions:
a. The law of the place where the land is located,
governs the validity of a contract relating to
real estate.
b. The law of the place of performance, governs the
validity of a contract which is made in one juris-
diction but to be performed in another.
II Parties to contracts
1. Ordinarily a contract imposes neither liability nor confers
rights upon persons who are not parties to it. Certain
exceptions may be noted.
(a) Where money or goods are wrongfully in the hands of
another the law will impose a quasi contractual
liability for the benefit of the true owner.
(b) In Massachusetts a beneficiary under a trust agree-
ment may enforce the trust, hence has rights con-
ferred upon him.
(1) By statute a beneficiary on a life insurance
policy may sue on the policy in his own name.
G. L. c. 173, s. 125
(c) A person not originally a party to a contract may
sue upon it if it has been assigned to him by act
of one of the parties or by opera bion of law.
(1) Credits in money or goods may be universally
assigned, but liability upon a contract can
not be assigned unless,
(a) the other party assents,
(b) the contract involves work requiring no
personal skill.
(2) Assignment should be in writing; no special
form is necessary.
(3) In case of conflict between successive as-
signees the first assignee in Massachusetts
is entitled to the property. See G. L.
c. 154, s. 2-5
(4) Assignees take subject to equities against
their assignors.
Ill Joint and several contracts.
1. Joint contracts
a. All should be sued though each is liable for the
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full amount,
b« If one joint, or joint and several promisor is re-
leased, the effect is to release all.
c. When joint parties are promisees they are entitled
to performance jointly, and should sue jointly.
d. If one joint debtor pays the entire debt, he may
enforce contribution from the others.
2. Several contracts.
a. The parties cannot sue or be sued jointly
(1) By statute "all or any of the persons sever-
ally liable upon written contracts may be
joined in one action." G. L. c. 231, s. 4
3. Joint and several contracts
a. Suit may be brought by or against all jointly, or
by or against each severally; less then all can
not sue or be sued jointly in joint and several
contracts except in case of the death of one.
V Discharge of Contracts
1. By agreement
a. Waiver, recission, cancellation.
b. Substituted contract; change of terms or parties,
- a novation.
c. Condition subsequent, where the contract contains
in itself express or implied provisions for its
determination, such a discharge may take place:
(1) By reason of the nonfulfillment of a speci-
fied term of the contract;
(2) By the occurrence of a particular event; or
(3) By the exercise of an option.
2. By performance
a - Ry performance of the conditions.
(1) At common law a strict performance of the
terms of the contract was required and in
Massachusetts the strict rule is applied
as to conditions precedent.
(2) Today if a party who has performed +he con-
tract has deviated slightly, but notwilfully,
he is entitled in Massachusetts to recover
the value of the benefit which he has con-
ferred upon the defendant by reason of his
work, labor and materials, i. e., upon a
quantum meruit,
b. By payment
(1) A negotiable instrument is held to be a com-
plete discharge unless a contrary intent
appears.
(2) Payment on account must be applied as the
debtor directs.
(3) Otherwise it may be applied to the earliest
legal debt by the creditor, or to the ear-
liest legtl outstanding debt by the court.
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(1) If money is tendered which is not accepted
the party tendering must keep the tender
good; such tender prevents the running of in-
terest and costs*
(2) If service is tendered and refused the promi-
sor is discharged from the obligation of his
contract*
5* By breach of the obligation which the contract imposes.
a* A breach always gives to the injured party a right
of action for damages, and it often, but not al-
ways discharges the contract*
b. Renunciation operates to discharge a contract if the
other party so elects, but because of the rule of
anticipatory breach, there is no recovery in this
state before the time of performance
•
c* In all states, when a breach occurs during the time
when a party is entitled to performance, he may
sue for future as well as past damages.
d* "Whenever the breach is wilful or goes to the es-
sence of the contract the other party is justi-
fied in considering the contract discharged*
4* By impossibility of performance.
a* Impossibility of performance arising from subse-
quent events not contemplated by the parties at
the time of the making of the contract will not
ordinarily relieve the party from his obligation.
b. There are three exceptions to the general rule:
(1) Impossibility created by law unless the par-
ties could reasonably have been supposed to
have contemplated such action of the courts
or legislature at the time they entered
into the contract*
(2) Where the continued existence of the speci-
fic thing is essential*
(3) A contract which has for its object the ren-
dering of personal services is discharged
by the death or encapacitating illness of
the promisor.

II In the realm of Agency ,- when we would act through
another
.
1. The law tersely stated.
Those who through another, as their agent, do
an act,
Are deemed to be the ones who in reality contract,
The agent's hut the instrument by whom the act
is done
The principal employs him, thus the act is his
alone
.
Latin Maxims
Poster
Quid facit per alium facit per se. He who
does a thing by another's agency does it
himself.
Coke
Qui sentire commodum sentire debet et onus
If you authorize your agent to sell in your name,
Your goods, and if the buyer, bona fide, has a
claim
Against the agent, you are liable, for it is plain
That "he who reaps the benefit the burden should
sustain"
.
Latin Maxims
Foster
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Who May Be Principals and. Who May Be Agents
Dear Mr. Cronin,
In the olden days they talked about masters and
servants, but we, in this land, don't care to be servants,
and prefer to consider ourselves as agents for others.
Likewise we object to calling any one master, and so we des-
ignate our superior as a principal, but in many situations
there is little difference between the law of Principal and
Agent and the law of Master and Servant.
There are no special requirements for an agent, no
more than there are for a principal; he may be of either
sex, and of any age. However, even though you feel that
Charles Grant, your nineteen-year old clerk, has wilfully
breached his agreement with you by leaving your employ and
going to work for your competitor, you are liable to him for
the fair value of his services to date. You are right in
feeling that had one of the older men done the same trick he
would not be entitled to back pay. When an adult wilfully
breaches his contract the other party can consider himself
as without further liability, but inasmuch as an infant can
avoid with impunity any contract, he can avoid without lia-
bility his contract of agency and recover the fair value of
his services. Moral—don't hire a minor'.
Sincerely,
Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457
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The Married Woman the Agent of Her Husband
Dear Weldon,
The liability of a husband to support his wife
continues even though she no longer is living under his roof
if she has really left for a justifiable cause, and I tell
you very frankly I think Ann has had cause. Of course,
there is always fault on both sides, and your case is no
exception to the general rule but you have ever been moody,
taciturn and disagreeable. For the past ten years, Weldon,
I have never been a willing guest at your dinner table for
I have not enjoyed the hateful, spiteful, sarcastic remarks
you ever felt called upon to hurl in her direction, and
although Ann has been silly and frivolous and all that, I
have seen her cringe under your tongue lashing in a way I
don't care to observe. There have been plenty of times that
I have thought a wholesome spanking would do you good. I
am sorry, Weldon, I am fond of you and ever have been since
you were a pupil in my first school back in the dark ages,
but I cannot but feel that you have made a mess of things.
So Ann told you when she left that she wouldn f t
run up bills exceeding twenty-five dollars a week. Evidently,
she has been better advised and the Chandler bill and the
other store bills for clothing for herself and Weldon
Junior, and household supplies would not seem excessive for
people in your station of life. A wife may be an agent of
her husband because he expressly authorizes her to act for
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him, or she may be his agent impliedly when she buys things
for the household or she is his agent through need when he
fails to furnish her with the things necessary for life, the
food, the shelter, the clothing suitable to her position in
the community.
We often say that the act of the agent is the act
of the principal, meaning simply, that he will be bound by
it. That is your situation, Ann is your agent, and within
reason, her acts will still obligate you. No agreement that
you people make together will bind because as your wife she
cannot contract with you. Therefore the seeming contract
into which she has entered is worthless.
You ask if it will do any good to publish a notice
in the newspaper— "So and so, my wife, having without just
cause left my bed and board, etc." Not much, Weldon. You
would still be liable for the things which are necessary to
her in her station of life. It would seem to me to be more
of a stooping than you with your sensitive nature would care
to indulge in.
I doubt if you people have grounds for a divorce.
She might apply for separate support, that she was living apart
for justifiable cause and under that decree your financial
problems would be adjusted. There is another way if you want
to keep out of the courts. You two can enter into a separa-
tion agreement with a third person as trustee and under the
terms of such agreement she would be bound as well as yourself.
It would enable you both to know where you stand and if you
agrUifct b 1
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people are determined to destroy the home, to allow the child
to suffer, and each go your selfish way this is a solution to
your problem.
Forgive me. I have probably forgotten that you are
a business man of prominence in the community, and am seeing
you only as a wilful, spoiled boy, but, Weldon, you deserve
all that I have written and more.
With pity,
Groce v. First National Stores, 268 Mass. 310;
Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418;
Conant v. Burnharn, 133 Mass. 503.
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The Meaning of Estoppel
Dear Leon,
Do you recall the young upstart, Collins, that
used to work in the Collins Dry-Goods Store on Warren Street?
He has been there all these years, and I have always liked
him about as well as we did in other days but the old man
has relied more and more upon the younger man.
In fact, people have wondered if he really were
not in the firm for he has taken unto himself more and more
the sense of proprietorship, apparently with the old man's
knowledge and approval. However, the community now knows
the situation.
Some months ago a salesman, new to the territory,
went into the store, inquired for Mr. Collins, and was told
by the man behind the counter that he was Mr. Collins.
Thereupon the salesman displayed his wares; Mr. Collins, the
clerk, ordered lavishly. The goods arrived, but the old man
was stubborn. He refused to foot the bill on the ground that
he had never ordered the goods and that the clerk had no
authority. The company took it to court and they won their
case last week on the ground that Mr. Collins, the proprietor,
was estopped to deny that the younger man was not his partner
for whose acts he would be responsible.
Estoppel is a bar raised by law to prevent a man
from taking an inconsistent position. Think it over. Was
the court decision correct?
Hastily yours,
Bartlett v. Raymond, 139 Mass. 275;
Mentzer v. N. E. Tel., 278 Mass. 478.
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Apt Signing to Avoid Liability
Dear Mr. Dennett,
Will you forgive me if I offer advice before any is
requested?
I was home over the week-end and while in the store
Saturday night, I read the notice offering the $1000 reward
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the
individuals who broke into the Post Office several weeks ago.
That notice is signed
Fred Dennett )
Samuel Olson ) Selectmen of the
John Bradford) Town of P
May I suggest that you take it down and change it
somewhat?
1*11 tell you a secret. The signing on that paper
binds you people personally and the money could be collected
from you rather than from the town.
Whenever the word, "Agent," or "Agent of" appears
after the name, the word or words are considered merely
descriptive and the individual personally liable. One can
accomplish very unexpected results by his method of signing
instruments.
Let your notice read, "Town of P
,
by its
selectmen, Fred Dennett, Samuel Olson, John Bradford" and all
will be well.
I hope you don't mind the hint.
Legally yours,
Haverhill Ins. Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen 130;
Jump v. Sparling, 218 Mass. 324.
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Reciprocal Duties of Principal and Agent
Dear Jack,
So you have gone to work for Thompson, and you are
to sell his product throughout the Maine territory. Good
luck to you, but don't forget that you have taken on new
rights and new responsibilities.
You have a right to expect compensation, of course,
and also a right to be reimbursed for expenditures that you
reasonably incur in carrying out his work. Note the word
"reasonably." Sometimes, agents expect to recover back sums
spent because of their own wrongdoing, and that is impossible.
You owe to old man Thompson intense loyalty, com-
plete devotion to his products, the duty of obeying instruc-
tions whether you like them or not, the duty of serving him
wholeheartedly.
One cannot serve two masters in the field of busi-
ness any more than he can in the field of religion. Don't
use any money which belongs to him, never mix the collections
with your own funds, and don't get others to do the work
assigned to you.
Many men on the road cannot stand the test; they are
people who need constant supervision, who know not how to use
freedom. The result is that they lose their grip and go to
pieces. Don't follow the crowd unless the road is one of
which you approve.
Thompson will be bound by the contracts you make
within your express or ostensible authority—ostensible
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authority is the authority the world believes you possess.
He will also be liable for the careless blunders you make,
the misrepresentations, in short, the torts you commit while
about his business.
He is recognized as a hard task master, but a just
man. Make good, play the game straight, don't charge the
trip to New York up to expenses, don't spend a week in
Portland with Louis and his family and charge it up as hotel
fee, don't stoop to sharp practice! He may never know, you
may be smart enough to get away with it, but it will be a
type of smartness that will mean your ruination from the
standpoint of character.
Good luck,
Wheelock v. Zevitas, 229 Mass. 167;
Mcintosh v. Abbot, 231 Mass. 180;
Russell v. Klein, 227 Mass. 297;
Elliott v. Kazajian, 255 Mass. 459;
O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123.
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Death Revokes the Agency *
Dear Leon,
The deed isn't good and if the heirs of Johnson
don't want to sell the "Goose House" at Pemaquid you will
have to find another attractive place. Because the deed
is no good they must return to you, however, the $2500 you
paid.
The real estate man was properly authorized to
find a customer, and he also had authority to give a deed.
The agreement to convey and the deed are in perfect form
but, Leon, don't you realize that Mr. Johnson died the night
before that agreement to convey was signed and four days be-
fore the deed was executed? The fact of death remains even
though the real estate man had no knowledge for more than a
week. He was only Johnson* s agent, his right hand as it
were, and with Johnson's death his right hand died too. In
other words his authority was gone at the time the agreement
to sell was signed and therefore the agreement amounted to
nothing as likewise does the deed.
If the agreement to convey had been executed prior
to his death, then I would say you could force the heirs to
give you a deed of the place for a contract, except for per-
sonal services, is not affected by death but under the cir-
cumstances you can do nothing unless the heirs desire to
sell to you. You are not the only person disappointed. The
real estate man is losing a commission too, and commissions
these days are few and far between. My advice to you is to
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talk with the heirs and perhaps you may be able to do business
with them.
Sincerely,
Mulloney v. Black, 244 Mass. 391;
Lincoln v. Emerson, 108 Mass. 87.
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THE LAW OF AGENCY
The law of agency involves the relation between principal and agent
and between both and third parties with whom the principal deals tiirough
hi-, agent. The law of principal and agent is very similar to the lav/ of
master and servant, but an agent is actually or impliedly authorized to
make contracts for his principal while a servant is chiefly engaged in per-
forming mechanical acts for h±y master.
A Forming the Relationship of Principal and Agent.
I By Contract, -with the ordinary elements of a contract present.
1. Under proper form note the following:
a. An agen': may be appointed orally, although it is
contemplated that he will exercise his authority
in writing.
b« If the contract between the principal and the third
party must be under seal, the authority of the
agent must be sealed. To this rule there are the
following except- ons:
(1) If the act is done in the presence of the
principal it is his act and the question of
form of authority does not arise.
(2) If the instrument is in fact, although the
law does not require that it should be, under
seal, the authority does not have to be under
seal.
a. An insane person, if not judicially de-
clared insane, may appoint an agent, but
the appointment will be voidable
.
b. An infant may be a principal, but both
the acts of his \gent for him and his
own contract of employment with his agent
are voidable
.
c. A married woman may today be either a com-
petent principal or an agent. Her hus-
band can be her agent only by her express
authority, but she may be his agent ex-
pressly, or impliedly for household goods,
or by necessity where he fails to furnish
her with the necessaries of life.
II By an agreement short of contract,—consideration lacking.
1. In such event, there is no obligation upon either of the
parties to execute the terms of the agreement, but if
the agent begins performance of the agency he will be
liable for its improper execution.
III By ratification.
1. If one does an act for another without authority, the
person for whom such act is done may afterwards ratify
the act done so as to give it the same legal effect as
if it had been originally authorized.
2. Such ratification dates back to the time of the act; it

is analogous to acceptance, and hence is irrevocable,
(a) The rights of intervening strangers, such as cred-
itors, cannot be cu;. off by this means, and third
persons may recede from the contract at any time
prior to ratification.
3. The principal must be an existing person capable of being
ascertained, and the contract must have been made in
his name and in his behalf.
IV By estoppel. This is the ostensible, apparent or implied agency.
1. Three elements should appear:
a. The principal is at fault in allowing this person to
appear to be his agent.
b. The third person has been honest and reasonable in
believing him an authorized agent,
c. As a result of the misleading the third person has
been damaged.
2. Estoppel may go to the existence of the agency or to the
extent of the agency.
3. One who deals with an agent acting within the apparent
scope of his authority is protected,
4. A third person may assume that the agent has the powers
necessary for the execution of powers actually con-
ferred; the powers annexed by custom or usage; and
any other powers which the principal reasonably leads
the third person to believe that the agent possesses.
V By necessity,
1. In addition to actual authority and ostensible authority,
a wife has an agency by necessity to obtain those nec-
essaries of life for her support which her husband has
neglected or even refused to furnish her.
a. An infant has life agency by necessity to bind his
father for necessaries which the father has faileo
to provide
•
b. The doctrine is often extended to cover the employ-
ment of medical assistance in cases of extreme
need, particularly in railroad accidents.
B Operation of Agency
I Duty owed by principal to agent.
1. Compensation for services. In cases of services rendered
by relatives there must be an express promise to pay.
a. If the agent is rightfully discharged for his own
fault he sacrifices his compensate ^a, but if he
is wrongfully dischared he may collect damages.
2. Repayment of advances or losses, incurred by the agent in
the prosecution of the principal* s business.
II Duty owed by the agent to his principal.
1. Obeying instructions. Failure to obey may make the agent
liable for damages or for conversion.
2. Exercising the skill and judgment which he has agreed to
use or which he has held himself out as having,
3. Acting in good fa5th, which implies that he will not take
a position antagonistic to his principal.
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4, Accounting for all proceeds whether obtained directly or in-
directly.
5. Acting in person unless otherwise authorized. He to whom a
duty is delegated can not delegate it.
III Duty of the principal to third persons.
1. Liable upon all c ontracts made by the agent within the scope
of his actual or ostensible authority.
2. Liable for the torts of his agent committed within the scope
of his authority and in the execution of his employment.
a. It makes no difference whether the tort vias wilful or
for the benefit of the agent alone as long as it was
within the scope of the authority.
b. In case of a servant loaned liability rests upon the
master who is in complete control.
c. The rule extends to torts of sub-agents if they have
been appointed under due authority.
d. The rule does not apply if the servant or agent has
deviated from his employment and gone on an inde-
pendent frolic of his own.
IV Liability of the agent to third persons.
1. An agent who has contracted on behalf of a principal is not
liable if he was duly authorized.
a. If his authority was lacking he may be liable to third
persons who did not know the facts, upon the theory
that he vjarrants his authority when he contracts
with them.
2. In case of torts, an agent may always be personally liable
if the third party so elects.
C The Doctrine of Undisclosed Principal.
I Liability of an undisclosed principal.
1. When the agent is acting for a principal whose name he does
not disclose, this undisclosed principal is ordinarily
liable to third persons to the same extent as is a dis-
closed principal.
2. If the third person elects to regard the agent as the sole
contracting party, as he may do, he cannot later proceed
against the principal.
a. He has made his election when vdth knowledge of the
existence of an undisclosed principal he has carried
suit against the agent to judgment.
3. If a contract under seal is sealed by the agent in his own
name, the principal is not liable.
4. In case of negotiable instruments, only those persons whose
names appear on the paper may be held.
II Right of an undisclosed principal.
1. Ordinarily he may bring an action in his own name against
the third person who supposed that he was dealing vdth
the agent as principal.
P Termination of the Agency.
I Termination of the agency may be brought about:
1. By fulfilment of the contract of agency or by agreement,
—
the purposes have been fulfilled, or the time of its

duration has elapsed.
2. By operation of law.
a. The subject matter changes or is destroyed.
b. The subject matter becomes illegal.
c. The parties become incompetent by death, bankruptcy,
or insanity.
d. War between the country of the principal and that of
the agent.
3. By revocation.
a. The principal may ordinarily revoke the agency, or the
agent renounce it at -will. True even though the
revocation operates as a breach of the contract for
which damages may be recovered.
b. In the following case the agency is irrevocable:
(1) Where the agent has a pov;er coupled with an
interest.

Ill With Credit Instruments , Bills , Notes , and Checks .
1, Important points summarized
.
THE INEXPERIENCED ADVOCATE
and
THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
An Inexperienced Advocate was once Requested by a
Learned Friend to "Devil" a Short Cause. As he had
Never Raised his Voice in Court (except to Apply
for a Case to Stand Out of the List till next Sit-
tings, Keeping its Place) the Inexperienced Advo-
cate was Rather Alarmed at the Prospect, But,
being Ambitious, he Agreed to Do his Best, He
Gathered that he was to Appear for the Defendant,
and that the Plaintiff was the Holder in Due Course
of a Bill of Exchange. Also that he was to Knock
the Plaintiff About a Bit in Cross-Examination.
Pulling himself Together he Went into Court and the
Case was Soon Called on. The Plaintiff had a
Slightly Red Nose and his Linen was not Unimpeach-
able, but he gave his Evidence Clearly and in a
Firm Voice. When he Rose to Cross-Examine the
Plaintiff, the Inexperienced Advocate Shook Very
Much, Particularly at the Knees, and the Court
seemed to be Spinning Round and Round. The Judge
and the Plaintiff Completely Disappeared from his
Vision and were Replaced by Strangely-Coloured
Sparks and Chaos. His Jaw Dropped and his Eye was
Glazed. He Became Unconscious of his Surroundings.
The Plaintiff was so Horrified by the Inexperienced
Advocate's Appearance that he Completely Lost his
Nerve. Asking in Faltering Tones what he was
Looking at him like That for, the Plaintiff Added
that he had been a Respectable Man Ever Since......
Here he Paused. But the Judge Took up the Running
and Before the Inexperienced Advocate had Recov-
ered his Senses, the Plaintiff had Admitted that
he had been Convicted of Fraud on Divers Occasions,
and the Judge had Given Judgment (with Costs) for
the Defendant. The Defendant's Solicitor was so
Delighted with what he Regarded as a Splendid His-
trionic Display that he thereafter Showered Briefs
upon the Inexperienced Advocate.
Moral — Silence is Golden.
Forensic Fables.
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The Woman and Her Check Book
Dear Althea,
Thank you for the check in payment for the book I
sent you last week. I was interested to see that you were
using a check book and judge that it has come along with the
teaching position. Personally, I feel a working girl is very
wise to deposit her salary and pay her bills in turn by check.
If she keeps the stubs filled out, she has a com-
plete record of her expenditures and can quickly know her
financial standing, and I have ever found that if I had to
draw a check for spending money I was a bit careful to figure
on how little I could get along. There is a tendency if one
has much ready cash to let it slip through his fingers with-
out knowing for what it has gone, particularly when one is
paid but once a month. Then again loose money is readily
lost or mislaid.
There is another thing that I hope you have done
or will do if you have not already, do start a budget system.
There are excellent books on the subject and the time is
coming when a course on "Money Management" will be given in
every school. If you learn to budget your income you will
be moving toward an appreciation of wise money handling. I
wonder if bad spending habits are not responsible for a lot
of the unhappiness of the world.
With a well planned budget and a well kept check
book I shall feel that you are on the road to at least one
kind of success.

Just a few things, Althea, about your checks J Be
sure that your words and figures are ever in harmony for if
there were a discrepancy, the words would prevail. Place
your figures close to the dollar sign so there is no opportu-
nity to slip in another figure, and be sure that the line on
which the words are written is wholly used up, if not by the
words with a line.
Don't do what I did last week, Althea.1 I gave a
doctor a blank check, that is, I left the amount blank for
him to fill in. It probably was a very nice gesture of faith
but it was a very, very foolish thing to do for I would be
liable for whatever amount he wrote in. I am almost as bad
as the woman who promptly wrote her name on every check
when she got her book and then announced triumphantly that
she guessed that book would not be lost. If it were she had
authorized the finder to fill in the blank spaces to suit
himself, and if the checks were passed on to innocent third
parties she might find herself in most unfortunate predica-
ments.
This is a case, Althea, of do as I say and not
as I do. A dumber thing I cannot conceive of.
May the school year go most happily.
With appreciation,
Burnham v. Allen, 1 Grey 498;
Libby Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462.
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Bearer Paper or Order Paper , What Does It Matter ?
D«ar Althea,
Your letter telling me of the budget was fine. I
am glad that one check a month is to go into the saving bank;
You ask about drawing checks for spending money.
Draw this to your own name rather than to "bearer. H It is
safer as a whole. When drawn to your name the bank will re-
quire you to indorse the check on the back because it has
become order paper and order paper can only be negotiable by
delivery and indorsement; that is, no one could get title
unless it had an indorsement upon it.
Bearer paper—that is, paper made out to bearer, or
cash, or sundries, can be passed on by delivery alone and you,
the maker, are probably liable to any person in whose hands
it may come, but if it is order paper, made out to the order
of a specified person, your liability never extends to a per-
son unless he can first show a claim of title which can only
come through indorsement and delivery.
Is this understandable?
Sincerely,
Patton v. DeVeney, 259 Mass. 100;
Shaw v. Smith, 150 Mass. 166.

What To Do With Checks.
Bear Mrs. Allen:
During the past two years people have found them-
selves in very unfortunate predicaments, if they have not
promptly put checks into the bank for collection. This is
because of a law which provides that unless a check is placed
in the bank for collection within twenty-four hours after it
is received by the original payee the drawer of the check will
be excused to the extent that he can show he has suffered by
the delay.
For example if I should receive a check from you on
Wednesday morning I really should put that check into the
bank for collection before the close of banking hours on
Thursday. If I do what we are so liable to do, namely, hold
the check until some day next week, and then offer it for
collection to ray bank, and I am told that the bank on which
it is drawn stopped all payments on checks the Friday before,
I should realize that I will be the loser and that the person
who gave me the check will not be responsible beyond any
dividend which the closed bank may pay. This is because the
bank was open during the entire day on which I should have put
the check in for collection and had I presented it on Thursday
I would have gotten my money without fail. Hence it follows
that because of my own negligence the check remains unpaid
and surely the individual who gave the check in good faith
should not be penalized because of my carelessness.

Yours is the experience of many people during this
period of banks closing and I wish I could tell you that the
man who gave you the check is really responsible, but he isn't.
If he pays you the amount of the check it is merely because
he recognizes a moral, rather than a legal, obligation. I
know that this sounds harsh but if you think of it from his
standpoint you will recognize that it is justice.
Sincerely,
I
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How to Endorse Your Checks .
Dear Mrs. Black:
You have asked me concerning the proper way in
which to endorse checks and I would suggest that whenever
you pass a check on to another person that you would be wise
to endorse it specially. By that I mean write on the back
of the check "pay to the order of So and So", and sign your
name. That means that the only person who can cash that
check is the individual whom you have named or some person
to whom she has again endorsed the instrument. So many
people endorse checks indiscriminately by simply putting
their name upon the back. This we call blank endorsing.
Remember that every person who endorses makes cer-
tain warranties, and in almost all cases promises that if
the maker does not pay, and the proper steps are taken, that
he will pay. If, therefore, one endorses a check in blank
he really promises to pay to all the world and even though
the check was lost or stolen, one might find himself obliged
to pay the stipulated amount.
There are also three other kinds of endorsements
which are used. The qualified endorsement arises when one
signs his name and follows it with the words "without re-
course". That person is simply saying that he does not in-
tend to be liable upon that particular check even though the
maker does not pay, and it would seem a very satisfactory
way to endorse instruments were it not for the fact that the
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person to whom he passes the paper frequently will object.
Moreover, whether he endorses that way or not he still war-
rants to all people that the instrument is genuine, that
prior parties had the power to contract, that he had good
title and that he knew of no defect impairing the obligation
of the instrument, and so, although he could not be caught
upon the instrument itself he might easily be made responsi-
ble for breach of warranty should there be any forged en-
dorsement of which he was unaware or should there have been
any endorsement by a minor prior to his. So that method of
endorsement is not as satisfactory as it seems.
When one sends paper to a bank for deposit or col-
lection he should endorse that instrument, "Pay to the First
National Bank for deposit" and sign his name, or, "For col-
lection." By so doing he has endorsed the instrument re-
strictively and any person who takes the paper after that en-
dorsement holds merely as his agent. If he collects the
money he must hold it for the purposes indicated by the re-
strictive endorsement. When we speak in legal parlance we
say that such endorsement prohibits further negotiations and
by that we mean that no person would be what is known in the
law as a holder in due course and thus possess perhaps even
better rights than the one who transferred to him.
There is a fifth type of endorsement but it is one
which is rarely seen or used. For example, I say "Pay to
Jones when he paints my house." Now that means that I am
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not going to be liable to Jones or any subsequent holder of
the instrument unless the house has been painted, but there
is no reason at all why Jones or subsequent holders could
not recover from the maker of the instrument or endorser who
preceded me whether the house has or has not been painted.
Perhaps all this seems very technical, and if ques-
tions come to your mind I shall be very glad to write fur-
ther, but I would say don't endorse checks in blank, and
whenever possible endorse them restrictively so that each
person thereafter is acting really as your agent in getting
the money. There is another thing which is much upon my
mind, and had not this letter already become too long I
should have written to you of the danger of holding checks.
We are very prone, I think, to collect checks and not prompt-
ly turn them into the bank for collection. When we do so
delay, particularly in these grave times, we take a very
great chance. I will take opportunity to tell you more
along this line in a later letter.
Truly yours,
Freeman^ Bank v. Nat'l. Tube Works, 151 Mass. 413;
Aronson v. Nurenberg, 218 Mass. 376;
Pelonsky v. Wattendorf, 255 Mass. 558.

The Endorser and Hie Warranties
Dear Althea,
Our correspondence this winter seems to center
around negotiable instruments, doesn't it?
You didn't realize that if you wrote your name on
the back of a note that that simple act made you liable if
the maker didn't pay. It really does unless you endorse
"Althea Fulton without recourse." In that case you do not
promise to pay the instrument if the party primarily liable
does not, but nevertheless you warrant four things.
Jane Alden loaned her husband $500 after they were
married to put in that extension irrigation system which
they never used after it was installed. It was just one of
their many wild ideas. He gave her a note for the $500
dated six months ahead because he expected by that time to
have money from his father's estate.
During the six months, Jane, not realizing that
the note was no good because husband and wife cannot contact,
endorsed it "without recourse" to a man who was unaware that
the maker was her husband. When the note matured, Alden
couldn't meet it; the estate was still in litigation but he
was not liable upon it anyway for the note was void.
The holder then turned to Jane, and sued her on the
ground that by endorsing it even "without recourse" that she
had warranted.
1. That the instrument was genuine, (which it wasn't).

2. That she had good title, (which she didn't).
3. That prior parties had capacity to contract, (which
they hadn't) and,
4. That she knew of no defect in the instrument,
(which she did)
.
Jane paid the #500 with interest and the costs of
the suit.
More anon,
Benney v. Globe, 150 Mass. 574;
Jacobs v. Brown, 259 Mass. 232;
Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Mete. 469.

Have You Made Proper Presentment and Given Proper Notice ?
Dear Mr. Allen,
You did a very ordinary thing when you called up
the maker of the promissory note and asked him if he was
prepared to pay the note on the day of its maturity, but
unfortunately, although you did a thing which is very com-
mon you did not make a sufficient presentment and demand
on the instrument to enable you to hold Mr. Barr as an en-
dorser. He really is within his legal rights when after
learning the facts he informs you that he is not responsible
for payment.
The law says that in order to hold endorsers upon
negotiable instruments, presentment and demand shall be made
upon the party primarily liable upon the day of maturity.
That means that it is necessary for the holder of an instru-
ment to present it in person and at the time of the present-
ment and demand to have the instrument in his possession in
order that if it is paid it may then and there be delivered
up to the party who met the obligation. Such presentment
and demand should be made at the address specified in the
instrument or if no address is given, either at the place of
residence or the place of business or in any event to the
individual personally wherever he can be found. After hav-
ing made proper presentment and demand, and having been
denied payment upon the day of maturity or if such day is a
legal holiday, or Sunday, on the next business day, it

then becomes necessary for the holder to give notice of what
he has done to the endorser if he would hold him liable. He
must give notice to endorsers who live in the same city as
himself before the close of the day following the day of
dishonor, but if the endorsers live in another city or town
then the notice shall at least go on the day following the
date of dishonor.
We have an interesting case in Massachusetts where
the holder resided in Boston and the endorser lived in
Somerville. The holder introduced in evidence the fact that
he had mailed notice to the man in Somerville at 8:30 P.M. on
the day after the notice was dishonored, but unfortunately
for him he did not prove that there was any mail which left
Boston for Somerville after 8:30 that night, and hence he had
not lived up to the technical requirement of the law and he
could not look to the endorser. All this material will be
disappointing to you, I know, and I am sorry that you have
lost your rights against Mr. Barr because I fear that the
maker of that instrument will never be in a position to meet
it. However, he will continue to be responsible upon the
instrument and you can bring suit against him if you think
it worth your while any time within six years from the date
of maturity. If I can be of further help let me know.
Truly yours,
Harris v. Baker, 326 Mass. 113.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A General Principles.
I Requirements to be negotiable;
1. It must be in writing, signed by the maker or drawer.
2. It must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a
sum certain in money.
3. It must be payable on demand or at a fixed future date.
4. It must be payable to the order of a specified person or to
bearer
•
II What constitutes an unconditional promise; S. 24, 25, 27.
1. The promise is unconditional although it is coupled with the
indication of a particular fund from which the money is to
be paid. It may contain a statement of the transaction
which gives rise to the instrument, but a promise to pay
out of a particular fund only makes the instrument con-
ditional.
2. An instrument which contains an order or remise to do any
act in addition to the payment of money is not negotiable,
except that it may:
a. Authorize the sale of collateral security in case the
instrument is not paid at maturity.
b # Waive the benefit of any lav/ intended for the advantage
of the person making the instrument,
c. Give the holder the election to require something to be
done instead of the payment of money,
d. Be made payable by instalments, with a provision that
upon default in any instalment, the whole shall be-
come due,
e. Be made "with exchange,"
f . Be made with costs of collection.
III What constitutes payable at a determinable future time;
1. At a fixed period after date or sight,
2. On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified,
3. On or at a fixed future period after the occurrence of a
specified event which is certain to happen although the
time of happening is uncertain.
IV Y/hen is an instrument payable to order of a specified person; S. 30
1. When drawn to a specified person or his order,
2. When payable to the order of the maker himself,
3. When payable to the order of payee, or payees, or to joint
payees,
4. Or to the order of a holder of an office.
V Yfhen an instrument is payable to bearer.
1. When so stated,
2. When payable to a person named therein or bearer,
3. When payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting
person, when such fact is known to the person making it
so payable,
4. When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name
of any person,
5. When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
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B Negotiation
An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one party
to another in such a way as to constitute the person re-
ceiving it the holder. If the instrument is payable to
bearer, negotiation may be by delivery. If the instrument
is payable to order, negotiation is by indorsement of the
holder coupled with delivery. The indorsement must be
written on the instrument itself, or upon a paper attached
to it. It must be an indorsement of the entire instrument
unless it has already been paid in part.
C Kinds of Indorsements. S. 56.
I Special A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or
to whose order the instrument is to be payable.
II In blank. A blank indorsement does not specify any person to
whom the indorsement is made and consequently makes the in-
strument payable to bearer.
III Re strictive
.
A restrictive indorsement is one which prohibits
further negotiation and makes the indorsee the agent of the
indorser. Such an indorsement gives the indorsee the right to:
1. Receive payment,
2. To bring any action which the indorser could bring,
3. To transfer his rights as a restrictive indorsee when the
form of the indorsement allows it; e.g. "Pay to A for col-
lection" Signed "X"
IV Qualified. A qualified indorsement makes the indorser a mere
assignor of the title. Such an indorsement does not impair
the negotiability of the instrument, but operates to relieve
the indorser from certain liability; he is still liable on
his warranties. Ex. "Pay to B without recourse."
V Conditional. A condi-*- " onal indorsement passes the title subject to
a specified condition. The maker or any party liable on the
instrument may disregard the conditon, but the person to whom
it is negotiated will hold it subject to the rights of the per-
son so indorsing. Ex. "Pay to B when he paints my house."
Signed "A".
D Requisites of a Holder in Due Course. S. 75.
I A Holder in Due Course may hold any person to whom he can trace
title, and such a holder takes the instrument under the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. It is complete and regular upon its face.
2. He became the holder before it was overdue and vdthout
notice that it had been previously dishonored.
3. He took it in good faith and for value.
4. At the time the instrument was negotiated to him, he had no
notice of any defects in the instrument or in the title of
the person negotiating it to him.
After maturity of the instrument, any person taking it takes it
subject to defenses available against the holder from whom
he derives title. Every holder is deemed prima facie a
holder in due course, but when it is found that the title
of someone negotiating it to him is defective, the burden
is upon him tc show that he is such a holder.
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E The Contracts of the Parties.
! The maker of a promissory note*
1. Agrees to pay it according to its tenor.
2. Admits the existence of the payee and his capacity to
indorse
•
II The drawer of a bill of exchange or check;
1. Engages that the person upon whom it is dravm will accept
it.
2. If it is dishonored and the necessary legal steps are taken
he will pay the amount of the instrument to the holder or
to any person who may be compelled to pay it.
III The acceptor of a bill of exchange:
1« Admits the existence of the drawer.
2. Admits the genuineness of his signature.
3. Admits his capacity and authority to draw the instrument.
4. Admits that the holder has the ordinary rights of a payee.
TV Every person who negotiates an instrument by delivery or quali-
fied indorsement warrants that;
1. The instrument is genuine,
2. He has good title.
3. Prior parties had capacity '~.o contract.
4. He has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the
validity of the instrument.
Note that he who negotiates by delivery warrants only to his
immediate transferee.
V In Addition, persons negotiating without qualification;
1. Warrant that the instrument is valid at the time of the
indorsement.
2. Agree that if it is dishonored and the necessary legal
steps taken, they will pay the amount of the instrument
to the holder or any indorser who may be compelled to
pay it.
F Presentment for Payment and Notice of Dishonor.
Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the
persons primarily liable, but it is necessary in order to
charge drawers and indorsers.
I Presentment for pay.ent is made at the proper place*
1. Where a place of payment is specified in the instrument
and it is there presented;
2. Where no place of payment is specified, but the address of
the person to make payment is given, and it is there pre-
sented;
3. Where no place of payment is specified and no address is
given and the instrument is presented at the usual place
of business or residence;
4. In any other case, if presented to the person to make pay-
ment wherever he can be found, or if presented at the
last known place of business or residence.
If the instrument is payable at the bank, presentment must be
made during banking hours unless there are no funds to
meet it. In that case, presentment at any time before
the bank is closed on that day is sufficient.
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II When an instrument has been dishonors
d
,
notice of dishonor must
be given to persons secondarily liable, or they will be dis-
charged. The notice may be given either personally or by
agent, and when notice is given to one party by another party,
all subsequent holders may take advantage of it, as my prior
parties who have rights against the party to whom it is given.
1. If parties reside in the same place notice must be given:
(a) If at the place of business, before the close of
business hours on the day following dishonor
.
(b) If at the residence, before the usual hours of rest
on the day following dishonor.
(c) If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post
office in time to reach its destination in the usual
course on the day following dishonor .
2. If parties reside in different places, notices must be
given:
(a) If by mail, in time to go by mail the day following
the day of dishonor, or if no mail goes that day, by
the next mail thereafter.
(b) If given otherwise, then within the time notice would
have been received if it had been deposited in the
post office at the proper time
.
G Discharge of a Negotiable Instrument.
I By payment or cancellation;
II By any other act which would discharge a simple contract to pay
money;
III When the debtor rightfully becomes the holder.
H Discharge of a Person Secondarily Liable.
I By the discharge of the instrument;
II By the cancellation of his signature by the holder;
III By the discharge of a prior party;
IV By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party;
Y By a release of the principal debtor unless the holder* s right to
recourse is reserved (generally by agreement);
VI By agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of pay-
ment by the principal debtor unless made with the assent of
the indorser sought to be held.
When a person secondarily liable upon an instrument pays it, it
may again be indorsed unless the person so paying is the drawer of a bill
of exchange or an accommodated party.
A person may at any time renounce his rights against any other party
to the instrument, but this affects him only, and no other holder in due
course •
When a negotiable instrument is altered in a material particular
without the assent of all parties, it is void except against those who
have authorized or assented to J~he alteration and subsequent indorsers;
but a holder in due course not a party DO the alteration may enforce pay-
ment according to the original tenor.
I Checks.—bills of exchange drawn on a bank, payable on demand.
I Presentment for payment.

1. Must be made within a reasonable time after its issue,
or the drawer will be discharged from liability to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
II Certification*
1. When a check is certified by the bank on which it is
drawn the certification is equivilent to acceptance.
2. When the holder has it certified, the drawer and all
indorsers are discharged from liability.
3. When the drawer lias the check certified his liability is
that of the drawer of a bill, i.e., secondarily liable.

IV The Law of Sales. Note that 85% of the purchases
are made by women. Let them give special heed.
1. Another summary to be skipped or perused.
Caveat Emptor
This maxim of law, "Let the buyer beware",
Means buyers must exercise caution and care
Defects, not perceived, give no ground for rescission
In the absence of warranty, fraud, or condition.
Latin Maxims
Foster

96
Title
,
Title , Who Has the Title?
Dear Arthur
:
Do you remember when we were youngsters how we
used to play "Button, button, who's got the button"? I
thought of that game instantly after I had your letter
telling of your problem. I am changing the wording a bit,-
"Title, title whose got the title"? On the answer to that
question depend your rights. Generally speaking the person
who has the title has also the loss or gain and the fact
that the article purchased has never been delivered makes
no difference.
You negotiated for Allen's sheep in the fall, and
he agreed to keep them through the winter for you. I see
no reason why you didn't get title to those sheep last fall,
regardless of the fact that you didn't know how many there
were. You really bought the flock, for a given sum and had
there been many or few you would have paid the set price.
If I am correct in believeing that the contract between you
was for the purchase of a flock of sheep which Allen agreed
to winter for you, then they were your property from the day
of purchase; if they grew wool as they surely did the wool
was yours and continued to be yours even after Allen sheared
the sheep. Surely he must pay you for its value.
The answer depends on one question. Did you
people last fall make a present sale or was the agreement
that November day simply a contract to sell in the future?
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If it were the former the sheep were immediately yours, and
if they all died during the winter you still would have been
liable for the agreed price. I wonder if that had been the
picture if Allen would have refused the money or for one
moment thought himself not entitled to it. If you took the
risk you also took the gain. On the other hand if that was
an agreement to sell the flock in the spring then no title
could pass to you at the time and with the title still in
Allen the spring clip would have been his. Evidently he re-
gards the transaction in this way but the Sales Act in
Massachusetts has laid down certain rules to aid in finding
the intention of the parties when the parties cannot agree
and if there is an agreement to sell specific goods in a de-
liverable state title passes at once regardless of the time
of payment or the time of delivery. The flock of sheep con-
stituted specific goods; surely they were at the time in
deliverable state and I see no reason why they did not then
and there become your property and any wool which they grew
was also yours. Talk your problem over with Allen again
and don't make any final payment until the matter is
adjusted.
Hastily yours,
Martin v. Adams, 104 Mass. 262;
M. K. Smith Corp. v. Ellis, 257 Mass. 269.
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Was the Sale Over Five Hundred Dollars, and If So, What of
It?
Dear Greta,
You always did have extravagant tastes and have
frequently indulged them to the detriment of your pocket-
book, but this time the law is on your side.
In the first place, I am surprised that you went
to that particular individual, a man of no business standing,
to purchase an Oriental Rug. I know that he has nice eyes,
a soothing voice and a way of looking at one as if she were
the only person in all the world. For heaven* s sake, Greta,
grow up! Really, Harry's financial success is a curse to
you. Why do women who have so much and who could do so much
have to be such fools. Oh, yes, I know you are thoroughly
angry with me, but you have been before and you* 11 recover.
So the dear showed you a wonderful Oriental for
$750, told you that it was a grand bargain, that it had been
in the palace of some old reprobate, and that it was just
what was needed to give your home atmosphere. I know the
line. And you fell for it. And it was to be delivered on
Wednesday. You told Harry and he was so furious that some-
how, though you were sorry for Adorable when you learned of
the fire that destroyed his store on Tuesday with the rug
still there, you did feel relieved. You felt relieved until
Adorable, now less adorable, informs you that the rug was
yours and that you owe him ^750 and that the loss is yours.
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He is right, Greta, to a certain point. The rug
was yours. Title passed on that Monday morning, and it is
true that he who has the title takes the loss.
However, in Massachusetts if a sale involves more
than $500, unless the buyer has signed a paper, or paid down
some money, the seller cannot enforce payment unless he can
prove that the buyer has both accepted and received the
goods. You accepted all right for you agreed to take the
rug, but you never received it, for it never left the store.
Send Adorable to me and 1*11 treat him a bit
roughly, and send the bill to you, not to Harry, and you are
to pay the bill out of your money, not out of his. I sup-
pose I should be glad that there are people like you these
days. Business is rather quiet.
Until the next time,
Marvin v. Wallis, 6 E. & B. 726;
Atherton v. Newhall, 123 Mass. 141.
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Did You Buy a. Portion of a_ Larger Mass?
Dear Mr. Robbins,
You are not liable to the sheriff for conversion
for you have exercised a dominion only over your own goods.
The general rule is that no title, by weight,
measure or count, can pass to a portion of goods in a larger
mass without physical separation but today we recognize an
exception in case of fungible goods, goods in which every
unit is like every other unit, e.g. grains, liquids, hay.
When you bought the two hundred bushels of corn in
Sterns' corn crib, you immediately got title even though
there were five hundred bushels in all. Therefore, when the
sheriff attached that corn for a creditor of Sterns, he
could not attach more than three hundred bushels. And when
Sterns seized two hundred bushels, he was merely bringing to
you that which was your own. The sheriff has no rights
whatsoever.
Truly yours,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 106, 8.8 (2).
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When the Seller Promises Personal Satisfaction
Dear Ada,
If the man from New Bedford promised you that you
should be personally satisfied with the chair he would send
out, you are quite right in thinking that you are entitled
to personal satisfaction. Stick by your guns. Demand that
he take the chair back and refuse to take others if they are
not what you want.
In the first place, you are dealing with a rather
poor outfit and I am surprised that they would ever promise
personal satisfaction. They probably will deny it, but Evan
is pretty clean cut in his thinking, and he seems confident
that the statement was given. It is a wise proposition to
insist upon because if a seller does guaranty to satisfy the
purchaser, the courts will enforce the contract as made.
You can be as unreasonable as you like, Ada, as
long as you are honest, and I know you are both that and rea-
sonable, but don't keep the chair. If you did, you could be
forced to pay the full price.
Devotedly yours,
Farmer v. Golde, 235 Mass. 260;
Weinstein v. Miller, 249 Mass. 516;
Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136.
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The Day of Caveat Emptor
Dear Mrs. Fuller,
Don't you know that the public likes to be "hum-
bugged"? It is not a new attitude. Do you remember how in
the Vicar of Wakefield, Moses went to the fair to sell the
family cow that they might get money for food? He returned
with a gross of green spectacles with "solid gold rims" ac-
cording to the words of the seller, but en route the solid
gold had turned to worthless brass.
The public still bites and we still preach the doc-
trine of let the buyer beware, the doctrine of caveat emptor.
"Balzaa's books are nice books for children to
read," and the tired mother purchases and learns she has no
come back.
"This cleaner is clean, economical, efficient, per-
fect in the smallest detail," and the buyer discovers that
once again he is a victim.
"This is a gilt-edge security," and the victim is
out of pocket.
So Louville bought a coat and was told "that it
would wear like iron," and instead it is proving a poor buy.
He really has no come back legally; he should have known that
those words were but words of puffing—dealer's talk. We all
like to hear them, we like to kid ourselves along, and if a
seller failed to use them, we would feel that he didn't
believe sufficiently in his wares. I suppose, after all,
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salesmen and advertising men give us what we want, and we can
hardly complain. However, I fight shy of advertisements that
stress "pink tooth brush," "B.O.," etc., they are a bit too
ghastly for me.
What Louville can't accomplish by legal means he
probably can accomplish through the force of personality.
Tell him to go to it!
Sincerely,
Lalime and Partridge v. Hobbs, 255 Mass. 189;
Pike v. Fay, 101 Mass. 137.
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All about Food ,
Dear Margaret
,
You are always interested in cases which come into
the office and I know you will be interested in my after-
noon. It is years since I have seen Mary Frost but I knew
that she worked in a dentist's office in the Back Bay. She
is not very different from what she was back in college
days, rather peppery and impulsive, fond of the good things
of life and easily disturbed.
Last Friday when she went out to lunch she went to
a new place up on Boylston Street and she said it was hot
and she thought she'd have a cool, refreshing salad. She
got a most appetizing dish and was enjoying it tremendously
when a young woman at the next table gave a little scream,
and there, dangling on her fork which was just on the point
of entering her mouth, was a fat green worm just the color
of the lettuce leaf. You can imagine how furious she was
and I suppose her chagrin was increased because of being
seen in the process of worm eating.
Naturally they were most apologetic, but she left
in high dudgeon, went back to the office, and, as you would
expect, was so completely prostrated that she spent the
afternoon on the couch in the rest room. Today she would
like to collect enough from "Ye Brass Kettle" to finance
her summer vacation. I told her that it was too bad she
hadn't eaten at least a piece of the worm, and I judge that
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now I am about as popular as the eating place.
Years ago the law thought of inns, and restaurants
and hotels as places of entertainment. If you ordered a
steak for dinner it didn't become your property, but you
were privileged to enjoy it, and so consume it, but if you
had decided to eat a part and take away the rest you could
have been stopped just as thoroughly as if you had attempted
to carry off the silver. Today apparently the law has
changed and I see no reason why one couldn't fold up in his
pocket handkerchief the remains of the feast and save it
for the morrow. However a few months ago I saw a waitress
remonstrate with a young woman who started to take a dough-
nut with her. I wanted to tell her that I believed she was
within her rights for somehow I felt that it was a depres-
sion measure.
Not only do you get title today to food which you
purchase in restaurants, cafeterias, etc., but the dealer
promises the consumer that it shall be fit for human con-
sumption and if it is not and causes expense to the victim
he can recover as long as he can prove that it was not fit
and that it was the thing which damaged him. A dealer is
liable in a contract action although there was no conceiv-
able knowledge or negligence on his side for that is one of
the burdens he takes with the privilege of selling. He can
also be sued successfully in what we call a tort action if
the victim can establish negligence. People prefer to sue
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in tort wherever possible for the money damages awarded are
liable to be greater but if one believes that it would be
difficult to prove carelessness then he better stick to the
contract action.
In a case against the Childs Dining Hall a woman
broke off a tooth by biting on a small pebble in baked beans,
thinking at the time it was but an overdone bean. She sued
in contract and recovered. I doubt if she would have been
successful had she sued in tort, for it would have been most
difficult to establish negligence.
Then there was another case against the Child's
Restaurant in which a woman was injured because of a tack in
blueberry pie. She sued for negligence but was not able to
establish any and lost her case, but had she sued in contract
she doubtless would have recovered if she was the one who
ordered the pie and therefore one of the contracting parties.
There has been, a recent case that I have watched
with interest against the Liggett stores. A woman ordered
strawberry shortcake and had her mouth cut by glass. The
action was brought for negligence. I was sure the case
would be lost for I didn't see how Liggett people who buy
the cake and the strawberries and the cream from outside con-
cerns could be found negligent. However, the evidence
brought out the fact that the concoction was assembled in
the basement by a sink into which broken Moxie glasses had
been thrown and that the glass in the cream was of the same
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variety, and just this spring the woman got a very substan-
tial judgment.
Mary Frost certainly was not served food fit for
human consumption, I really think that negligence could be
found to exist when a salad is permitted to come to the table
with a nice fat active worm, but her sickness and discomfort
did not come from any contact with the worm but from her own
fright. Unfortunately the law doesn't value mental sufer-
ing caused negligently, as damage. You see she really should
have eaten the worm!
Continued in our next, may be,
With love,
Friend v. Ohilds Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65;
O'Brien v. Liggett Co., 255 Mass. 553;
Gearing v. Berkson, 233 Mass. 257.
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"Furnish the Love Nest at a Dollar Down and a. Dollar a Week"
Dear Grace,
Do I think you and Jimmie should get married or
wait until the depression period lifts? Well, youngster, I
am a bit of a pessimist at times and I wonder if the depres-
sion ever will lift and if you wait for that if you may not
be old and feeble and gray.
You are young, ambitious, strong, and well. I know
Jim's salary is small, but I think I*d risk marriage next
fall if you both very much desire it and perhaps it will
seem wise for you to work for a time longer in order that
you may get a start.
What do I think of buying furniture on the instal-
ment plan? I don't think much of it, Grace, more than I
think people should buy cars on the instalment plan, or
radio, or fur coats or hundreds of other things. Personally,
I believe that people should budget for things, save system-
atically for them and not have them until they can pay for
them. But I know I am very old fashioned in this belief.
There are plenty of people who stress the glories
of the system, it teaches you thrift. Personally, I think
it teaches extravagance. It enables you to maintain a stand-
ing in society. A society which is maintained because of
material things has little of real value. The system brings
you comfort and happiness. No more comfort and happiness
than a deferred purchase and with my plan there is much less
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worry.
There are several months before fall. Both you and
Jim have saved some money. Talk over what you'll really need.
Forecast what you can save between now and then. Watch the
sales. You can buy now and the stores will hold for future
delivery.
If my suggestions seem too humdrum, then go into
the conditional sales contracts with your eyes open. First,
make up your mind you'll pay more for inferior goods. Re-
member that if you fail to meet any instalment the concern
may take your furniture and furnishings after thirty days
and all money that you have paid in will be lost, and the
contract will probably provide that the unpaid balance will
still be due the company. There are many pitfalls for the
unwary, and don't get in too far.
Sincerely yours,
Sallinger v. Collateral Loan Co., 215 Mass. 266;
Angier v. Mfg. Co., 1 Gray 421;
Bousquet v. Mack Truck Co., 269 Mass. 20;
Porter v. Stuart, 203 Mass. 46;
General Laws, (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 255, s. 12, 13,

UNIFORM SALES ACT
A .sale, of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers the
title to goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price. An
agreement to sell is distinguished from a sale in that a sale represent
an actual transfer of title, while an agreement to sell is merely a con
tract to make such a transfer in the future.
A Elements
I An agreement, - a sale is a contract and must have all the ele-
ments of a contract.
1. One exception, - a sale by operation of law.
II A transfer of title, - as a general rule he who has the title
has the risk.
Ill Goods, - personal property, either tangible or intangible.
IV Price, - today, money or money's worth. It may be fixed by the
terms of the contract or be left to be fixed later. Today
a barter is a sale.
B Transactions Somewhat Similar in Nature
I Bailment , - a transfer of goods to another; identical goods to
be returned in the same or altered form. The title remains
in the bailor, but possession is in the bailee.
II Conditional sales agreement., - installment leases.
1. Under the terms of the contract of sale the title is to
remain in the vendor until the full purchase price has
been paid.
2. Inasmuch as title is kept for one purpose, namely to get
the price, the risk is upon the vendee.
3. The possession is in the vendee and upon performing the
condition he will gain title, but upon breach of the
condition the vendor is entitled to possession, and may
recover the specific goods from the vendee or his as-
signs, or may sue either in conversion for the value,
after a demand and refusal,
4. Until breach of condition the vendee may sell such inter-
est as he possesses, or it may be attached by his cred-
itors.
5* A conditional vendee from whom goods have been taken has
fifteen days in which to redeem upon payment of the in-
stalment due and costs.
C Statute of Frauds.
I Applies to contracts involving goods or chose s in action to the
value of $500.00 or over in Massachusetts.
II Contract will be unenforceable unless the statute is satisfied
in any one of three ways:
1. Acceptance .and. receipt
a. Acceptance is mental, - expressing satisfaction with
the goods.
b. Receipt is physical, either the actual physical
possession by the buyer or delivery to a common
carrier for transmission to the buyer satisfies
the requirement.

a* Formerly "earnest" meant something in addition to bind
the bargain; today it has no distinctive meaning,
b. It may be money or money 1 s worth, or even the extin-
guishment of an old debt, but it is not forfeit
money.
2^J!he_jnejaQrandiuiu
a* The memorandum must state the promises of the defend-
ant and be signed by him or his agent, or it must
incorporate other documents in which the essential
terms may be found,
b. The buyer and seller must be identified in the mem-
orandum element in this state,
c. The memorandum may be made any time before suit,
D Conditions and Yfarranties . S 13-18.
1 Warranties.
1. A warranty is an affirmation of a fact or a promise of a
future event.
a. No form of words is necessary; it is not necessary
even that the vendor shall intend to ivarrant for it
is enough if the buyer is led to purchase because
of his statement,
b, A warranty must be more than a mere expression of
opinion or "dealer's talk".
2. In a sale by inspection.
a. An express warranty does not ordinarily cover patent
defects for the doctrine of "caveat emptor" applies
but the seller may, by express statement, however,
protect the buyer even against such patent defects
if the buyer prefers to rely upon the warranty
rather than on his own judgment.
b. There is one implied warranty in a sale by inspection
namely, if the seller is a manufacturer, grower, or
producer that the goods shall be free from latent
defects, not apparent upon reasonable examination.
2. In a sale by description.
a. Two implied warranties:
(1) Goods must answer the description, and
(2) Be merchantable.
4. In a sa le by sample.
a. Three implied warrantie s
:
(1) Goods shall correspond to the sample in bulk;
(2) The buyer shall have the opportunity to com-
pare the goods with the sample unless they are
sent G. 0. D.
(3) Goods shall be merchantable and free from de-
fects not apparent on reasonable examination
of the sample where the seller is a dealer in
goods of that kind,
5. Implied T/rarranty of fitness.
a. Today if food is purchased by a consumer from a
dealer there is an implied warranty that it shall
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be fit for human consumption if the consumer relied
upon the dealer for selection.
(1) This rule does not apply to "trade marked"
goods*
b # At other times there is no such implied warranty un-
less:
(1) The buyer makes known the particular purpose
for which he wishes the goods and relies upon
the seller 1 s skill and judgment, or
(2) Unless such warranty has been annexed by usage
or trade
•
E Valid. Voidable or Void Titles. S. 25-29
I The buyer secures, generally, no better title than the seller
had, to sell.
1. Under the Sales Act retention by the seller of the goods,
is fraudulent and he who first gets possession, be he
an innocent purchaser for value or an attaching credi-
tor, is entitled to the goods.
II If the seller's title is voidable, but has not been avoided,
an innocent purchaser for value may acquire a valid title.
Ill From a thief one gets no title.
F Rights of The Parties ,
1. In the following cases he may retain possession until
payment, or tender of payment of the price
•
a. When goods are sold without stipulation as to
credit; (Cash sales)
b. When goods have been sold on credit but the term
of credit has expired;
c. When the buyer becomes insolvent.
2. The unpaid seller loses his lien,
a* When he delivers the goods to a carrier for the
purpose of transmission to the buyer, unless he
reserves the right to possession;
b. When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains
posse ssion;
c. When he waives his right to the lien by allowing
the buyer to come upon the premises and work
upon the goods.
II The right of stoppage in transit.
1* There must be an unpaid seller who has parted with
title and possession. The goods must be in transit,
and the buyer ias_olvjani.
2. Good3 are in transit from the time they are delivered
to the carrier until under the control of the buyer.
3, If the carrier has not actually or constructively de-
livered the goods to the buyer, it must upon notice
redeliver the goods to the seller.
Ill The seller in event, of breach by thft hnyar may;
1. Resell the goods under certain circumstances and recover
the loss from the buyer.
2 . Sue for the price
.
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3. Sue for damages for nonacceptance • s. 53.
4, Rescind the contract upon notification of his election to
do so,
TV The buyer in event of breach by the seller may;
1. Maintain an action for conversion of the goods if the title
has passed, and the seller wrongfully refuses to deliver,
s. 55.
2. Sue for damages for nondelivery, s. 56.
3. Seek specific performance of the contract, if damages for
nondelivery do not afford an adequate remedy.
4. Rescind the contract.
V_J£ter^_yiej^_Jm^
seller, the buyer may:
1« Keep the goods and set up the breach of warranty by way of
recoupment in diminution of the price.
2. Keep the goods and sue for damages occasioned by the breach
of warranty.
a. The damages will ordinarily be the difference between
the value of the goods received and the value the
goods would have had, had they been as warranted.
3. Refuse to accept the goods, if title has not passed, and
sue for the damages.
4. Rescind the sale by refusing to accept, or by returning,
or offering to return the goods and recover any amount
paid.

D Letters to those who would acquire Property, real and
personal
.
* Rea^ property , - the soil of the earth and every
-
Thing attached thereto in a permanent and sub
stantial manner.
II Additional points in skeleton form.
"Property has its duties as well as its
rights."
Letter to the Landlords of
Tipperary, May 22, 1838
by Thomas Drummond
He that holdeth his lands in fee,
Need neither to shake nor to shiver.
I humbly conceive, for, look, do you see
They are his and his heirs forever.
Lord Hardwicke
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About Trees and Fruit .
Dear Ada:
It is one of those rarely perfect days when the sky
is so blue and the air marvellously clear; the sun is warm
but a cool breeze keeps one ambitious. We left the beach
about seven thirty o'clock this morning, and with mother,
Mrs. Holmes and Frances, started on the King's Highway to
Provincetown. We reached Wellfleet about eleven o'clock and
Mrs. Holmes went calling on friends of other days while the
rest of us enjoyed the hospitality of a delightful Cape Cod
yard. At present, by permission, Frances is busy digging up
small spruces which we hope to plant at our cottage. I am
reminded of your disgust the day you found the automobile
stopped by your field and its occupants engaged in helping
themselves to fruit which overhung the highway. There seems
to be a tremendous misunderstanding in reference to apples,
cherries and grapes that are overhanging travelled roads. I
recall how belligerent the people were that day when you sug-
gested that you would enjoy picking your own fruit. You were
right, and they were wholly wrong; but to a disinterested
listener the odds would have seemed to have been quite the
other way.
Fruit which overhangs either the highway or the
land of another really belongs to the person on whose land
the tree, bushes, or vines grow, and he alone has a right to
it. If, through the force of gravity, the fruit falls to
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the earth its owner may go for it without being a trespasser;
but on the other hand should he shake the tree so that the
apples fall in his neighbor's yard he cannot later remove
them without permission.
The principle which governs fruit overhanging the
highway is the same. Automobilists and pedestrians are not
entitled to it but this bit of law has never been digested
by the American populace*
There is another interesting angle concerning trees
near boundary lines, trees whose branches overhang the neigh-
bor's land. Such branches are trespasses and nuisances, and
can be removed by the owner of the adjacent land. However,
he has no right to the wood; it still belongs to the man on
whose land the tree stands.
Do you recall the fine old maple in Mrs. Cushman's
yard? They were planted by Mr. and Mrs. Oushman shortly
after their marriage, and in the fifty years that had inter-
vened had gained a glorious growth. Mr. Cushman was tremen-
dously proud of them while he lived, and Mrs. Cushman loved
them tenderly. The adjoining property was sold and the new
owner reminded Mrs. Cushman that the branches badly shaded
his buildings and asked permission to trim them up. She
felt so disturbed that she went away the morning it was done
and, poor lady, she wanted to die the afternoon she returned.
The trimming person had done a thorough job, and all the
beauty was gone - it was as if a sharp knife had cut the
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greater portion of one side. At the time I thought the trees
would die; but they are still alive and I often feel as I
pass them by that they are pitifully trying to heal the bruise
and cover their nakedness. He was wholly within his legal
rights; but surely he lacked imagination and appreciation of
beauty - for "only God can make a tree".
I have been asked if overhanging branches can be
removed after a period of twenty years, the time required to
gain an easement by prescription, i. e., a right which cannot
be interrupted? The length of time makes no difference with
trees, for the character of their limbs is constantly chang-
ing but if the eaves of my house overhung your land for
twenty years you could not touoh them.
Frances has taken up four little spruces and be-
cause of the permission we are not trespassers. Now we'll
dump them, ants and all into the trunk, and tomorrow morning
they will become a part of our real estate. We shall lay no
claim to the ants because as wild animals they belong to no
one until reduced to possession, and we certainly have no
desire to domesticate them.
Love,
Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N.Y. 201;
Cora. v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234;
Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 598.
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Rights upon the Beaoh
Dear Mortimor,
I am sorry about Junior's boat, and I do believe
that you will find someone on the water front who will be
more gracious than legal and who will permit you an opportu-
nity to tie the boat up. You ask me if they can prevent you
anchoring your boat. I imagine, yes—but that depends on the
way their deeds read. They tell you that their deeds give
them ownership even under the water and that is quite pos-
sible. Today by statute ownership may go out to low water
mark or a distance not greater than one-hundred rods from
mesne high water mark. In that case the public, of which
you are a part, have a right "to fish, to fowl and to navi-
gate" at high tide. People often wonder what meaning is
attached to the last two expressions. "Fowling" refers to
duck shooting, and "navigating" to rowing or swimming, but
note there is no right of bathing. If your friends on the
beach wanted to be particularly technical they could stop
you, not only from anchoring your boat, but also from bath-
ing at high tide, unless their lots were sold subject to
that privilege for all North Shore colonists.
Over here the beach is owned by the community;
therefore, the problem does not arise. The community speci-
fies the places where boats may be anchored and the places
where the bathing beaches must be kept clear. Why not sell
on the North Shore and buy over here at the Heights? That

118
is a real solution to your problem. We'd love to have you
and Margaret and Hope and Junior for neighbors. Of course,
the inconvenience of selling in these days is a mere detail.
Regretfully yours,
Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 371;
Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. 145;
Cora. v. Ohapin, 5 Pick. 199;
Butler v. Attorney-General, 195 Mass. 79.
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When Mine Becomes Yours.
Dear Margaret,
I do remember your telling me of the old table and
secretary left by your mother in your grandmother's home, but
your letter makes me afraid that it will continue to remain
there. I !m sorry
I
Of course your uncle knew all the while that those
pieces belonged to your mother. Had he lived you could prob-
ably have gotten them, but apparently your letter to his widow
was not too pleasantly received. In fact after all these years
he probably looked upon them as his own and since his death
seven years ago she has certainly treated them as her property
and you people have permitted her to do so.
The law in reference to chattels is that a title by
adverse possession is obtained when chattels are held openly,
notoriously, adversely for a period of six years. So the law
strengthens her position.
I recall one highly amusing case. A stole B's horse,
held him for more than six years when B stole him back again.
Then A sued B for the horse and won. Through holding the horse
for six years and claiming title he had gained an ownership
that could not be questioned even by the original owner.
You, I know, are familiar with the principle that if
I occupy your land openly, notoriously, claiming it to be my
land continuously for a period of twenty years that I gain a
title and right to possession which you cannot dispute. The
same thing is true in reference to personal property but the
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time instead of being twenty years in six.
It is a shame, Margaret. You should have those old
heirlooms and in turn they should go to Hope, hut the law seems
to be on her side. If she won't, she won't; that's all.
If I were you I'd go to see her, talk things over
frankly, try the effect of friendliness. I find that that
approach often helps tremendously.
Devotedly,
Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass. 371.
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Property Owned by Husbands and Wives .
Dear Mother,
I laughed over your letter! So you would really-
like to see me long enough to enable you to consult with your
family lawyer I What do I think father ought to do about the
home place? I have an idea that he will do about whatever
you'd like to have him do. You are asking me if I would ad-
vise his deeding the property so you both would hold it as
tenants by the entirety.
Do you realize that you are paying me a real com-
pliment when you ask my opinion on that score because if I
advise it and see it put through I am cutting myself off from
my statutory right, namely my right as an only child to two-
thirds of his property if he passes away without a will, and
he certainly will never make a will. I wouldn't even suggest
it to him for if I should he'd get the idea that I either de-
sired or expected his immediate demise. However, old dear,
don't worry, whatever there is I should want to be yours. I
shall do no complaining until I see a second marriage in the
offing. Seriously, I think that a husband and wife are very
wise to hold their property as tenants by the entirety.
People may hold real property as tenants in common,
but there is no special advantage to such holding. In the case
of the death of either administration is necessary, and the
share of the deceased person passes to his heirs, but if they
hold as joint tenants, the right of survivorship is stressed.
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By that I mean that if A and B hold as joint tenants and A
dies, his share at once passes to B. This method does away
with the need of taking out administration to settle up the
deceased's estate.
The same words which will make other people joint
tenants will make a husband and wife tenants by the entirety,
and such a holding differs from a joint tenancy only in the
fact that neither one may sell his interest unless the other
agrees; whereas if A and B are joint tenants, A or B can sell
and thus destroy the joint tenancy. The purchaser becomes a
tenant in common with the remaining joint tenant.
In a tenancy by the entirety, which by the way is
possible only to a husband and wife, I have always felt that
a wife was better protected. You take, for example, a man is
in business, if there were law suits, and his property were
attached, often unjustly, creditors could not prevent the prop-
erty held by the entirety from passing to her upon his death,
even though they might during his life control it. Of course
the best thing of all is for a married man to have the home
in his wife's name. Then it cannot be reached at all, but if
he objects to that, and many men do, the other method is the
next best thing.
The tenancy by the entirety is not as popular as it
was a few years ago because recent decisions have determined
that during the period of their lives all benefits are his.
Apparently he can lease and collect the rents and profits,
she cannot. It is attachable for his debts during his lifetime,
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but not for hers, but on the other hand it does away with the
need of administration and if he predeceases her it is hers
absolutely, likewise his if she predeceases him. If a man
holds his real property with his wife either as joint tenants,
for they can hold jointly too, or as tenants by the entirety,
and his personal property is held either jointly or by the en-
tirety, all need of expensive and long drawn out administration
is eliminated and it really works out advantageously.
When F and I first bought the cottage we had the
deed drawn to us as tenants in common, but later when we came
to feel that when one of us died v;e wanted the other to have
the place wholly we changed the deed to a joint deed. To ac-
complish that we had to deed as co-tenants to another; we call
him a straw-man, and then he deeded to us to hold jointly and
that is the way the cottage stands today. It will go to the
survivor if before that time we do not dispose of it.
For father to change over the deed of the home place
it will be necessary for him to deed to some one. I'll do for
a straw-man, and then in turn I 1 11 deed to you both as tenants
by the entirety. A person who owns land may since 1918 deed
to himself and another jointly but he cannot deed to himself
and his wife as tenants by the entirety except he acts through
a straw-man.
One old couple came into the office one day. They
were buying a piece of property and finally decided to have
the deed drt;wn in this fashion. With much hesitation she asked
what would happen if they got a divorce. I didn't even express
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surprise at the possibility but assured her that thereafter
they would hold as tenants in common. They went away satis-
fied and I don ! t know whether they are still tenants by the
entirety or not,
I'll prepare the necessary deeds, if you people say
the word. This may not be as satisfactory as talking the
problem over, but I hope I have answered your questions.
Lovingly yours,
Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37;
Voigt v. Voigt, 252 Mass. 582;
Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428.
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Conditional Conveyances
,
Good or No Good
Dear John,
I have read carefully the deed which your uncle gave
you on his last trip to Boston, covering the old home place
down on the Wescasset shore. I understand now why you wouldn't
stop to talk and why you seemed so troubled.
John, you are perfectly safe in considering the old
place yours for all time. He has attempted to do something
that the law will not permit, and I think you are under no ob-
ligation to tell him that he has been illy advised. You are
the one to whom the place should go, the only one in the family
that cares anything for it and with all his peculiarities and
warped ideas, I ever thought he would leave it to you in bis
will. However, now that he is going to California for the
rest of his days, I can see that he wants to place it in hands
that will keep it up. He told you he ! d sell it to you for .'$100,
and when he got the $100, you got the deed but failed to read
it over at the time.
Was it because he knew that you wanted to marry that
he inserted the provision that he was deeding to you in fee
on condition that you never married? I wonder what girl jilted
him and why he wants to make you a recluse. The law considers
such a condition void and you take the land free and clear of
the condition. You may marry when you like and keep your prop-
erty .
Had he deeded it to you "as long as you remained un-
married", then the lav; would have upheld it on the ground that
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he did not object to marriage but that he was seeking to pro-
vide you with a shelter until another one, your wife's, was
available. We say that one can do by words of limitation what
he cannot do by words of condition.
Had you been once married, John, then the terms of
his deed would be enforced for the law feels that one marriage
is sufficient, but as far as you are concerned the condition
is null and void.
Is it practicing trickery on the old man not to tell
him? I don't think so. He gave you a deed of his own making.
That it will not have the effect he desired is no fault of
yours, and the day may come when jour children may be such a
comfort to him that he will be very glad that he failed to
accomplish what, at a given moment, he thought desirable.
Sincerely,
Ruggles v. Jewett, 213 Mass. 167;
Randall v. Marble, 69 Maine 310.

SUMMARY OF THE IA1V OF PROPERTY
Introduction
I Property is either real or personal.
1. Real property includes lands, tenements and heriditaments,
the last two terms, now synonymous,
2. Personal property includes all goods, chattels—movables.
II The term "land".
1. Trees belong to the individual on whose land they stand
and such person is entitled to fruit of overhanging
branche s
•
a. Such overhanging branches are a nuisance and may be
cut off by the person whose land is invaded.
b. No easement by perscription can be gained.
c. The right of the owner to go on the other* s land to
take wood or fruit depends on whether he is to
blame for its presence there.
2. Growing trees are land, and trees which have fallen and
nothing further has been do-ie with them :ass under a
deed thereof.
a. In a sale of standing timber the doctrine of con-
structive severance applies in this state.
(1) Oral agreement to convey is good; no title
passes except upon severance.
3. Title to ice is in the owner of the soil on or over which
the water rests, or runs.
a. If title is in the public, as in great ponds—bodies
of water of more than 20 acres, or in navigable
rivers—where the tide ebbs and flows , then the
public has title to the ice formed thereon, and it
belongs to the first appropriator
.
b. Ice formed on a non-navigable stream belongs to the
riparian owners.
(1) For the purposes of sale ice is regarded as
personal property and so is not within the
fourth section of the Statute of Frauds.
4. Natural crops
—
products of the earth which are permanent
in their nature and do not depend primarily for their
growth upon the care and labor of man.
a. The?/ follow the land to the heir or the devisee.
b. For the purposes of sale are considered as personal
property and the sale may be oral.
5. Emblements—products of the earth which are raised annu-
ally, and depend on the care and labor of man.
a. Emblements are personal property, but as between a
grantor and grantee of land they will pas?: under
the deed to the grantee in the absence of
reservation.
B The Law of fixtures.
The chief test to determine whether fixtures are real fixtures or
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personal fixtures is the intention of the party making the annexation.
Three classes of eveidence are introduced to prove this intention.
I Character of the annexation* Weakest evidence.
1. If the chattel is so affixed to the land as to lose its
identity, or cannot he removed vri.th.out material injury
to the land or to itself it has become a part of the
realty.
II Adaptability of the fixture to the realty*
1. The tendency is to regard every fixture as real property
which has been attached to the realty with a view to
the purpose for which the realty is held or employed,
except as between landlord and tenant.
III Relation of the parties, the most important of all.
1. Between the tenant for life and the remainderman or
reversioner.
a. The life tenant is favored hence the chattels which
he annexed would belong to his personal represent-
atives, G.L. c. 184, s. 12.
2. Between the landlord and tenant.
a. The tenant is favored.
(1) The chattel may be removed before his tenancy
expires, or before he has quit possession but
he loses the right to remove fixtures annexed
during his term if he renews his lease and re-
mains continuously in possession unless the
new agreement, lease or renewal expressly
permits the ri^ht.
(2) If the landlord prevents the removal he is li-
able to the tenant for damages, or the tenant
may remove the fixtures after the term has
expired if he can do so peaceably.
(3) A purchaser of the property is chargeable with
the rights of a tenant in possession.
3. Bet.veen a mortgagor and mortgagee of land.
a. '^Whatever is placed in a building subject to a mort-
gage by a mortgagor or those claiming under him,
to carry out the purposes for which it was erected,
and permanently to increase its value for occupation
or use, although it may be removed without injury to
itself or the building, becomes a part of the realty."
The mortgage is favored.
4. Bet.'/een mortgagee of land and mortgagee of chattels.
a. In Massachusetts the real property mortgage covers
fixtures placed on the land either before or after
the mortgage was made, and therefore the real prop-
erly mortgagee has preference over the chattel
mortgagee unless he agreed to the chattel mortgage.
C Estates in fee Simple.
Real property can include only freehold estates.
I Freeholds at common law
1. The fee simple—an estate of inheritance.
2. The fee tail—an estate of inheritance.
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3, The estate for life--not an estate of inheritance at
common law, but by statute an estate for autre vie
is made an estate of inheritance,
4. By statute, leases for one hundred years or more are
freehold estates of inheritance so long as fifty years
thereof remain unexpired.
The fee simple
.
A freehold in perpetuity, descending to all heirs of
the owner, both collateral and lineal*
I Facts concerning:
1. Prior to 1912 the conveyance had to be to the grantee and
his "heirs"
.
No other word was equivalent.
2. No living man has heirs; hence the presence of the word
"heirs" grants nothing to the heirs, It is a word of
limitation and no4-- of purchase,
3. The word "heirs" could be incorporated by reference at
common law.
E The fee on condition. An estate with a qualification annexed by which
the estate may, on the happening of particular event, be created,
enlarged, or destroyed.
I Condition precedent vs. the condition subsequent.
1. The court favors the condition subsequent.
2. Apt words--"if," provided," w on condition,"—are necessary
in a deed to create a fee on condition. If not present,
the particular clause will be interpreted to be a cov-
enant rather than a condition because a breach of a con-
dition may result in a forfeiture. Not true in a will.
3. If the condition precedent is void, or for any reason im-
possible of performance, no estate can vest.
4. If a condition subsequent is void or impossible of per-
formance through no fault of the grantee, the title
vests in him free of the condition.
5. If no time is fixed to the condition, by statute of
July 16, 1887, the property will be freed from the con-
dition at the expiration of thirty years, except in
cases of gifts, or devises, for public, charitable or
religious purposes.
6. Any condition which is a general restraint on alienation
is void.
7. Conditions in either general or partial restraint of
marriage contained in gift of personal property are
void, but in transfers of real property a condition
in partial restraint, not general, is valid as far as
first marriages are cc ~erned, if reasonable. Con-
ditions in total restraint of first carriages are void
but good when appled to second marriages,
a. A restraint on marriage which is void if expressed
in the form of a condition is valid if done by
means of a limitation.
8. In case of a breach of condition subsequent either the
grantor or his heirs may enter and defeat the estate,
but until such entry the estate is not defeated.
9. Whenever an estate is granted upon condition subsequent
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there remains with the grantor a possibility of reverter,
a. Such possibility of reverter may be willed but not
deeded*
(1) If the grantor attempts to deed his possibility
of reverter he conveys nothing, but also de-
stroys the possibility of reverter and give the
holder of the defeasible fee, a fee simple
absolute
•
F Estates for life* A freehold interest held by the tenant for the term of
his own life or for that of another person, the latter is called a
tenant per autre vie
•
I Life estates are convention al or legal*
1. Conventional life estates, those created by acts of the
parties, whether by deed or will.
2. Legal life estates, created bv operation of law, without
any act of the parties—curtesy, dower.
II Facts concerning;
1. Life estates may be freely conveyed, sold, leased or
mortgaged, and are subject to attachment and sale for
debts.
2. The life tenant must keep the property wind and water tight.
He is liable both for voluntary and permissive waste
while the tenant at will is liable only for voluntary
waste •
a. Nothing constitutes waste which is dictated by good.
III Curtesy. At common law the life estate of the husband in all
of the estates of inheritance of which the wife was seised
during coverture provided there was issue of the marriage
born alive and capable of inheriting. By stature of 1902
curtesy and common law dower are now analogous.
IV Dower. The life estate of the wife in one -third of the estates
of inheritance of which her husband was seised during
coverture
.
G Joint tenancies.
I Facts concerning;
1. Every joint tenancy must have four unities; Unity of time;
Unity of title; Unity of possession; Unity of interest.
2. Joint tenancies can be created only be purchase, e.g. by
will or by deed, but never by descent,
3. The chief distinguishing feature is the right of survivor-
ship.
4. A conveyance by one joint tenant to a stranger makes the
tram "eree a tenant in common as to the share thus trans-
ferred. In the interest so conveyed the right of survivor-
ship is destroyed.
H Tenancies in common.
I Facts concerning;
1. A tenancy in common may have all four unities, but the only
unity which is necessary is the unity of possession.
2. There is no right of survivorship in a tenancy in common,
but there may be curtesy and dower.
Z
. If one co-tenant ousts the other from possession then,

then only, vri.ll an action in trespass lie.
4. One tenant in common is ordinarily not liable to his
co-tenant for bhe cost of improvements or repairs.
I Tenancies by the entirety. Held by husband and wife together so long
as both live end, efter the death of either, by the survivor.
I Facts concerning;
1. All the four unities are present and also the unity of
person.
2. A tenancy by the entirety is a species of joint tenancy.
3* An absolute divorce \vill terminate an estate by the en-
tirety, but not a mere legal separation.
4. While coverture existf the husband has the entire use of
the estate in entirety, and his right to the use, rents,
and profits of the estate during coverture may be con-
veyed, leased mortgaged or assigned by him.
5. A tenant by the entirety is not entitled to have partition
at least without the consent of the other party of tne
tenancy.

Deeds and Mortgages—lands conveyed between living
parties,
1, Another summary.
In Indenture or Deed
In indenture or deed
Tho 1 a thousand you read
Neither comma nor colon you* 11 ken 1
A stop intervening
Might determine the meaning
And what would the lawyers do then?
Chance for change of construction gives
chance for new flaws;
When the sense is once fixed; there's an
end of the cause.
Samuel Bishop.
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When You Must Own _a Home .
Dear Leon,
You are quite right, it is the buyer's market as
far as real estate is concerned and the summer of 1933 will
probably mark the lowest price level for many a year.
People surprise me so much by their lack of every-
day knowledge when they come to purchase real estate. Mrs.
Nash came to the office recently. She was frantic. She
thought she was to own the old Marshall place on the River
Road—had drawn her money from the bank, had sent her furni-
ture over the road, and had that morning received a letter
from Marshall that he "guessed they'd better not sell, Ma
felt pretty bad about leaving the old place."
Leon, can you imagine the Nashes, intelligent people
that they are, having gone to that point in their negotiations
without having a scrap of paper to show their contract? If
Marshall had been obdurate they would have lost out and I tell
you that my heart was in my mouth when I drove out to see
them that night. It was not any legal big stick which finally
persuaded the old couple to sign the paper I carried with me.
It cost the Nashes two hundred additional dollars to learn
that any contract concerning buying or selling of real estate
must be evidenced by a writing signed by both parties in or-
der to be enforceable against both in our courts.
I didn't mind the Nashes paying the Marshalls the
additional money; it is a magnificent old place and well
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worth all they paid and more. I told them in terms emphatic
that they were exceedingly fortunate to get the property at
any price. You see there is a most desirable shore site
with the property and they have a scheme to commercialize it
which may prove most excellent. This particular angle I
didn't know until after the agreement to purchase had been
signed. Then I asked them if they had had the title examined.
Of course, the answer was no. I was most uneasy for I had
visions that the land might be restricted but luck was with
them and they are having a delightful summer renovating the
old place.
People seem to think, Leon, that money spent for
title examination is money thrown away. I'll confess that
the charges made by some of the title examiners approach
highway robbery, but there are still honest people who charge
honest prices and who do honest work. Miss C in my office is
dependable to the extreme. She knows the work thoroughly and
is careful and painstaking. I never worry about titles that
she passes upon and her prices are right.
One man who was selling told me recently that my
client didn't have to bother with any title examination,
that he had paid $5 six months before to have the title run
down and that he bought the place after it had been in one
family for one hundred and fifty years. I had great diffi-
culty in persuading the would be purchaser to let Miss C
check it over at a charge of $35, even though I knew that
that was the most dangerous piece of property to buy.

She unearthed so much trouble that the sale fell
through. An old undischarged mortgage reared its head,
heirs who had never signed off were discovered, traced to
Pennsylvania but we couldn't go further with them they may be
dead, or in distant climes, but they are the people who
appear so unexpectedly on one's doorstep and make life miser-
able. The deal was off, and the would be vendor is a wiser
man. He is raving over his five dollars. I told him he
got all he paid for, a sense of security for six months.
People are so foolish. If you find what you want, be sure
that the agreement to sell is carefully and fully drawn up,
all terms plainly stated, all rights defined. I always de-
mand a warranty deed, it may be old fashioned but I prefer
it and then be sure that a reliable title examiner passes on
the title before you accept the deed and make payment.
Best wishes ever,
Williams v. Carty, 205 Mass. 396;
Quinn v. Quinn, 260 Mass. 494;
Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32.
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The Requisites of a_ Valid Deed.
Dear Leon,
So you have finally bought on Glenview Street. I
hope you will be as enthusiastic over your purchase as we
are over ours on Beacon Hill.
You can accomplish what you desire but not in the
way you suggest. You tell me that the deed is in your name
but that you wish it were in Arlie's for business reasons
and wonder if before recording you could erase your first
name and substitute hers. Such procedure would not give
her title, Leon.
Land can be conveyed between living persons only
by deed. When Harris delivered to you that instrument,
signed and sealed, he gave you title and if you wish to give
title to Arlie you too must prepare a deed properly signed
and sealed and deliver it to her. Since 1912 in our state
husbands and wives may deed directly to each other, but you
cannot accomplish the result by merely substituting her name
for yours in Harris's deed. One may destroy his deed but
not his title. If you deed to her be sure that both deeds
are placed on record in the Middlesex Registry because
Arlington is in Middlesex County and whether you decide to
deed to her or not put yours on record at once for only by
having it recorded can you be sure of protecting your title
against innocent purchasers. There is a well-known old case:
A deeded to B in 1860 but B did not record his deed until
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1866. A died in 1864 and his son as his heir sold the place
to C who had no knowledge of any prior rights of B, and C
placed his deed on record in 1865 and C was the winner. Our
recording statute favors the individual who first records his
deed as long as he acts honestly. You say, M 0h those are
things that never happen," but they do. Don't kid yourself.
As ever,
Carr v. Frye, 325 Mass. 531;
Chessman v. Whittemore 23 Pick. 231.
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The Mortgage and the Insurance Policy .
Dear Mr . Razee
,
There is a provision in the General Laws which
does provide that if the mortgaged premises are transferred
without the assent of the insurance company that the policy
is null and void but that provision has been interpreted to
refer to the mortgagor or the person to whom he has conveyed
and as a mortgagee you are not affected at all. Where the
building has been destroyed by fire you are entitled to the
amount of the mortgage from the insurance company, for the
policy is made out in your name as your interest shall appear.
However since Mr. Allen sold his equity in the premises with-
out getting in touch with the company the Globe people will
ask you to assign to them the note and the mortgage that they
may look either to the land or to the mortgagor for the amount
paid to you. In this way the statute is made vital.
I am writing promptly that your mind may be satis-
fied. You see your informant told the truth,- but not the
whole truth,- and as a result you were a bit uncertain as to
whether you lost or won. You win.
Sincerely yours,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 175, s. 99;
Whiting v. Burkhardt, 178 Mass. 535.
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Second Mortgagees Considered
Dear Mr. Finley,
There was a time when people used to speak of in-
vestments being as sound as real estate, but that day seems
to be gone forever.
As the market is, I fear very much that if the
first mortgagee forecloses on the Greene property, as he is
now threatening to do, that your second mortgage will be
completely wiped out. That property has never justified the
two mortgages, a first mortgage of $10,000 and a second of
$6,000 mean a burden under which the mortgagor with decreased
rentals can hardly continue to stand up. He will be obliged
to let it go and I think him wise not to attempt longer to
stagger under the load.
But if the first mortgagee forecloses, I doubt if
the sale will bring enough to cover the first mortgage even,
and there will be nothing left for you.
It is true that you still hold a note as does the
first mortgagee and the mortgagor will continue to be liable
on those notes. However, one can hardly get water from an
empty well. If Greene has to let the foreclosure sale go
through, I doubt if he will have money with which to meet
any unpaid balance on the first mortgage, to say nothing of
the second.
If you felt the place was worth the amount of the
first mortgage, it might not be a bad idea, if you have
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$10,000 available, to pay the first mortgage and get an as- •
signment of it. Then you might be able to foreclose and hold
the property till the dawn of a better day.
Truly yours
,
Oook v. Basley, 123 Mass. 396,
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DEEDS
A Deeds in use in Massachusetts
I The Warranty Deed .
1. The granting words of a warranty deed are "give, grant
bargain, sell and convey "
2. The long form ^varranty deed crvenants as follows:
"I hereby for myself and my heirs, executors, and
administrators, covenant with the grantee and his heirs
and assigns that I am lawfully seized in fee simple of
the granted premises; that they are free from all incum-
brances, that I have good right to sell and convey the
same as aforesaid; and that I will, and my heirs, exec-
utors, and administrators shall, warrant and defend the
same to the grantee and his heirs and assigns forever
against the lawful claims and demands of all persons."
II The Quit Claim Deed.
1. The granting words are "remise, release and forever quit-
claim.
2. The covenants commonly appearing in the long form quit-
claim deed are as follows:
"And I hereby, for myself and my heirs, executors and
administrators, covenant with the grantee, and his
heirs and assigns that the released premises are free
from all incumbrances made or suffered by me, and that
I will and my heirs, executors and administrators shall,
warrant and defend the same to the grantee and his heirs
and assigns against the lawful claims and demands of all
persons claiming by, through or under me , but against no
other."
III The Short Forms Act , passed in 1912 effective January 1, 1913,
provides shorter forms both for warranty and quitclaim deeds.
1. The short form warranty deed is expressed "with warranty
covenants," while the short form quitclaim deed states
simply "with quitclaim covenants."
IV Grantors and Grantees .
1. The deed of an insane person under guardianship is abso-
lutely void, but if not under guardianship, his deed
is voidable only. The paramount right of infants and
insane persons to avoid their deeds may be exercised
against an innocent purchaser for value from the grantee
.
2. If not named grantees must be ascertained by description
so as to be distinguished from all others.
3. Since January 1, 1923 property may be deeded to a partner-
ship in the partnership name
.
4. If the name of the grantee has been left blank and author-
ity given to an agent to fill in such blank such author-
ity in Massachusetts must be under seal to make a
conveyance valid if the grantee is cognizant of the
blank.
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V Consideration .
1. Actual want of consideration is not good ground, in the
absence of fraud, for the avoidance of a deed by the
grantor. The seal purports consideration.
2. In Massachusetts the clause in the deed acknowledging
consideration affords only prima facie proof of the
fact, and may be rebutted by parol evidence.
a. It is not competent to show that no consideration
was paid, only that the consideration was greater
or less than that named, or altogether different
from it.
VI Proper Execution of a Deed .
1. To be valid even between the parties a deed must be
signed
,
sealed , and delivered, and for the purposes of
recording; it must be acknowledged
.
Acknowledgment by
one grantor is sufficient.
a . Xhe signing may be by mark or by the hand of another
person in the grantor's presence.
b. Since 1929 no attached seal is required if the
grantor recites in the instrument that "this is a
sealed instrument
c. Delivery may be actual physical delivery to the
grantee or delivery to an agent or in escrow, but
in order to have a valid delivery there must have
been intent to deliver.
(1) By statute the recording of a deed by the
grantor is conclusive evidence of delivery in favor
of innocent purchasers for value.
2. To be binding upon purchasers from the grantor without
notice the deed must be recorded in the county in which
the land lies.
a. Deeds between husband and wife are not effective to
pass title between them unless and until acknowledged
and recorded during the lifetime of both.
VII Validity of a Deed .
1. If a deed was obtained through misrepresentations, fraud,
duress or undue influence equity will set it aside.
2. If through accident or mistake the deed fails to convey
the t^act of land concerning which the agreement was
made equity will reform the deed if possible,
a. To enlarge a deed the Statute of Frauds must have
been satisfied either by a writing or part per-
formance .
B The Parts of the Deed
_I Premi se s .
1. In a warranty deed the granting words are "give, grant,
bargain, sell and convey"; in a quitclaim deed, "remise,
release and forever quitclaim."
2. A grant of land carries with "all rights, easements;
privileges and appurtenances."
3. In order that title to land may pass by deed, it must be
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described by metes and bounds, or by a general
description.
a. Description by metes and bounds may be divided
into two classes:
(1) Those where the premises are described at
length, and
(2) Those in which such a description is incor-
porated by reference to another deed or plan
.
(a) Be sure that the reference incorporates
and is not a mere title reference.
(b) An incorporated reference may build up a
prior description but it can never cut it
down
.
b. Where land is described in reference to monuments the
following rules have been laid down.
(1) If the land is described by courses and dis-
tances and also by monuments which are certain,
monuments govern, and the measurements, if
they do not correspond must yield.
(2) If land is described as extending "to" a non-
navigable stream, the land conveyed extends to
the thread of the stream, but if the stream is
navigable the land extends to low water mark.
(3) If the description is "to the bank," the land
conveyed does not extend to the thread of the
stream.
(4) If a natural pond has a definite low water
mark, the presumption is that title to land
described as "extending to the pond" extends
to the low water line . If an artificial pond
is raised by dam the presumption is that title
extends to the thread of the stream.
(5) Ownership "on the seashore" is to low water
mark, subject to the right of the public to
fish, fowl and navigate but not to bathe. The
low water mark must not exceed 100 rods in
width from the high water mark.
(6) If land is bounded "By the highway," public or
private title extends to the middle if the
grantor owns that far
.
(7) If the description reads "beginning at the stake
and stone on the southerly side of the road
—
thence by said roed," then the boundary follows
along the side of the road.
II Habendum . The part which usually describes the quantum of the
estate granted.
1. Today by 0. L. Ch. 183, s. 13, "heirs" or "assigns" or
"other technical words of inheritance shall not be neces-
sary to convey or reserve an estate in fee."
III Reddendum . That portion of a deed which contains reservations,
exceptions, conditions or restrictions if any.
1.. A_ re servation is a new and independent right or interest
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in favor of the grantor (but not of a stranger) which
he did not before enjoy.
a. Whether a provision is an exception or a reservation
does not depend upon the use of the word "reserv-
ing" or "excepting."
b. Prior to 1912 if a reservation was to be more than
a life estate the word "heirs" was needed.
2_. An exception is an existing right or interest in the
grantor which is excluded from the conveyance,
a. No words of inheritance were ever necessary in case
of an exception.
3_. Restrictions . These are contract stipulations, or cov-
enants inserted in the deed, the violation or which may
be restrained by injunction, or may be ma.de the basis
of an action for damages. The violation of such re-
striction does not, however, work a forfeiture of the
estate. The courts favor restrictions rather than con-
ditions for this reason.
p . If a deed is given under a General Improvement
scheme rights may arise against a grantee and his
assignees in other lot holders whose deeds are
subject to similar restrictions.
(1) If no such improvement scheme is found no
action could be brought except by the original
grantor or his assignees.
IV Covenants
1 . In a warranty deed .
a. The covenants of seisin , of title or right to convey .
and against incumbrances, are broken, if at all,
at the moment of the delivery of the deed, and so
become a chose in action which by law is not as-
signable .
b. The covenant of warranty runs with the land conveyed
and any heir or assignee of the grantee, to whom
the estate may afterwards come, is entitled,
whether heirs, and assigns of the grantee are, or
are not mentioned in the covenant, to maintain an
action upon it in case of breach,
(l) If a grantor by warranty deed conveys to an
innocent purchaser, land to which he has no
title, any subsequent acquired title will
enure to the benefit of the purchaser and his
assignees
.
(a) If the deed is a quitclaim deed subse-
quently acquired title does not pass
unless such is the clear intention.
(b) In order to constitute a breach of the
covenant of warranty it is necessary
that there should be not only a want or
defect of title, but an actual eviction
or ouster or what in law is deemed
equivalent thereto.
I 1
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2_. In a_ quitclaim deed .
a. The grantor covenants that the premises are free only
from incumbrance s made or suffered by him and in
case of ouster he will be responsible only if those
causing the ouster claim by, through or under him.
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Are You a Tenant at '.Yill or for Years ?
Dear Mr. Fletcher,
The paper which you brought into the office reads,
"to lease you the land at the corner of Sim and Maple streets
for use as a parking space for a period of three years or
until such time as the party of the first part should have
an opportunity to sell."
It is the last clause which defeats your conten-
tion. The paper does not constitute a lease as you contend,
for a lease has to be in writing and for a definite period
of time. Unfortunately, the last clause makes the time in-
definite. If you are not holding under a lease you are, in-
stead, but a tenant at will, whose tenancy can be terminated
at any time by giving a notice in writing equal to your
rental period and to take effect upon a rental day, or you
may be leased out, for any lease given by the lessor termi-
nates your tenancy.
Tenants at will can be created either orally, or
in writing, but if by a writing the term must be indefinite
as it is here.
Under the circumstances, you have no choice except
to vacate, even though the man is not selling, but leasing
the parking space to another.
Truly yours,
Dennet v. Nisson, 244 Mass. 299.

Ill Landlord and Tenant
.
1. For the benefit of those who own and those
who hire.
Certum est quod certum reddi potest
"That is certain which can be made certain in
some way",
And, therefore, if the lessor, in a lease for
years, should say
"For so many years as J may name", uncertainty
there ' s none
,
Since J has power to fix the term of years the
lease may run.
Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria
Of his own wrong, no suitor can in law, advantage
take
And therefore if a party to a lease condition
break
Y/hence, by its terms, the lease is void, he still
by it is tried
The option to avoid the lease rests with the other
side
.
Latin Maxims
Foster
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Even a Landlord Has Rights
Dear Clara,
It was pleasant indeed to see you again last eve-
ning, but I confess I was selfish enough to be sorry to find
other guests and really I was infuriated by Miss Smith, who-
ever she may be.
Forgive me, but I surely went away with the feel-
ing that she had the making of a first-class crook and that
she, because of her money and position, was no better than
the lowest street trickster. In fact, I think I resent
trickery and lying more in a person of her apparent attain-
ment and means than in the person who has never had a square
deal out of life. If I had ever opened my mouth last night
it would have been too bad, for I should have enjoyed telling
her what I thought of her methods. People have strange
ideas of humor and fair dealing.
As you well know, Frances and I have had more than
one lease on this hill. Twice we have moved during the
lease, but never for a moment have we thought of jumping the
obligation. Doesn't one's word mean anything to him? Ap-
parently it doesn't to her. I recall the apartment we had
on West Cedar Street. 77e expected to sign a lease; we agreed
to sign one, and, although the agreement was not enforceable
because the owner had no writing to that effect signed by us,
when the time came that we wanted to leave, we told him that
we would be responsible for the rent until we could provide
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a substituted tenant for the expected period and we did.
Even if one isn't legally bound, isn't he ever morally bound?
Apparently she recognizes neither legal nor moral obligation.
You know I thought she showed the size of her soul
when, with much delight, she related her method of handling
the situation. When the time came to give a notice she gave
it through her lawyer and demanded a return receipt. There
are plenty of situations where such conduct is justified,
but apparently she had always received fine treatment from
him. You know I think people by that kind of pettiness bring
on themselves the very thing they would prevent. It is a
law of life that smallness begets smallness, and faith be-
gets faith. I could have forgiven her that and accepted her
as a shrewd, calculating person, but when she told how she
lied as to the amount she could pay, and how she put the
other tenants up to the game, so that the owner faced the
alternative of an empty house or complying with their unrea-
sonable demands --we11 , I was furious.
What has brought this country today to its present
condition except graft, crookedness, lying to one's fellow
men, trickery? '"hen I see a woman, educated, financially
able, stooping to such means, I wonder if there is any hope
for us. She surely left a bad taste with me, and I'm not
even apologizing to you for thus criticizing your guest. Be
thankful I was in your home and, of necessity, silent. Per-
haps you noticed that I didn't say upon leaving that I was
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delighted to have met her. I wasn f t delighted she had
tended to destroy faith in women of my generation.
Still seeing red,
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The Lease and Its Multiplicity of Terms
Dear Clara,
You hope I have cooled down. I have, my sense of
humor has come to the front. Will I tell you what I think
you ought to know concerning leases? Gladly.
In the first place, if you are taking a lease of
that apartment on Pinckney Street, he sure that you get the
things done before you sign any lease, in fact before you
move in. You know nothing of the owner and if he has agreed
to paper and paint in consideration of your taking a lease
for three years, you can safely sign the agreement "to take
a lease when the work is done" to your satisfaction, but it
isn't safe to sign the lease. Note I suggest "your satis-
faction." He may be unwilling to promise that and I don*t
criticize if he does, but at least the agreement should read,
if he asks for your signature on one, that the work will be
done in "a workman-like fashion."
When all is in readiness and you are presented with
the lease, read it carefully. It will probably be a form
lease, and those are drawn for the benefit of landlords and
not tenants, I assure you. You will be wise to understand
it thoroughly. In the first place, note if you are signing
one of those renewal things which call for notice one month
or two months before the period is up. They are all right,
but they are dangerous because it is easy to forget the day
on which you must notify the landlord of your desire to quit;
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and if you do forget, you are once more a lessee for another
period of similar duration. If possible, see that the pro-
vision is eliminated.
Again, remember that unless the landlord agrees to
repair you are liable for the repairs and you should not be.
Frequently leases provide that the landlord may enter to see
if the premises are in need of repair. That provision does
not help you; it merely enables him to look over the prem-
ises without being a trespasser. The ideal provision con-
cerning repairs from your standpoint is to have him covenant
that he will repair and maintain the premises in good con-
dition.
Read carefully the provisions that would make you
liable for any one injured upon the premises, the provisions
which would prevent you from driving nails into the walls
and making reasonable use of the house, the provisions which
would prevent you from assigning your lease to another with-
out his consent, and a dozen other prohibitions. After you
have weighed the meaning of all of these things then proceed
to have them stricken out.
Another thing, Clara, try to get a provision in-
serted that the lease would be terminated upon your death.
If that provision is not put in, your estate would be liable
for the rent for the balance of the term, and that is most
unfortunate. A landlord has just collected the rent for
three years from the estate of a Boston school teacher who
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died very shortly after she had entered into the lease.
It is wise to have the right of renewal and a pro-
vision that you shall pay at the same rental for such time
as you hold over after the expiration of the lease. The
value of this last provision depends, of course, on the hope
that we are facing better days and that rents may advance.
One last word, perhaps before you sign that lease
it would be wise to let your lawyer friend read it over.
Sincerely ever,
Kimball v. Cross, 136 Mass. 300;
Kabley v. Worcester Gas Light Co., 103 Mass 392.
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All About Assigning
Dear Mrs. Davis,
You may either assign or sublet your apartment in
Cambridge for the balance of your lease, and I think you are
very fortunate to find a Harvard Instructor who is willing
to take it over. That will enable you to go to Florida for
the winter, and enjoy the warmth and sunshine of that play-
time land.
I would suggest that you assign by passing over to
him your lease on which you have endorsed the following, "In
consideration of one dollar and other valuable consideration
I hereby assign and set over unto all my right,
title and interest to the within lease." Follow this state-
ment by a seal and your signature.
The man will then become liable to Mr. Orchard,
the landlord, because of privity of estate, upon the cove-
nants of the lease. The seal will establish liability
whether he enters into occupation or not, and without it he
would not be liable for the rent until he took possession.
You, too, will remain liable to Mr. Orchard be-
cause of privity of contract, so if he does not get the rent
from the new tenant he will look to you. Let us hope there
is no reason for that to happen. The ideal thing would be
if the landlord would give you a release in writing and take
Mr. Harvard Man in your place, but he is not liable to do
that
.
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There is one problem about an assignee. He can
ever escape future liability by assigning to another regard-
less of whom that person may be. Thereby he destroys his
privity of estate. But this man will be at Harvard through
the school year, and as your lease expires in May I don't
believe that you will have any difficulty.
It is much better to assign than sublet whenever
possible. Subletting means that you still keep control and
the rent would be paid to you and you, in turn, would take
care of the landlord. By assigning you are freed from far
more anxiety.
Have I answered your questions?
Cordially yours,
Saunders v. Partridge, 100 Mass. 556;
Collins v. Pratt, 181 Mass 345;
Farrington v. Kimball, 126 Mass. 313;
Bailey v. Meade, 250 Mass. 46.
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Repairs and Injuries
Dear Margaret,
'J7e had a tragic case come in the office recently.
A woman hired an apartment on the third floor of one of
these three-decker affairs. She had five rooms and a back
porch, and after a time one of the posts on the piazza seemed
to be weak and rotten at the base. She showed it to the
landlord when he collected the rent but nothing was done
about it, nor do I think he even promised to do anything.
Last week, her small youngster, four years old,
racing up and down the porch crashed into the piazza railing
close by the post and it gave way and he was hurled to the
yard below and killed.
There is no legal right to recover, Margaret.
Landlords are under no duty to repair premises under the
exclusive control of tenants unless they contract to do so
at the time of letting. The tenant is responsible for re-
pairs and, because in control, he is liable for injuries
caused by the defective conditions.
I have been almost ill over the tragedy of it all.
Devotedly,
Jordan v. Sullivan, 181 Mass. 348;
Salsman v. Frisch, 276 Mass. 228;
Cormier v. Weener, 277 Mass. 518.

155
Ousted or Not Ousted and The Resul ts Arising
Dear Alma,
Your letter reminded me of the winter Frances and
I put in on Pinckney Street. I cannot tell you how thank-
ful we have been during this charming season of zero and
sub-zero days to be in our own home, running our own oil
heater.
Many a morning, I studied with overshoes on, a
bath robe and heavy coat. Frances used to say she got break-
fast in her fur-lined gloves. Rarely would the thermometer
go above 58° during the forenoon in that $90 a month apart-
ment. It may have been healthy, but it was decidedly uncom-
fortable.
We used to talk about our rights. We did make a
complaint to the Housing Commission. We could have moved
out and avoided future rent on the ground that his failure to
supply us with heat constituted a constructive eviction, that
is, a deliberate taking away from us of our enjoyment of the
property.
There are two kinds of evictions, an actual evic-
tion, the physical deprivation of the tenant of some part of
the premises let, and the constructive eviction of which I
have just written.
A man hired a house, found the attic locked. The
landlord refused the key to the attic, and the tenant occu-
pied the rest of the house for the year and paid no rent.
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None could be collected from hirn for the eviction was
actual
.
On the other hand, a tenant in the Little Building
lost her key and was denied the right to have another made
by the persons in authority. She had access to her office
because the door was unlocked, but she had no enjoyment of
the premises. The lessor's act was a deliberate one, it de-
prived her of rights in the premises and during the term of
the lease she moved out and was not liable for the rent for
the remainder of the period.
If you decide that the landlord is making no effort
to give you heat, you may move out if you do so while the
weather is cold. You could hardly wait until spring, blessed
word, and then expect to depart without liability.
Let me hear from you again, before you really leap.
Sincerely yours,
Moore v. Mansfield, 182 Mass. 302;
Smith v. McEn?ney, 170 Mass. 26;
Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33;
Longwood Towerb v. Doyle, 267 Mass. 368.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW SUMMARIZED
A» The Relationship Established .
The relation of landlord and tenant arises only by virtue of a
contract, express or implied, under which one occupies or has posses-
sion of the land of another either for a definite period of time or
at will.
I Kinds of Tenancies.
1
.
For years--when holding under a written lease for a
definite period of time, even though for less than a
year
.
2. At will—exists when there is an oral demise or written
lease for an indefinite time.
3. At sufferanee
-
-exists when one remains on premises after
right to hold has expired though his original entry
wa s lawful
.
B. The Lease.
I Facts concerning.
1. Leases should be made in duplicate, and signed by both
lessor and lessee.
2. A lease should be under seal, but so slight is the in-
terest in land that lease is valid between the parties
and those having actual notice even though it is not a
sealed instrument.
3. Oral evidence is not admissible to contradict or modify a
written lease
.
4. A lease becomes effective to vest the estate in the lessee
upon its delivery and if no time is named in the lease
for the commencement of the term the date of delivery
fixe s the time
.
II The Lease Obtained by Fraud.
1. A lease obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation is
voidable
.
a. The right to rescind may be lost by acquiescence.
2. A lease made with the intent that the premises be used for
any unlawful purpose is absolutely void.
3. A lease made on Sunday is void.
a. If the lessee under a Sunday lease subsequently en-
ters and occupies he is liable for use and occupa-
tion.
III Subject Matter Included in a Lease .
1. A lease of a building passes the land on which it stands
and also all land adjacent thereto.
a. Because of this fact the lessee continues to be
liable for rent even though the building is de-
stroyed by fire unless the lease provides other-
wise .
2. Vihere different floors of a building are let to different
persons a lease of any one floor carries no estate in
the land under the building
.
IV Recording of Leases.
1. Under the following conditions leases must be recorded in
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the Registry of Deeds in the County where the land lies
in order to be valid and binding against persons other
than the immediate parties, their assigns and heirs, and
parties with actual notice.
a. If a lease is given for more than seven years*
b. If for less than seven years if the right of renewal
would carry it beyond seven.
c. If for a term of less than seven years, but not to
take effect until the expiration of such time as
would bring its termination beyond the seven years.
C. Assignment and Sub-letting of Leases.
I What Constitutes an Assignment.
1. If a lessee transfers his entire interest to another for
his whole or remaining term it is an assignment.
2. A transfer of less than the whole interest, or the whole
interest for a period less than the balance of the term,
is a sub-lease.
II Form of the Assignment or Sub-Lease .
1« An endorsement on the back of the lease stating that the
lessee transfers "all right, title and interest in and
to the within lease" includes whatever lease -hold estate
the lessor has and satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
a. Inasmuch as leases are under seal the assignment it-
self should be under seal.
b. If the assignment is not under seal the assignee is
liable only for rent during possession; if the
assignment was under seal, the assignee is liable
regardless of entry or possession.
III Liability of an Assignee of a Lessee to the Original Lessor .
1. An assignee is liable to the lessor on all covenants which
run with the land because of privity of estate. The
lessee also remains liable because of privity of con-
tract.
a. Because the assignee's liability to the original
lessor depends on privity of estate he may always
escape liability for breaches of covenant after he
gets rid of the term by assigning the term to
another.
2. An assignee cannot maintain an action against the lessor
for breach of a covenant running with the land which
took place before the assignment to him because a right
to sue is a chose in action which does not run with the
land.
IV Liability of Parties under a Sub-Lease.
1. The lessee and not the sub-lessee is liable to the lessor
for breach of covenants under the lease.
2. The sub-lessee must look to his lessor, the original
lessee, for remedies.
D. Covenants in the Lea3e. Express and Implied.
I Covenants in a lease are the agreements under seal; they may be
either personal covenants or covenants which run with the land.
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1. Covenants -which run with the land bind whoever is an
assignee of the leased premises; personal covenants
bind only the original lessor and original lessee,
a. All covenants may be made to bind the assigns of
either the lessor or lessee by the insertion of
the word "assigns."
Covenants which run with the land define the manner in which the
premises shall be enjoyed or dealt with. Included are the covenants
to pay rent, taxes, not to use the premises unlawfully, to use the
premises for a certain purpose, to renew the lease, quiet enjoyment,
the covenant to repair, to make improvements.
The right to sue for breach of a covenant running with the land
is a chose in action which does not itself run with the land; hence
an assignee cannot" maintain an action against the other party to the
lease for a breach which took place before the assignment.
II Dependent and independent covenants.
1. Dependent covenants are to be performed only upon per-
formance of some covenant by the other party,
a. Only two covenants are impliedly dependent:
The covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant
to pay rent.
(l) A breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment is
brought about by an eviction, actual or con-
structive; in either case the tenant may de-
fend in an action for rent. If an actual
eviction from any portion of the premises the
tenant may defend though still on the prem-
ises, but in case of a constructive eviction,
only if he leaves the premises.
III The Covenant to Fav Rent.
1. If expressly inserted in the lease the lessee is liable
for all rent which may become due luring the term.
2. Rent may be paid in anything of value, and it is payable
up to midnight of the day it is due unless there is an
agreement to the contrary.
3. The provision for payment of rent at the rate specified
"for such further time as he may hold" does not give
the tenant the right to hold over. He would still be a
tenant at sufferance and by statute liable for such time
as he occupies.
a. Without the provision the landlord could recover
the fair value; with the provision rent can be
recovered at the rate specified.
4. A guaranty of rent must be in writing and should be
under seal unless consideration can be shown.
IV The Covenant to Make Repairs.
1. Unless there is an express covenant on the part of the
lessor to repair the duty is upon the lessee, reasonable
wear and tear expected.
2. A provision that the tenant "will allow the lessor and his
heirs—to enter and examine the condition of the
premises and make necessary repairs" does not impose
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any liability on the lessor or lessen the duty of the
lessee
.
3. If the lessor covenants to repair there is no liability
until he has had reasonable notice of the need of re-
pairs.
a. Exception. If the landlord covenants to repair, and
"to maintain the premises for and during the term
of" the lease, he is liable without notice in
either contract or tort.
4. Even though the landlord has expressly covenanted to re-
pair, if the premises become unfit for the purposes for
•which they were leased, the tenant has no right to leave
the premises or to refuse to pay rent.
5. If the lease is of entire building the lessee must rebuild
in case of fire unless the exception as to fire is in-
serted in the lease.
r The Covenant of Title and Quiet Enjoyment .
1. Such covenant is always present either expressly or im-
pliedly, and carries with it the thought that the land-
lord will do nothing to interrupt the free and peaceable
enjoyment of the thing granted.
a. While it includes any act done by the lessor or
those claiming under him, or by title paramount
under which the lessee is ousted or deprived of
substantial benefit which was given to him by the
lease, it does not extend to acts of wrongdoers
or strangers. It does not include talcing by emi-
nent domain.
2. The covenant of quiet enjoyment is broken by an eviction,
actual or constructive
.
a. An actual eviction is the physical deprivation of
the whole or a part of the premises demised.
(1) If there is an actual eviction, though of only
a part of the premises, the tenant may aban-
don the leas^ and defend against any claim
for rent.
b. A constructive eviction consists of acts not amount-
ing to an expulsion, or physical deprivation, but
such an eviction as substantially diminishes the
enjoyment and which is committed by the lessor
with the intent to deprive the lessee of the en-
joyment of the demised premises,
(l) In such an eviction the tenant may leave and
defend against an action for rent, but if he
remain in he will be liable for the rent.
VI The Covenant of Fitness.
1. Such a covenant is implied in three instances only:
a. Over such portions of the premises as the landlord
continues to control - -common stairways, entries,
roofs, gutters, etc.
b. In case of concealed defects. If the owner lets
premises which are not merely defective, but
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which contain positive agencies of injury he is
liable if it appears that he knew of the defect or
should have known of it.
c . In the case of furnished dwellings there is an im-
plied warranty that the premises are reasonably
fit for occupancy.
2. Otherwise there is no implied covenant that the building
is fit for habitation or for any particular purpose,
nor is there any implied warranty that the premises,
even if fit at the time of letting, will continue fit
for any particular use • The doctrine of caveat emptor
applies.
E . Liability for In.iuries.
I Liability of Landlord to Tenant for Injuries.
1. If the landlord is liable at all his liability extends not
only to the tenant but to members of his family and to
those who are there through his express or implied in-
vi *-"tion.
2. Prior to the entry of the tenant the landlord is liable
to him alone, and only in contract; but after entry the
liability extends to all persons for whose benefit the
lease was taken and the liability is in tort.
3. Inasmuch as the landlord is not bound to change the condi-
tions existing at the time of the letting, he is not
liable for injuries sustained by the tenant, his family,
or guests, caused by defective conditions in the demised
premises unless they are concealed defects not dis-
coverable on reasonable examination and of their exis-
tence the lessor knew or should have known.
4. If the injury arises because of failure to repair where
the landlord has expressly agreed to repair and there
has been the necessary notice the liability of the land-
lord is in contract, not in tort.
5. On such portions of the premises as the landlord continues
in control he is liable for injuries sustained if he
has not used due care to keep such portions in the same
condition it was, or purported to be in, at the time of
the letting and the liability is in tort,
a. The liability of a landlord does not extend for the
benefit of those who come upon the premises for
their own convenience, without any invitation
either express or implied, or which may be implied
from the preparation and adaptation of the prem-
ises for the purposes for which they are appropri-
ated.
6. If the landlord who has contracted to repair does so neg-
ligently the right of recovery is not limited to the
tenant personally, but includes all persons who within
the contemplation of the parties were to use the premises
under the hiring.
a. But if the landlord undertakes the repairs
gratuitously he is liable only to the tenant or
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person with whom he made the gratuitous undertaking
and since 1917 liable only in case of gross negli-
gence, except in cases where death is caused "by
the negligent act.
II To '.Thom the In.jured Third Party Mav Look.
1. Usually the tenant alone is liable for injuries sustained
by invited persons because of defective conditions, due
to negligence, in the demised premises. The test is
control.
2. If the injury is caused on passageways, elevators, etc.,
under the control of the landlord he is liable except
in two instances:
a. If the person injured was an agent, guest or member
of the family of the tenant, he cannot recover if
the landlord maintained the premises "in as safe
condition as they appeared to be at the time of
letting." Such persons have no better rights than
the tenant.
b. If the tenant has agreed to keep the common passage-
ways in repair and to save the lessor harmless
from injuries sustained thereon, the tenant, and
not the landlord is liable to third persons for
injuries caused by negligence.
F. Duty of the Tenant, to use the premises in a tenant-like manner.
I A tenant for years is liable both for permissive and volun-
tary waste while a tenant at will is liable only for volun-
tary waste.
1. Therefore if landlords would protect themselves from mere
negligence of their tenant they should take a written
lease •
G. The Tenancy for Years Terminated.
I By Forfeiture and Reentry by the landlord for breach of some
oondition in the lease, as forfeiture for nonpayment of
taxes, for assigning or subletting, or for illegal use.
II By Forfeiture for Nonpayment of Rent .
1. Unless the right to reenter for nonpayment of rent is
reserved in the lease the landlord must seek some other
remedy for the courts lean against forfeitures and
penalties.
III By Surrender of the Lease by Agreement of the Parties. G. L.
1. Such surrender must be in writing.
IV Surrender by Operation of Law.
1. Such surrender takes place only where there is a change of
possession.
V By Eminent Domain Proceedings.
1. Both the lessor and the tenant for years are entitled to
compensation.
2. If the taking is of the entire premises the lease is
terminated.
VI By Eviction. Discussed previously
VII Bv Giving the Statutory Notice to Quit for Nonpayment of Rent .
G. L. c. 186, s. 11.

163
1. "Upon the neglect or refusal to pay rent due according
to the terms of a written lease, fourteen days' notice
to quit, given in writing by the landlord to the
tenant, shall be sufficient to determine the lease
unless the tenant, four days at least before the re-
turn day of the writ, in an action—to recover posses-
sion of the premises, pays or tenders to the landlord--
all rent then due with interest thereon and costs of
suit."
a . The notice must state with accuracy the time at
which by law the tenant is required to vacate the
premises. The statute is silent as to the precise
mode of service.
b. The forfeiture does not become absolute until the
fourteen days have run out, and payment or tender
of rent before the expiration of the time will
purge the forfeiture.
c. The notice determines not only the original demise
but any sublease which the tenant may have made.
H. Termination of the Tenancy at Will.
I By Agreement.
1. A tenancy at will may be terminated on the happening of a
condition subsequent—in which case no notice would be
required unless contracted for.
II By Operation of Law.
1. By death of either party.
2. Bv sale or lease of the premises .
a. Such lessee or grantee may take possession after no-
tifying the tenant of such lease or deed.
b. The burden is on the tenant at will who denies that
his landlord's written lease to another terminates
his estate to prove that such lease conveys no
estate at all or one not greater than an estate at
will,
3. Bv assignment bv the tenant.
a. An assignment of his estate by a tenant at will ter-
minates the tenancy without notice,
(l) The landlord may treat the assignee as a tres-
passer or maintain the statutory process to
recover possession.
III By Notice to Quit . G. L. c. 186, s. 12.
1. "Estates at will may be terminated by either party by
three months' notice in writing for that purpose given
to the other party; and if the rent reserved is payable
at periods of less than three months, the time of such
notice shall be equivalent to the intervals between the
days of payment."
a. The notice must fix the day of termination on a due
day.
b. If a tenant at will quits the premises on a rent day
without having given previous notice he remains
liable and the burden is on him to show that the
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landlord has waived the notice or that there has
been a surrender by operation of law.
IV By Notice to Quit for nonpayment of Rent. Supra.
V By Surrender . Supra
.
I. Tenancy at Sufferance .
I A tenant at sufferance is not entitled to any regular notice to
quit but he is entitled to a reasonable time to remove him-
self, his family and goods without being deemed a trespasser.
1. After notice to quit the landlord may bring summary
process to recover possession or may enter by force and
expel the tenant.

E Not Contracts but Contacts, Torts and Crimes
II Crimes, against society.
1. Salient facts.
"Thus the moralities which protect every indi
vidual from being harmed by others, either
directly or by being hindered in his freedom
of pursuing his own good, are at once those
which he himself has most at heart, and those
which he has the strongest interest in pub-
lishing and enforcing by word and deed. It
is by a person's observance of these that his
fitness to exist as one of the fellowship of
human beings is tested and decided; fox on
that depends his being a nuisance or not to
those with whom he is in contact."
From John Stuart Mill's
"Utilitarianism. H
"Prisoner, your counsel thinks you are innocent,
the prosecutor thinks you are innocent, and I
think you are innocent. But a jury of your own
countrymen have found you guilty and it remains
that I should pass sentence upon you. You will
be imprisoned for one day and as that day was
yesterday you are free to go about your business."
The Lawyer in History, Literature
and Humor
Edited by William Andrews,
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If the Dog Bites , What Then?
Dear Margaret
,
So poor Bozo has gone to dog heaven, or the other
place, and you are all heartbroken. Forgive me, I'm sorry
that you are heartbroken, and I do sympathize with Junior for
I know how close to a boy's heart is his dog, even if that
dog, like Bozo, had some undesirable traits.
Of course, the dead always acquire a halo of glory,
but if you will allow yourself to face the facts and recall a
few of the escapades of last summer you will be willing to
acknowledge that Bozo did possess a few unlovable character-
istics. I shall never forget the day he had fat Mrs. Lacy
imprisoned on your piazza. Wasn't it funny? I don't know
how he ever let her waddle up your pathway, but there was one
thing certain, he had no intention of letting her waddle
back. I have often wondered why she was so short of breath
and so purple about the neck. It must have been overexertion
of the vocal cords, rather than overexertion of the pedal ex-
tremities. When we arrived it looked as if they had been
having a heated discussion; there was nothing that resembled
a peaceful prayer meeting then. Bozo's eye had a wicked look
and his growl an ominous sound. Has she ever spoken to you
since?
Margaret, I wouldn't condemn Bozo to a watery grave
for that. Really, I would even admit that he was an excel-
lent watch dog. However, the day he engaged in the fight
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with Peter's collie dog does remain a nigiitmare . I can see
the beautiful slick coat of "Lady" being scattered upon the
winds, and blood flowed almost too freely to he attractive.
1 marvelled at the calx way in which the Peters accepted thm
situation. Was there any dog in the summer colony with whom
Bozo didn't pick a fight? The people stood him with -unusual
patience, but I think it is just as well for both you and
Mortimor that you returned this year minus the brute.
The day I really was terrorized was the morning he
bit little Sdith White. Fnether done in play or not, it ras
bad busine-ss, and if her father had not been a doctor things
might hawe turned out quite differently. He did threaten
suit, did he not, but you and Lfortimor were so sure that
there would be no liability where you had not known the dog
to bite before that I decided to let you enjoy your right-
eous state, fcr when "ignorance is bliss, it is folly to be
wise." But now that Bozo is really quiet, let ne tell you
some law.
There was a time when every dog was entitled to
one bite and every horse to one kick. Well, tne horse,
under certain circumstances, ia still entitled to the kick,
but the dog is no longer allowed his first bite. In fact,
there is a statute which makes either tne cwner or keeper of
a dog liable for double the amount of the damages , even
though he has no knowledge that the dog has bitten before,
and if by chance he has knowledge of a previous nip, ne be-
comes liable for triple damages. Ufhen you think what might

come in the way of hospital bills, doctor's charges, and
evaluation of suffering, the financial picture assumes
rather large proportions if you triple the amount, or even
double it.
I imagine that you are a bit glad that such a pos
sibility is not yours this season. Of course, if an indi-
vidual hectors and teases a dog and the animal bites, the
owner has a defense against liability for he can set up the
contributory negligence of the victim. Usually, however,
teasing is done by a small boy and thus, the courts are
liable to say that the boy really knew no better and that h
acts can hardly constitute negligence, so he recovers.
Moral— don't own or keep a dog if you want peace of mind.
Devotedly yours,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 140, s. 155-159.
Maillet v. Mininno, 266 Mass. 86.
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Animals, Wild and Domestic , at Home and Abroad
Dear Margaret
,
This is a continuation of my letter of yesterday.
One of the neighbors at home years ago drove his horse down
to the store and left him in front of the post office. Old
Man Schultz came along, head bent as usual. He always walked
with his eyes fastened on his feet as if he were afraid
they'd fail to travel on the straight and narrow path. As he
got opposite the horse, what did the animal do but reach over
and grab the old man by the shoulder. I don't think he hurt
him much, but it certainly scared him out of a few years of
life and the thing which probably infuriated him most were
the loud "guffaws" of the usual morning group of loungers on
the steps. He sued the owner, but he lost his case because
the evidence revealed that the horse was where he had a right
to be, and that Mr. Manley had never known of any vicious
propensities. Had the horse bitten before to his owner's
knowledge, he would have been liable, or if the horse had
been trespassing, the owner would have been liable for both
expected and unexpected acts, even though without knowledge
of vicious tendencies. Of course, with the coming of auto-
mobiles this common law on domestic animals is rarely called
into use, but there are still good cases in rural sections
where cows break through and trample down corn fields. We
ever have in New England the duty of fencing our domestic
animals in.

169
Speaking of domestic animals makes me think of wild
animals. Do you recall on the Middleboro road to the Cape
the gasoline station where the bear was ever the center of
attraction? I never got gas there because to me it seemed
all wrong to keep a poor animal encaged in a small space to
be the target for the wise remarks of unthinking automobil-
ists who are bent ever on going somewhere, never mind where,
as long as they are burning up distance. That bear proved
expensive. One day, in madness I suppose, he bit the hand
of an individual feeding him cheap candy which the man kept
for sale for that purpose. Probably the poor beast had a
toothache, or possibly a stomach ache because of too much of
such fodder, but the court awarded the victim $2000, for he
who keeps a wild animal is an insurer that he will do no
harm, therefore, he is liable without any proof of negli-
gence. Don't buy Junior a monkey to console him for the loss
of Bozo
:
Do you recall the article which appeared in the
newspapers in the early spring concerning the small young-
ster who was badly mutilated by the bear at Franklin Park?
He had climbed over the first fence when the paw of the
great creature reached him and pulled him against the bars.
A tragic little story, but there could be no redress for two
reasons. In the first place the boy's own negligence in
climbing over the enclosure would bar recovery, and again,
when animals are kept in zoos by municipal authorities there
c^n be no recovery. It is nigh impossible to recover from
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cities, for cities are sovereign bodies not to be sued with-
out their consent and the places of consent are very few.
In conducting zoos a city is considered as acting as an
agent of the state and the state refuses to be liable for
injuries.
Bozo's departure has given me opportunity for a
long dissertation. Don't feel too heartbroken, remember you
may have been saved an expensive law suit. Is this poor
consolation?
Devotedly yours,
Dix v. Somerset Coal Company, 217 Mass. 146;
Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44;
Bottcher v. Buck, 265 Mass. 4;
Frasier v. Chapman, 256 Mass. If
Goodwin v. Nelson, 239 Mass. 232.

171
The City is a Sovereign Body
Dear Annie,
I was very glad to hear your voice over the tele-
phone last night, and glad to hear of you and your family
once more.
The youngster concerning whom you asked really
has no right to recover for an injury caused by the older
boys playing tag in the school yard. Whom would you like
to sue?
The city of Boston when conducting its school
system is really acting as an agent of the state and sover-
eign bodies are not to be sued without their consent, I
assure you that the opportunities to recover from a city
granted by the Legislature are few and far between, and that
is wise. Tax payers 1 money should only be used for public
purposes and not to redress private wrongs. Individuals like
to receive money, but as tax payers they object strenuously
to increased tax rates. There have been many cases brought
against the cities because of injuries on school premises due
to defective conditions, carelessness on the parts of teachers
and servants, but never has there been a recovery.
You asked me if the teachers on duty in the yard
would not be responsible. I think not, Annie. It was an in-
evitable accident; boys will run and play. She could hardly
be expected to control their every movement and to attempt to
hold her responsible would seem to me unwise.
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There is no one left but the boys themselves.
Youngsters are liable for their own torts, but boys are not
expected to use the care of an adult and I doubt if any
court would consider them, under the circumstances, more care
less than boys of their age would be expected to be. Even if
they were found negligent what value would a judgment be?
Parents are not responsible for the sins of their offspring,
not liable for judgments obtained against them and the col-
lection of such judgments would be a long and difficult task.
Not an impossible one, but hardly a pleasant one.
I sympathize with you both. I think if the par-
ents and the boys knew how seriously Allen was injured that
they might feel a moral obligation to help bear the expense.
Personally I believe results could be accomplished if the
problem were approached from this angle.
Sincerely yours,
Murphy v. Hurley, 250 Mass. 582;
Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344;
Kelley v. Boston, 186 Mass. 165;
Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387.
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Why Charitable Corporations are not so Charitable.
Dear Miss Dexter,
Do you know that for a law student you surely
showed poor judgment when you chose the stairs of the Home
for Independent Living as the place upon which to fall and
break your arm? Poor youngster, I am so sorry for the hurt,
so sorry for the inconvenience that will be yours, and sorry
also that you are learning law from the practical stand-
point .
You ask me if it is true that even though your in-
jury was caused by a defective brass edging on a common
stairway that there is no liability.
This beautiful Home for Independent Living, Miss
Dexter is listed in the State House as a Charitable Corpora-
tion. Do you know what that means? Evidently some one left
money to establish for working girls congenial home sur-
roundings, and the money paid in by the inmates really does
not meet all of the expenses. In other words there are no
profits to stockholders. The idea is fine and Boston has a
number of such places where girls can live for nominal sums.
The benefits of such an institution are many but there are
some disadvantages. Because the law feels that the funds
of such places should not be available to redress private
wrongs they have established the non liability of charitable
institutions for the torts of their servants and agents. It
is a wise law but it frequently works for individuals a
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hardship, as it is doing in your case. I wish I could help.
The law on this subject has been growing through
the years. In an old case, McDonald v. Mass. General, a
patient was injured while in the hospital and although they
denied him recovery the court said by way of dictum (by that
term I mean an expression of his opinion as to the law on
hypothetical facts not established in the given case), that
had the injury been due to the negligence of employees who
had been carelessly selected by the trustees then there
would be liability.
However in a later case, Roosen v. Peter Bent
Brigham Hospital, liability was flatly denied regardless of
any carelessness in the selection of the probationers, and
today the law seems well settled on the non liability of
charitable institutions regardless of whether one is an in-
mate of the institution, a patient, a person there on busi-
ness or merely a pedestrian on the street who is struck by
an article thrown out of the window by an attendant.
If a charitable corporation goes into work along
a line wholly commercial then it loses its mantle of pro-
tection and becomes liable like any private person or organ-
ization. We have had a recent case involving Morgan Memo-
rial. You know that they maintain their own workshops and
then sell the renovated products. Selling is a venture
primarily commercial and they were recently found liable
where a person was injured because of a defective condition
in one of the stores.
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On the other hand if a charitable hospital causes
injury to a paying patient there is no recovery because
caring for the sick is charitable work whether with or with-
out pay. And so in your case, theirs is a charitable pur-
pose, the providing of wholesome home conditions for young
women away from home at nominal figure. Hence, there can be
from them no recovery.
This is all a fascinating subject, but to appre-
ciate it one should not be an innocent victim. Frankly,
Miss Dexter, you have no case. Sometimes I wish I knew the
law less well for I have a feeling that lawyers with less
knowledge and a goodly supply of plain brass often bulldoze
people into settlements not particularly because they are
interested in the client but because they need cash for
their own selfish ends.
With little hope for you, and with deep sympathy,
McDonald v. Massachusetts General, 120 Mass. 432:
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham, 235 Mass. 66;
McKay v. Morgan Memorial, 272 Mass. 121;
Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465.
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More about Charitable Corporation^
Dear Mr. Alexander,
About the float! It is owned by the P. H. Im-
provement Association which I understand is incorporated
under G-. L. c. 180, and it is classified as a charitable
corporation. You ask if the present sign, "Bathers use at
their risk," would protect the association in case of in-
jury. Frankly, the sign neither adds nor detracts from the
liability, for charitable corporations are not liable for
the injuries caused by the negligence of their servants or
agents. If it were not there, there would be no liability,
and with it there, there is still no liability. However,
its psychological effect is good; its presence will satisfy
some of the more fussy members and it will make the bathers
a bit careful perhaps. By all means, let it remain.
Cordially yours,
Chapin v. Holyoke Y.M.C.A., 165 Mass. 280;
Holder v. Mass. Horticultural Soc, 211 Mass. 370.
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Manufacturers and Their Responsibility.
Dear Miss Nash,
Thank you so much for the recent clipping. I will
confess that the decision handed down by the Judge of the
Federal District Court giving to the plaintiff a substantial
judgment because of the burn received by her when the coffee
urn melted, in her friends home, was a surprise to me. It
is evident that the court classified the coffee urn as an
article which is inherently dangerous, that is dangerous in
and of itself, and I am afraid I should not have put it in
that class.
Recent cases have enlarged the class of objects
inherently dangerous a good bit, but this particular deci-
sion seems to open the door wider than ever. Manufacturers
would be constantly tied up with litigation if every Tom,
Dick, and Harry could successfully sue them in tort for in-
juries, real or imagined, caused by use of their products.
In the last analysis the public would suffer for the simple
reason that the bills would be handed on to the public as a
part of the overhead charges. The cases have narrowed the
liability of manufacturer to remote people down to two in-
stances in case of injury and the action is of necessity
one in tort because of lack of contractual relation between
the parties. We find judgments against manufacturers be-
cause of negligence where they have placed upon the market
articles which are dangerous in and of themselves. One
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concern sold naptha under the name of kerosene. It was
again sold incorrectly labelled and the resulting explosion
caused serious injury to the plaintiff. He had no difficul-
ty in recovering from the concern.
On the other hand a defective emery wheel found
its way into the hands of a remote party who was injured
because of the defective condition and he was denied recov-
ery on the ground that emery wheels in and of themselves are
not dangerous. I would have been inclined to put the coffee
urn in the same class but the court must have found from the
facts that all urns manufactured by the concern were care-
lessly manufactured so that they could not stand the degree
of heat necessary for their ordinary use. On such a set of
facts they would be inherently dangerous.
A very interesting case came down a year or so
ago. Scrap film purchased from the Lasky Players was being
carried in burlap bags by servants of the purchaser. The
electric car was crowded and the bags were deposited by the
radiator. Result? A terrific explosion, panic among the
passengers and serious injury to several. They recovered
from the Lasky concern on just the old principle. Here was
a material dangerous in and of itself which they had neg-
ligently allowed to be taken from their premises without
giving any warning as to its dangerous characteristics.
Manufacturers have also been held liable in tort
where injury has come because of food prepared negligently
by them for human consumption. There was the case in which
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the individual bought canned spinach. It contained ground
glass which hardly aggreed with the consumer's alimentary
canal. Inasmuch as the concern had handled the produce ex-
clusively from the time it came from the field to the moment
it was delivered to the purchaser the negligence must have
been theirs and recovery permitted. Perhaps you will enjoy
remembering and translating an old Latin phrase which often
is applied in such cases, "Res ipsa loquitur" - "The thing
speaks for itself" of negligence.
On the other hand there is the case where a man
bought Quaker Oats for his horse. The Paris Green contained
therein killed the animal, but the remote manufacturer was
not liable. Here was food, negligently prepared, but it
was not purchased for human consumption. The cases tried
are many but success depends on the presence of these
elements. The plaintiff, a stranger to the manufacturer,
who would sue in tort, must prove that he consumed food for
human consumption, negligently prepared, and that he was
damaged as a result.
With these two cases the manufacturer's liability
to others than those with whom he has had contractual rela-
tions ceases and if a judgment is to be obtained against
him it must be that the article is injurious because of his
wilfulness rather than his negligence as in the case where
a plow which was imperfect in casting was deliberately
painted over by the order of the manufacturer to conceal the
defect. We have no hesitancy in placing responsibility for
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injury upon such an individual.
Again, thank you for sending me the clipoing. I
am very glad to have it. I do not ordinarily see the Feder-
al Reports and might have missed the case had you not so
thoughtfully sent it to me. You see it was a case which had
to be tried in the Federal rather than in the State court
for it involved litigation between citizens of different
states and that ever calls for Federal jurisdiction. The
plaintiff comes from Ohio, she was injured by the melting
of the urn in Rhode Island and the manufacturing company
was located here. Had she been a Massachusetts woman the
State court, rather than the Federal would have had
jurisdiction.
Sincerely yours,
Farley v. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230;
Guinan v. Lasky Players, 267 Mass. 501.
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The Cause of the Cause and What Then?
Dear Leon,
This afternoon the bay has "been like a mill pond,
calm and serene. Do you recall the afternoon so many years
ago when you tried to teach me to skip stones on the waters
of Lake Winnepesaukee?
I have been indulging in that pastime for the past
hour and been a bit fascinated by the ever widening circles.
How they typify life. One event brings another, until a
series of events are traceable to a single act, thoughtless
or planned.
I see that situation so frequently in my work.
Mr. Fuller decides to smoke out a skunk on Sunday morning
and he puts a charge of dynamite into the hole . The next
thing the entire village is aroused by the ringing of the
church bell, announcing fire. The hole has another opening,
the fire raced through the underground passage, fired the
dry grass, spread to the buildings far down the road. So it
went; and he was the cause of it all.
Jones left a revolver lying on the table. His
small youngster picked it up, gave it to an older playmate
and tonight Arnold Pratt has a bullet wound in the shoulder.
Jones was the cause of it all
.
At a bridge party several months ago, Mrs. X
dropped the delicious bit of gossip that she had heard that
young Pinkham in the bank had served a term in Atlanta
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Penitentiary years ago. The story didn't stop there, it
grew and grew and grew. The family was dropped, the young-
sters shunned in the school, and young Pinkham advised to
resign in the bank. He did and they have left town and Mrs.
X was the cause of it all
.
The law says there is responsibility on individu-
als who set in motion wrongful acts which acts in time set
in motion other events until a chain of unfortunate circum-
stances may be traced to the careless, the thoughtless or
deliberate act of a given wrong doer. The law is right, we
who do the things should pay a price
.
In reminiscent mood,
Metallic Casting v. Fitchburg R.R., 109 Mass. 277;
Jacobs v. N.Y.N.H.&H., 212 Mass. 96;
Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507;
Heaney v. Colonial Filling Station, 262 Mass. 338.
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Mental Suffering as Damage
Dear Elsie,
Your problem reminds me of an old case in
Massachusetts. A contractor was blasting negligently and a
tremendous explosion occurred. Rocks and debris were hurled
against the house occupied by Jane Allen and her sister
Joan. The window in the sitting room was shattered and bro-
ken glass and flying fragments came into the room. Both
sisters had been sitting by the table sewing and Jane, who
was ever phlegmatic, was according to the case "frozen to
the spot." She could not and did not move, but Joan, the
younger, rushed toward the door. In her fright, she struck
her shoulder against the door frame and bruised it quite
badly. Neither sister was touched by the flying bits, but
both were ill for several days following the explosion.
Gould either, or neither, or both recover from the con-
tractor?
In Massachusetts, we do not grant recovery for
fright alone which is caused by the negligence of another
because people are constituted so differently that there
could hardly be a common standard, but if there is physical
contact with some outside substance recovery is allowed both
for the physical and the mental suffering. Jane had no
physical contact; her illness came wholly from fright. She
was barred from recovery, but Joan, because she struck the
door frame, could recover from the contractor both for the
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physical and mental suffering.
You have a cause of action against the Elevated
road. Yi/hen the two cars came together in the Park Street
subway, you were naturally much frightened, but the impact
threw you against the seat in front and the necessary physi-
cal contact established. You say the chest and shoulder are
still bruised and sore; you were fortunate to escape without
more serious injuries. Your case will be taken care of
speedily.
Sincerely,
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 385;
Kisiel v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 240 Mass. 29;
Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576;
Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238.
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The Principal and Hi a Agent .
Dear Mr. Fulton,
I am sure that you need feel no anxiety over the
outcome of that law suit. It is true that an employer is
liable for the injuries caused "by the tortious acts of his
employees when they are acting within the scope of their
employment and the law goes to the point of fixing liability
upon him even if the acts of the employees were wilful as
long as they were still about the master's business.
I am satisfied however, that in allowing the men
to use the field adjacent to the factory for a recreation
field that there was no carelessness upon your part and the
fact that a fly ball during the noon hour activities went
into the street and struck the plaintiff is not going to
make you responsible. I even doubt if the man himself who
struck the ball would be liable. It was an unfortunate
strike, but, after all, a pure accident, and even the man
in your employ is not responsible unless his act was neg-
ligent or that which is worse than negligence, deliberate.
If he would not be responsible, neither would you under the
circumstances. Even if he could be found to be negligent,
and, so liable, you are not going to be liable. When en-
gaged in playing ball the men were not acting within the
scope of their employment, they were rather on an independ-
ent frolic of their own, and so you could not be liable
merely because you are the employer. If you had authorized
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the hitting of the ball into the street, or if you had
allowed your men to make a nuisance of your premises, then
you could be made responsible, but not on the facts as you
present them.
Truly yours
,
Harrington v. Border City, 240 Mass. 170.
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For Those Who Toil .
Dear Mr. Williamson,
Shall you or shall you not insure your employees
under the Workmen's Compensation Act? By all means insure.
Of course I know you hate to have the expense hut my experi-
ence is that employers who do not insure are pennies wise
and pounds foolish. It doesn't seem to matter much that a
factory is modern, even accident proof as it were, you'll
always find accidents occuring and law suits looming up.
If you are insured you know that the insurance company must
shoulder the worry and you can forget the problem.
I recall how glad you were to recall that you
carried automobile insurance the day you drove over the
man's foot in Provincetown even though the fault was en-
tirely his. I recall your saying at the time, "Look where
the car is, but I bet there will be a dozen witnesses who
will swear that I deliberately drove on the sidewalk."
That is the story, cases are frequently won on the facts as
they are made to appear at the trial rather than lost on
the facts as they actually existed. It is a relief to have
a professional worrying concern and that is exactly the role
that your insurance company may play for you if you insure
your workmen.
Then there is another side, you will have workmen
incapacitated who are honest and whose needs are great. As
long as their injury arose out of and in the course of their
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employment they will be eligible for compensation and you
are going to feel a sense of gladness in knowing that they
will be taken care of. Insure not only for your peace of
mind but for the sake of those whose happiness is more or
less dependent upon you because from your concern comes
their means of livelihood.
Truly yours
,
Von Ette's Oase, 223 Mass. 56;
Holmes' Case, 267 Mass. 307;
Collarullo's Case, 258 Mass. 521;
Silver's Case, 260 Mass. 222.
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Your Duty to Your Guest
Dear Anne,
Please don't worry over the threatened litigation.
I cannot see the slightest possibility of recovery for Mr.
Danner. In the first place, there was no carelessness or
negligence on your part and you do not insure people who
ride in your car against the possibility of a tire blowing
up.
Furthermore, I'm not so sure on the facts that Mr.
Danner was even an invitee in your car, and if he were, Anne,
you are not liable in Massachusetts except you are proven to
be grossly negligent. To find a person grossly negligent the
jury must be satisfied that no reasonable, prudent man would
do what he has done under the circumstances; such conduct
in their eyes would be inconceivable I For example, if you
invited me to ride home from Boston as you so frequently have
and then while at the wheel went to sleep and crashed into a
telegraph pole and caused me injury, I have an idea I could
recover real money from you if I myself had not indulged in
a similar nap. The law in Massachusetts on this point has
been well fixed since 1917, to a gratuitous invitee one is
liable only on proof of gross negligence. A gratuitous in-
vitee is one whom you ask to ride with you and who pays
nothing for the service. Massachusetts feels that such an
individual should not be able to make miserable the life of
the one good enough to extend the courtesy unless such one

190
was greatly negligent. Massachusetts on the point is not in
harmony with many of the states, so I always tell my students
not to take their guests out of the Commonwealth if there is
the slightest chance of their being found negligent, for the
law of the place where the accident occurs governs. There-
fore if you were in New Hampshire at the time of the injury,
you would be liable to your guest if negligent, regardless
of whether you were grossly negligent or not.
Personally, on the facts, as you have presented
them, I doubt very much if Mr. Danner qualifies as an invitee.
You told him you were driving to Williamstown on Tuesday. He
asked if you had an extra seat , and knowing what a bore he is
I imagine that it was with some reluctance that you admitted
that you had. Did you express great pleasure at having
accommodations and did you urge him to accompany you? If so,
he was an invitee. If on the other hand, you told him the
number in your party, and he asked as usual if you couldn't
pack in his humble self, and assured you as usual that he'd
not be the slightest trouble and would take up only the
smallest space, etc., etc., I have heard him before, then I
classify him legally as a licensee to whom you owed no duty
except to refrain from wilful and wanton wrongdoing.
There is a difference, Anne, between negligence and
wilfulness. 7;e are often careless, without any intention,
but wilfulness carries the thought of deliberateness. Did
you, Anne, plan to have that tire go up just at the moment
when Mr. Danner was leaning far out of the car to see what
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he could see so that for a moment you would lose control of
the machine and go into the wall, against which he was thrown
with such force as to break his collar bone? Don't be ridic-
ulous. Even if he were an invitee, which he was not, you are
not liable for you were not negligent at all. If he were a
licensee, you surely are not liable for you did nothing which
was deliberate or intentional. Take heart and forget him.
3e sorry for the expense to the machine and your own sprained
wrist, and rejoice in the fact that he T ll not again tell you
how much he adores the country side and how he*d love it if
you could tuck him in.
Sincerely,
Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487;
Oppenheina v. Barken, 262 Mass. 281;
Lytle v. Monteau, 248 Mass. 340.
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The Family Gar Doctrine .
Dear 2van:
You write asking me what is meant by the "Family
Car Doctrine." In many states, if the head of a family has
a car registered in his name he is always held responsible
for any accident which occurs while the car is being used by
any member of his family.
Massachusetts, however, has never recognized the
"Family Car Doctrine," but there is a Statute which was
passed in 1928 which provides that any person who operates
a car is to be considered as the agent of the individual
in whose name the car is registered. However, such a person
may deny specifically the existence of the relationship,
but if he does so deny, he has the burden of proving that
there is no agent in the picture. If he does not so prove,
then the individual operating the car will be considered as
his agent, but it does not necessarily follow that merely
because a person is my agent that I am liable for the tor-
tious acts which he does.
In order for a principal to be liable for the torts
of his agent or the master to be liable for the tortious
acts of his servant, it is essential that not only the re-
lationship exist but also that at the time of the accident
the servant or agent be acting within the scope of his em_
ployment. Hence it follows that where a son, for example,
is driving his father* s car, the Statute would make him his
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father's agent, but for his acts his father would not be
liable unless the son at the time could be said to be acting
under the authority of his parent.
A great many cases on this question come before
our courts, and I imagine that in about fifty per cent of
them the son is found to be acting within the scope of his
employment. If, for example, the father kept the car for
the use of his wife and instructed the son that whenever his
mother desired he was to take her wherever she wished to go,
then, under this set of facts, if the boy while driving the
car for his mother was involved in an accident because of
his negligence, I should feel that the father would be re-
sponsible. On the other hand, as so frequently happens, if
the young people of the household take the family car for a
joy ride of their own, and of course, take it surreptiously,
then, in our state no court could hold the father responsible.
I do not know what particular problem has pre-
sented itself to you but if I have not met your need let me
know and I will try again.
Yours very truly,
Haskell v. Albiani, 245 Mass. 236;
Statute 1928, Ch. 317;
McNeil v. Powers, 266 Mass. 446.
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When is Your Car Unregistered?
Alice Wilson Smith,
You are a foolish, foolish person. You cared
enough for John Smith to marry him and his name is your
legal name; whether you like it or not you are Mrs. John
Smith and you should register your car in the name of Alice
V* Smith and not in your maiden name of Alice Wilson. "Why
all the excitement?" you ask. Because, young woman, after
five years of married life you are driving an unregistered
car on the highway, whether you know it or not, and that is
a dangerous proposition. The mere fact that you have paid a
registration fee and hold a certificate does not make your
car of necessity registered.
John Taylor registered his Ford Touring car, then
put a truck body on the chassis; and behold, he had an un-
registered car.
Allen had a collision—a new engine was necessary;
he travelled with his old papers—but his was an unregistered
car—and so it goes. He who drives an unregistered car is a
trespasser on the highway, an outlaw to whom no duty is owed
except to refrain from wilful and wanton wrongdoing, and fur-
thermore such an individual is an insurer and liable in case
of an accident even though not himself negligent.
Let me paint pictures for you. You are late on a
certain morning; unless you drive at a good pace John Smith
will be late at the office. As you pass the foot of Pinckney
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Street out shoots the car of Jones—and you two come together
with injuries to the car and to persons both driving and
riding.
Picture 1. Let us assume that there was negli-
gence on the part of Jones and that you were guiltless. You
cannot recover for injury to your car or to your person
either from Jones or his insurance company. "Why not?" you
immediately ask. Because you are a trespasser, an outlaw on
the highway and for negligence alone Jones is not liable.
To recover it would be necessary for you to prove that Jones
wilfully and wantonly went forth to injure you. But that is
not all. Mr. Smith cannot recover for his injuries because
he knew or should have known that he was riding in an unregis-
tered car.
Picture 2. It is impossible from the facts to
find any negligence on the part of either you or Jones yet
both cars are badly damaged, and all people more or lesr
hurt. But this time you will pay for the damages to Jones*
car, pay his doctor's bill plus, and likewise the expense of
his guests in the machine. Why all this? Because, he who
drives an unregistered car is also an insurer, and that means
that he is liable for damages whether negligent or not. Not
a pretty picture.
Picture 3. From this one alone you may get some
comfort. Here both parties were careless, and neither can
recover from the other for personal injuries or for damage
done to the machine because you are both allowed to set up
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the defense of contributory negligence and if you prove
Jones's negligence he is barred from recovery. However,
guests in the car of Jones would have an opportunity to re-
cover from you because the negligence of the driver is not
generally imputed to those who ride with him; but Mr. Smith
would not hold as good a position in reference to Jones.
Formerly everyone who rode in an unregistered car was like-
wise a trespasser but today he is not a trespasser unless he
knew that the car was unregistered or should have known—and
husbands are supposed to know how their wives are registering
cars
.
Take my advice and get your registration changed
—
forgive the "know-it -all" attitude, but I don*t want to see
you get into trouble.
Hastily,
Hanson v. Culton, 269 Mass. 471;
McMahon v. Pearlman, 243 Mass. 367 j
Brown v. Alter, 251 Mass. 223;
Nicholas v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 250 Mass. 86;
O'Leary v. Fash, 245 Mass. 123.
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About Negligence
—
and 7,'hen Imputed
Dear Alice
:
You wish I'd be a little less technical--I 'm sorry
my language was not wholly clear. You don't know what I
mean by negligence being imputed?
Listen, my child, and 1*11 explain and then read
my letter of July 22 again and if you don't understand, just
do what I advised, namely have your car registered under the
name of Smith and not Wilson.
A nurse-maid, the other day, took the small young-
ster out in the stroller. The house is located well upon a
hill and at the corner the maid caught sight of the policeman
on the beat. She let go of the handle, to talk with him for
a moment, and somehow the youngster shifted his position, and
the stroller went on a journey of its own, gaining momentum
on the incline, ^n ice team turned the corner—the driver
was paying no attention to where he was going, and the
stroller crashed into the team, the youngster of a year and
a half thrown out and badly injured. There was evidence of
the negligence of the driver of the team, but no recovery
for the child because the negligence of the nurse was imputed,
carried over to the child, and for that reason his recovery
barred. A child under three or four is considered too young
to be either careful or careless and for that reason if
another who has him in custody is careless, that person's
negligence is imputed, we say, to the child, and he cannot
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recover. On the other hand, if a child is too young to ex-
ercise any degree of care, and there is no negligence on the
part of those who stand in loco parentis, there is no reason
why he cannot recover for an injury caused by the careless-
ness of another.
A mother had left a small child in the yard, with
the gate securely fastened. She missed the child and he was
found in the street bacly injured by a passing truck. It
seems that a neighbor T s child attracted by the small young-
ster had stopped for a moment to play with him, and then gone
its way leaving the gate unlatched. There, no negligence
could be attributed to the mother so that there was none
which could be imputed to the child and damages were allowed.
If a child has reached years of judgment and uses
the care a child of its years would use, then it can recover
for its injuries unless negligence on the part of those in
loco parentis can be said to be the real cause of the injury.
If such is the case, then no recovery is possible, for once
more negligence is imputed. On the other hand, as sometimes
happens, a child uses all the care that a prudent adult would
use. Then the child is allowed to recover for his injuries
caused by another's negligence regardless of any lack of care
that might have existed on the part of parents or those in
charge.
This doctrine of imputed negligence has also been
discussed in reference to persons in cars and automobiles, and
as a general rule it can be stated that the negligence of the
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driver is not to be imputed to the rider; but that necessi-
tates a finding that the rider was actively on the lookout
for his own safety, and it is a favorite ruse of lawyers to
endeavor, in cross examination, to trick the guest into an
admission that he relied wholly on the skill of his driver,
and had no thought for his own care. If he succeeds, as in
the case when the woman admitted that she felt so secure
that she went to sleep on the back seat, then her case against
his client is immediately lost.
Enough for a dissertation on imputed negligence.
If one can get at the facts the law is easy to apply. Mary,
though seven years old, returned from the store with three-
year old Tommy. In no uncertain terms she ordered him to
remain on the steps until her return from the third floor
apartment where she was to take the bottle of milk to her
mother. Tommy didn f t obey; he was found on the avenue run
over by a street car. Negligence on the part of the motor-
man was found and Tommy recovered for his injuries. v;as the
judgment right according to the law as I have stated it?
Sincerely,
Bullard v. Bos. Elev., 226 Mass. 262;
Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 309;
Gibbons v. Williams, 135 Mass. 333;
Travers v. Bos. Elev., 217 Mass. 188;
Sullivan v. Chadwick, 236 Mass. 130.
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What Do Do About Nuisances ?
Dear Bessie Grace,
I was much interested in your sister's problem in
Leominster. Between your neighbor's hens and radios she is
surely having a problem. Of course they constitute a private
nuisance, an old French word which means "that which worketh
harm." You ask me if she can do anything. The law permits
one to abate a nuisance himself, but I will confess that the
fact is easier stated than executed.
One man who knew that much law and had been in-
censed with the depredations caused by the neighbor 's poultry
in his garden, in desperation caught the lot one day, cut off
their heads and arranged their remains neatly on his neigh-
bor's front porch. The method was efficacious but the man
learned some more law. Although one may abate a private
nuisance, he has no right to take the life of trespassing
animals except to prevent irreparable damage being committed;
and the court didn't agree with the man that the hens were
doing irreparable damage and merited such treatment. He had
to pay their owner for their value.
I will tell you what Arlie did. Again hens worked
havoc in the flower bed over which she had toiled so assid-
uously. Repeated requests to ov/ners fell on deafened ears
and still the hens came joyfully and destructively. Finally
Arlie bought whole corn, soaked it several hours and then
prepared neat little oak tags, "These hens have been
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trespassing on the property of Leon Smith." A silk thread
eight or nine inches long was fastened on one end to the tag
and the other end was hitched to corn kernels and then the
corn was broadcasted in the garden. Result? Very simple!
The hens came, they saw, they swallowed, they went home drag-
ging their tags after them. The results were gratifying for
they came not again and Arlie felt infinitely rewarded for
the time and patience needed to bring tags and silk and corn
kernels together.
This device might help with the hens, but the radio
isn't so easily handled. Doubtless it is a nuisance, but in
order to abate it it looks as if your sister would have to
adopt the "Carrie Nation" methods of other days and the pic-
ture is not so pleasing. Not only would she dislike the no-
toriety of going forth to destroy another's property, but in
the process she would make herself liable as a trespasser and
that would be to invite litigation and once the wheels of lit-
igation start it is difficult to know just when they'll stop.
I often tell clients that it doesn't matter whether they win
or lose in our courts they lose in the long run anyway.
If circumstances make personal abatement inadvis-
able and the radio proposition would seem to come into that
category one can of course seek an injunction against the
offender in the court of equity, but there again one faces
litigation and all its trouble. If your sister only lived in
the city so that the wires were stretched over her roof as are
our neighbors in S. Russell Street, she could perhaps get
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temporary relief on some particularly maddening night by
journeying to the roof and doing things up there. Legally
all rights are on her side but the obtaining of those rights
will involve some particular cleverness I'm thinking. I
wish I could do better for you than I have, but I hope a
half loaf may be more acceptable than none and I really
recommend Arlie's treatment of the hens.
Sincerely,
Clark v. Kelliher, 107 Mass. 406;
Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine, 241 Mass. 245;
Prest v. Ross, 245 Mass. 342.
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A New Duty of Support
Dear Frances,
I went down to see the house today. It was a sorry
sight. Solig and Blair had tied in the front wall. Huge
planks attached to steel cables running from the front to the
back of the house told all the community round about that
something was quite wrong with that four-story brick wall.
Now I presume we settle down to a period of peace-
ful waiting. The wall at 29 has been condemned too, and in-
asmuch as that is not shored up, we dare not start to take
down ours until they do.
You see, they can safely begin for although the
walls are together, ours will not fall, but if we started on
ours, theirs would be almost sure to go into the street.
Then we would be liable to them in damages for in the City of
Boston, by ordinance, property owners not only are liable for
the lateral support of land but also liable for the support
of adjacent buildings.
We are certainly having some unusual experiences.
Vv'ho would ever have believed that such a good-looking wall
could have moved out from two to four inches from the main
house. I don't know what ever saved it from going into the
street before this. I think we are most fortunate to have
discovered it before the house was finished inside and we had
moved in.
Devotedly
,
Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220;
Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199.
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SUMMARY IN TORTS
General Information
A. The tort and its essentials
I Definition; A tort is an act of commission or cf omission by-
one -without right whereby another receives some actionable
injury to person, property, or reputation.
II Elements
1. Violation of a legal duty
2. Injury or damage resulting
B, The Liability of Parties
I Insane persons- -liable for torts involving purely physical
capacity.
II Infants—liable for all torts which they can physically com-
mit and those involving a mental element if not of too
tender years.
III Parent- -not liable for torts of minors, unless act was com-
mitted in the presence of, and no steps were taken to inter-
fere or prevent it, or minor was acting as the agent of the
parent, or the parent was permitting the premises to be used
as a nuisance •
IV Masters—liable for torts of servants when acting within the
scope of the master* s business whether wilful or not.
V lAunicipal corporations—liable in the following instances:
1. Injuries caused by defective highways.
2. Injuries caused from mob violence.
3. Injuries caused from the wrongful exclusion of
children from the public schools.
4. Injuries caused from cases of continuing trespass (common
law)
.
5. If there is pecuniary gain or production.
6. Liable for injuries caused by negligence in the construc-
tion or care of sewers but not liable when damage arises
because of an inadequately planned system.
VI Charitable corporations
—
not liable for the torts of their
employees causing either suffering or death, but if the
property is used partly for charity and partly for private
gain, then liability arises.
VII Manufacturers
—
liable to the entire world when wilful, wanton,
or reckless, liable for negligence only to immediate vendee
except in two instances when liable to sub-vendees.
1. If the article placed upon the market is one inherently
dangerous to life
.
2. Also liable to third persons because of negligence in the
preparation of food for human consumption.
G. Extent of Liability
I Liability for proximate consequences.
1. Liability extends to all consequences which proximately
flow from the defendants wrongful act.
a. The act of a third person intervening will not
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excuse the first wrongdoer if such act is either
instinctive, impulsive or involuntary and one which
could have been reasonably foreseen, but if the act
was voluntary the line of causation is broken and the
defendants ivrongful act too remote,
II Liability for intervening causes.
1. Where the line of causation is broken by a voluntary act
such act becomes the intervening cause of the injury
and the second wrongdoer is responsible.
III Liability for concurring causes.
1. The fact that the wrongful act of a third person concurs
with the wrongful act of the defendant to produce the
damage to the plaintiff does not in any way excuse the
defendant; each is primarily liable for the full amount
of the damage.
D t Defenses to Tort Actions.
I Necessity.
1, Defense of person
—
force may be met with reasonable force
but unless in one's home life should not be taken until
there has been retreat to the wall.
2. Defense of property
—
reasonable force appropriate to the
end is excusable. In Massachusetts one may defend or
regain his momentarily interrupted possession by use of
reasonable force short of wounding or the employment of
a dangerous weapon. If the possession is not momen-
tarily interrupted the owner should apply to the law
unless he can regain his possession peaceably or by
strategy.
II Acts of State
—
in the exercise of police power or the right of
eminent domain.
III Licenses by law
—
officer serving civil process may break
inner door of a dwelling house, officer serving criminal
process may break either outer or inner door, right to enter
an inn or conveyance of a common carrier, right of landlord
to go on the demised premises to prevent waste, right to go
to collect debts, right to reclaim goods on the land of
another, to leave the highway if it is impassable, right to
trespass on the land of another to save life or property.
IV Illegal conduct or contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
1. The illegal conduct may be a condition and not a cause of
the injury; hence, not a defense.
2. The defense of contributory negligence has been abolished
by statute in Massachusetts in case of a:
a. Passenger killed on railroad or railway.
b. Person injured or killed at a railroad crossing where
the road fails to give statutory signals unless the
party was guilty of gross negligence or wilful mis-
conduct and is also abolished by common law where
the defendant acted wilfully and wantonly.
3. If a minor is suing for injuries to which the negligence
of a parent or one in "loco Parentis" contributed, the
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parent's negligence is imputed to the child and there is
no recovery.
a. Even if the parent was negligent, if his negligence
did not contribute, the child can recover if
(1) the child was too young to exercise due care;
or,
(2) if old enough to exercise care, he has exer-
cised the care to be expected of children of
his years.
b. If the parent's negligence contributed the child
might yet recover if he used the care of an ordi-
narily prudent adult, but othervd.se not.
E. Injuries to Person
I Assault and Battery.
1. An assault is an attempt, real or apparent, to do bodily
injury to the person of another within reach, while the
battery is the consummation of the assault; namely, the
unlawful touching of the person of another.
II False Imprisonment.
1. The total or substantial restraint of another's freedom
of movement or liberty.
2. Either an officer or a private person may arrest without
a warrant if a felony is being or has been comnited.
or if a misdemeanor is being coiiimitted.
III Malicious Prosecution.
1. To maintain a suit four elements must be proven:
a. A fr vorable termination of the prior suit
b. Instituted with malice,
c . Vfithout probable cause .
(1) The jury may infer malice as a matter of fact
from lack of probable cause .
(2) If the former plaintiff (the now defendant
)
took the advice of an attorney after making to
him full disclosure of all the facts he cannot
be held liable in this action for by this method
he establishes that he acted with probable
cause
.
d. To the damage of the now plaintiff.
F. Injury to Property.
I Trespass quare clausum fre git.
1. An interference with possession.
2. Justification for trespass.
a. Entry by express or implied consent of the owner.
b. Entry by license of law.
(l) One has an irrevocable license to go on the
land of another to get his goods if they be
there through no fault of his.
II Trespass de bonis asportatis.
1. An interference with possession, not an exercise of
dominion.
2. Possession or right to possession is sufficient to
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maintain action.
Ill Conversion.
1. The usurpation of dominion or ownership over the personal
property of another.
a. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be the owner
of the goods; a right of possession as against the
defendant is enough, e.g. the right of a finder of
lost articles, or the right of a bailee to maintain
conversion.
b. If one commits a positive tortious act his inrocence
of good faith is, as a general rule, immaterial.
c. Demand and refusal are evidence merely of conversion,
and need not be proved vrtiere conversion is estab-
lished by a positive tortious act, as where the
taking was wrongful in the first place,
(l) If the taking was rightful then to establish
conversion there must be evidence of a demand
and an absolute refusal.
d. The measure of damages is the value at the time of
conversion plus interest.
G. Injury to Reputation.
I Slander and libel.
1. Slander is transitory defamation while libel is defamation
in a permanent form.
2. The gist of the tort of either slander or libel lies in
publication, i .e . the communication of the defamation to
some person other than the plaintiff.
a. One who repeats a slander is liable for all the in-
jury flowing from his repetition.
3. Truth is an absolute defense to an action of slander,
regardless of the motives or malice of the defendant,
but in action of libel truth is not a defense if the
article has been published maliciously.
4. An absolute privilege is a defense in either case.
a. An absolute defense is confined to the officers of
government in the three departments, and to publi-
cation of judicial proceedings.
5. If the defendant had an interest to protect or a duty to
perform in publishing the defamatory matter, and acted
in a reasonable manner, he will be prima facie privilege
but malice will lose for him the privilege.
H. Miscellaneous Tort a, affecting both persons, property and property
rights.
I Negligence
-
-the doing or omitting to do an act in violation of
a legal duty or obligation due to the person sustaining the
injury
.
1. Since 1917 three degrees of negligence
—
gross, ordinary,
slight.
2. Standards of duty owed the following people determine the
degrees of negligence, if any, for which the defendant
is liable.
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a. To trespassers there is no duty owed except to
refrain from wilful and wanton wrongdoing.
b. Only a similar duty is owed to the licensee.
c. To an invitee a duty is owed coexistent with the
extent of the invitation.
3. Unregistered automobiles are trespassers upon the high-
way, and the driver of an unregistered car is an insurer
that the car will do no damage
.
4. A gratuitous bailee is liable only for gross negligence.
II Damage by animals.,
1
.
Wild animals—the owner is absolutely liable for damage
without proof of negligence.
2. Domestic animals.
a. Trespassing on the plaintiff's property.
(1) Liable if the damage is such as is to be ex-
pected from the animal's nature.
(2) Jf domestic animals trespassing cause special
damage because of vicious propensity the owner
is liable whether he knew of the propensity
or not.
b. If a domestic animal is where it has a right to be
and causes damage the owner's liability turns on
his knowledge of the animal's viciousness.
c. "The owner or keeper of a dog shall be liable in an
action of tort to a person injured by it in double
the amount of damages sustained by him." G. L. c.
140, s. 155. No longer is the dog entitled to one
bite.
Ill Nuisance, "that which worketh harm."
1. A nuisance may be public or private, but for a public
nuisance to be also private it must differ in kind
rather than in degree
•
a. An individual may abate a private nuisance but not
public nuisance
.
b. The legislature may legalize a public nuisance but
not a private nuisance.
(1) Although one may abate private nuisances he
must not kill animals which constitute a
nuisance except they be doing irreparable
harm.
2. Every man must so conduct his business as to cause
minimum discomfort; the old doctrine that one must not
go to a nuisance has little force today.
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Arson of Yesterday and Today .
Dear Laura:
You will be much interested to know that the town
is all excitement over the fact that poor Mr, Fuller burned
down, one day last week, deliberately and intentionally,
the little cottage on the lake. You will recall that he
had always hated the place and that its memories were far
from pleasant. For some time he has been living in the old
house on the river road but whatever possessed him to delib-
erately destroy the cottage is beyond me. However the
property was not insured and no one can say that he intended
to burn it for the purpose of defrauding his insurance
company, but some smart individual in town has discovered
that there is a statute to the effect that if one burns even
his own property he can be indicted for arson and Mr, Fuller
is much afraid that he is going to spend the rest of his days
in jail. Can you imagine people being mean enough to make
the poor old man unhappy? I can hear you say, "That is
ridiculous," but after all, Laura, it isn't ridiculous. If
any one wanted to make a complaint to the Court it is really
true that he could be convicted of arson today.
Formerly in order for a person to be liable for
arson he had to wilfully and maliciously burn the dwelling
house of another and he could not be guilty of arson if he
burned his own building. For example, if a man had gone
away for the summer and had left his servants in his house
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and they burned his dwelling they would be liable for arson
because it would still be the dwelling house of another. On
the other hand if the house was occupied by a tenant and the
tenant burned it he could not be convicted of arson because
the tenant was the one who was in possession, hence it wa.
his dwelling house which had been burned and not the dwell-
ing house of another. It followed then that should the
landlord burn the house he would be liable for arson because
he would be burning the dwelling house of his tenant. The
old common law was very exact in its requirements and the
only time that a person would be indicted for arson if he
burned a building other than an occupied dwelling house
would be if he burned a church because the good people of
the past considered the church the dwelling house of God.
Today, by statute, liability for arson has been greatly in-
creased and he who maliciously and wilfully burns either his
own dwelling or the dwelling of another, occupied or unoc-
cupied, may be convicted of arson and become a guest of the
state for a period not exceeding twenty years.
Poor Mr. Fuller, he really has some cause for
alarm, but I am assuring him that there isn r t a District
Attorney in the State who would not "nol pros" his case.
You ask what I mean by that expression, I simply mean that
under the circumstances I can not concieve of any Attorney
for the State who would prosecute the case, but the old
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man's life has certainly been made miserable. I'll write
you later if further developments arise.
Hastily yours,
Corn. v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368;
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 266, s. 1-10.
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Larceny or Robbery
Dear June
:
To hear your name broadcasted over the radio in
the news flashes yesterday afternoon was decidedly surpris-
ing and you can believe that I was interested to read the
report of the robbery in the morning paper. Of course I
realize that the report is probably far from true and after
the fright of it all has subsided a bit I shall be very glad
to get your vision of the situation. For some time I have
been surprised at your willingness to have so much money in
your possession from week to week, and I have often wondered
if you still had the courage, as of yore, to carry a couple
of thousand dollars in a paper bag under your arm from the
bank to the office, for the pay roll. I do hope that it may
be possible for the men to be apprehended and for you to be
able to identify them. I appreciate that you will not enjoy,
during the coming weeks, being called to various jails to see
if you can identify suspects, but our country is in a bad way
and, although the duty will be distasteful, I know that you
will go through with it.
The question was raised at the house last night
whether or not the men, if apprehended, could be convicted of
robbery and if not of what crime they might be found guilty.
Robbery means the taking of personal property either with
fear or violence from the person of another. The word person
is used very broadly and if one gives up property under the
emotion of fear, robbery will still exist even though it was
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not taken from his person. Furthermore it does not follow
that the property taken must be the property of the person
from whom it is taken in order for robbery to arise. There
is no question but the two men could be convicted of robbery,
a crime which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
When they ordered you to open the safe and again to open the
cash register they were forcing you at the point of a gun to
make it possible for them to get the money and the element of
fear is certainly present even though no active violence was
practiced upon you. Several weeks ago a woman was going down
State Street and had an under-arm purse with her. A snatch-
thief took it and ran, and the woman in question pursued.
For a wonder she was a better runner than he was and she suc-
ceeded in getting hold of him long enough at least to enable
others to come to her help. In a way that fellow can be
grateful for under the circumstances he can not be convicted
of robbery. Evidently she was not particularly afraid for had
she been she would not have pursued him and furthermore there
was not enough violence to constitute robbery. If violence is
the element depended upon there must be some sign of real phys-
ical injury, for example, the tearing of the lobe of the ear
when the earring was snatched or the spraining of the finger
with the seizure of the ring.
I think you did, under the circumstances, remarkably
well and I am exceedingly glad that although you opened the
safe they did not, in their haste reach the several packages of
money which you had secreted away. I'm also glad that the pay
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roll at that particular moment reposed in the drawer of your
desk and that they only got away with a small amount, namely
that in the cash register, in comparison with what they might
have gotten had they been more careful in their search.
Sincerely yours,
Com. v. Weiner, 255 Mass. 506;
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Oh. 277, s.39.
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Were the Goods Obtained by False Pretenses ?
Dear Leon,
In the days of common law crimes, they spoke of
larceny, of embezzlement and of obtaining goods by false
pretenses. Today the three are placed under one heading
—
that of statutory larceny.
I still like to have students see the differences
between them, to point out that in larceny the complainant
had parted with neither title nor possession; in embezzle-
ment, he had parted with possession but not title; while in
the last crime, the complainant had, because of the false
pretenses, given up, when he otherwise would not have so
done, both title and possession.
You asked me if a concern would be criminally liable
if by clever advertising it created a false market for
ancient spark plugs and in that way unloaded a tremendous
amount of undesirable merchandise. If the firm created an
artificial demand by setting forth orders which were ficti-
tious, I should say, yes. The crime is that of obtaining money
by false pretenses.
There must be a representation of a material fact
which is intended to deceive and which does deceive and which
accomplished the desired result.
An occupant of a poor farm refused to work. He said
he couldn ! t work because he didn ! t have shoes. The authori-
ties bought him a pair and still he wouldn't work. Then they
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had him arrested on the charge of getting shoes by false
pretenses. He wasn f t guilty. He didn't want the shoes; he
merely wanted to escape work.
Think it over. We'll argue it some other day.
Your concern is a first-class crook.
Hastily,
Com. v* Quinn, 222 Mass* 514;
Com. v. Rich, 219 Mass. 440;
Com. v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116;
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 266, s.30.
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CRIMINAL LAW SUMMARY
A crime is any act or omission which is forbidden by law to which
a punishment is annexed and which the state prosecutes in its own name
.
A. Classification of Crimes*
I Crimes mala in se—those which, are wrong within themselves and
which will cause an individual to be guilty of any crime
arising therefrom.
Crimes mala prohibita—thos- crimes which are made so by
statute. One is not guilty for the commission of a crime
which grows out of such a crime.
II Treason
—
against the Comuionvrealth consists (l) in levying war
against it, or (2) adhering to the enemies thereof, giving
them aid and comfort. The punishment is life imprisonment.
Felony- -any crime punishable by death, or imprisonment in
the state prison.
Misdemeanors—all other crimes.
B. Elements of a Crime.
I The Criminal Intent. Except in cases of statutory crimes,
there must be a criminal intent or such gross negligence as
the law considers equivalent.
1. General criminal intent is the intent inferred from the
doing of an unlawful or wrongful act on the theory that
the defendant is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his conduct.
2. Specific intent is -*-he intent required in certain crimes,
e. g. in burglary, the intent to commit a felony; also
in larceny, the intent to permanently deprive the owner
of possession.
3. The term "constructive intent" is used in such cases as the
defendant is held criminally responsible for the unin-
tended act when engaged in the commission of a crime
which is malum in sej in such cases the intent to do the
crime actually committed is supplied by proof of the
intent to commit the crime intended.
II The Criminal Act. If a statute makes the doing of an act crimi-
nal no intent beyond the knowledge of what the defendant was
doing ne~d be alleged.
1. The Crime of Attempt, consists of an intent to do an act
and the doing of an act which should apparently result
in the accomplishment of the criminal intent,
a. Elements necessary,
(1) A specific intent,
(2) Performance of an act amounting to more than
mere preparation vihich should bring about
the result,
(3) Failure of accomplishment.
C. Defenses.
I Incapacity.
1. Infants

a. Under 7 years, conclusively presumed incapable,
b. Between 7 and 14, prima facie incapable.
c. Over 14, prima facie capable,
2. Married Women,
a. If an unlawful act is done by a wife in her hus-
band^ presence there is a prima facie presumption
of coercion. The presumption does not apply in
cases of treason, murder or perjury,
3. Insane Persons,
(1) The right and wrong test—A person is insane
so as to be incapable of committing a crime
when he does not know the nature and quality
of the act which he is to do and is unable to
distinguish right and wrong.
(2) Irresistible impulses—This test is accepted
on the theory that a person has no will to
resist,
4. Intoxicated Persons.
a. Intoxication, no matter how great, is in general no
defense to a crime, unless
(1) It is a case of involuntary drunkenness pro-
cured by stratagem or fraud, or
(2) Drunkenness amounting to delirium tremens, or
(3) Unless the crime requires specific intent,
D, Parties
I In Felonies there are principals in both first and second dp-
grees, accessories before and after the fact.
1. Principals in the first degree—those who actually do the
act.
2. Principals in the second degree—those who by previous ar
rangement, are in position to render personal aid if
necessary,
3. An accessory before the fact is one who is not present at
the place of the commission of the crime but merely pro
cures, advises or hires it to be done. The punishment
in the three convictions is the same. G. L. c. 274,
s. 2.
4. An accessory after the fact is one v/ho harbors, conceals
maintains or assists the principal felon, or accessory
before the fact. Punishment is not more than seven
years in the state prison. A husband, wife, parent,
grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister, can
not be an accessory after the fact. G. L, c. 274, s. 4
II In Misdemeanors all are principals.
E. Offenses against the Person.
I Murder—the unlavrful killing of a human being by a human being
with malice aforethought.
1. Murder in the first degree consists in killing another
with:
a. Deliberately premeditated malice aforethought; or
b. With extreme cruelty? or
c. In the commission of a crime punishable with life
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Imprisonment or greater*
2. Murder which does not fall within any of the above classes
is murder in the second degree*
3. The person killed must be a person born and alive, and the
victim must die within a year and a day or it is not
murder
.
4. Murder in the first degree is punished by deathj in the
second degree, by life imprisonment.
II Manslaughter- -the unlawful killing of another without malice,
justification or excuse
.
1. Voluntary Manslaughter—done in heat of passion under great
provocation with the intent to kill
.
a. Words or gestures are not usually regarded as suffi-
cient provocation.
2. Involuntary Manslaughter—arises in three instances when
there was no intention to kill but death followed.
a. While doing an unlawful act, not one necessarily
dangerous to life; or
b. While doing a lawful act with gross negligence; or
c. Because of omitting to act, such omission amounting
to gross negligence
.
3. For Manslaughter the punishment is not more than twenty
years in the state prison.
F. Offenses against the Habitation.
I Arson
—
at eommon law the wilful and malicious burning of the
dwelling house of another.
1. Any charring is sufficient, but a specific intent to burn
is necessary.
2. Arson is an offense against possession, so the house must
be actually or constructively occupied, and be the house
of another.
3. Statutory arson now includes the burning of any class of
buildings, whether belonging to another or not, and
includes the burning of bridges, ships, dams, etc.
G. L. c
.
II Burglary- -at common law, the breaking and entering of the
dwelling house of another in the night time with the intent
to commit a felony.
1. Breaking means the use of any unusual passage, or the
entering by force, or obtaining entrance by fraud.
2. Entering is effected when any portion of the criminal's
body or tools enters the house for other purpose than
the breaking, namely, to commit the felony.
3. Night time is from one hour after sunset to one hour before
sunrise
4. Statutory burglary now includes the breaking and entering
of any dwelling house in the day tiine, or entering in
the night time without the breaking.
G. Offenses against Property.
I Larceny—at common law, the felonious taking by a trespasser
and carrying away the goods of another without his consent
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and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property and to convert it to the taker's own use. By stat-
ute, larceny includes all forms of larceny, criminal
embezzlement, and obtaining property by false pretenses.
II Embezzlement—the fraudulent appropriation of another's
property by a person to whom it has been lawfully given.
1. Larceny without trespass—there must be a taking, an
asportation of the goods of another with intent to
steal.
III False Pretenses--if the owner parts with both possession and
title under false inducement, the defendant is guilty of
getting goods by false pretenses at common law.
1. Essentials of the Crime:
a. The pretense must be made with intent to defraud and
obtain property.
b. Actual fraud must be committed either by use of a
false token or a false statement of fact.
c . The pretense must have induced parting with the
property.
IV Receiving Stolen Goods
—
To be guilty the defendant must know
that the goods he received were stolen. G. L. o. 266, s. 60.
H. Other Crimes.
I Forgery- -the fraudulent making of a writing which if genuine
might be of legal efficacy; or the fraudulent alteration of
a writing so as to materially change its effect.
II Perjury—the wilful giving under oath, in a judicial proceeding,
of false testimony material to the issue, or of testimony
which is required to be given under oath.
III Conspiracy—the confederating of two or more persons to
accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful
purpose by unlawful means.

F Letters Centering about the Home and Its Sacred Relations .
I Husband and wife*
II Parent and child.
Ill Domestic Relations summarized.
The Court of Love
Brief for Respondents.
Statement
That in the month of May,
On or about some day
Appellant took relator 1 s heart, and
stole it quite away.
Point 1
The case is more than clear
Intent doth well appear
"Felonious taking" please the Court,
is quite established here.
Point 2
The heart was not returned;
Appellant claims 1 twas spurned,
The evidence, however, shows, with
passion it was burned I
Point 3
The larceny is grand
And, as the cases stand
Arnellant, to relator clearly for-
feiting her hand,
Should be confined for life
In bonds of "wedded strife,"
And be proclaimed to all the v/orld
as the relator 1 s wife.
Dan Cupid, of Counsel
William Bard McVickar
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Domicile and All That It Means
Dear Frances,
Frankly, I am not at all sure of my domicile though
I know that I have one. After one becomes of age, she may
take a domicile of her own if she so chooses, but I have
never intentionally done so. For years, when I was shifting
from place to place, it was a comfort to feel that I had a
permanent home in a little quiet town on the Cape and I
would have had no hesitancy in saying that I was domiciled in
Plymouth County.
Today, frankly, I fear the court would find me dom-
iciled in Suffolk County. Here is my place of business; here,
I own property; here, I pay taxes; and recently I have voted
here. I am afraid I have returned to take up my domicile in
the city of my birth and in which, I was domiciled until the
home people moved to the Cape twenty odd years ago.
The child has the domicile of its father until it
can, at maturity, take a domicile of choice. If the father
dies and the mother takes a new domicile, the child*s domicile
follows the mother's but not if she marries again.
A married woman takes the domicile of her husband
and as his changes so does hers, except in one case— she may
take a separate domicile for the purpose of divorce.
To have a new domicile, one must have both the
intent and the physical presence in the new place.
The subject is one of importance. Your will is
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probated in the domicile, your personal property is taxed at
the place of the domicile, a child is legitimate or illegiti-
mate according to the laws of the father's domicile, the di-
vorce is good or no good according to the laws of the matri-
monial domicile.
A man came over from Turkey intending to save money
and to return to Turkey where he had left his wife, a
Christian girl. After a time, he learned that she had re-
nounced her Christianity, and had married a Moslem. Accord-
ing to the Mohammedan law, that was enough to constitute a
divorce. He decided then to remain here. He married with-
out telling the story of his life. His wife learned the facts
and asked to have her marriage annulled on the ground that he
was already married. No, his domicile was Turkey; there, he
was a single man after his wife's renunciation of the Christian
faith and her marriage. If he was a single man there, he was
likewise single here and the marriage was valid.
Where is your domicile?
With love,
Kapigian v. Minassian, 212 Mass. 412;
Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388;
Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass. 44-8.
-i ji; [ Ml I N'j
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Marriages, Valid, Voidable and Void
Dear Mrs- Grant,
Esther was seventeen when she married Jim Murphy.
You can*t talk in terms of that marriage being void or void-
able. It is absolutely valid and nothing that you or
Mr. Grant can do will set it aside. Jim Murphy may not be
the man of your choice, but at least be thankful that he is
a good, clean lad and give them a chance to work their way
out of the situation. The time may come when you may rejoice
in their happiness.
There are very few marriages in our state that are
void, and by that I mean, without any standing. If the girl
were below twelve or the boy below fourteen then the marriage
would be declared void. It is true that if a clergyman per-
forms the ceremony with knowledge that the girl is below
eighteen, or the man, twenty-one, he will be liable to a fine
unless the parents* consent has been given. But here Esther
lied about her age, and Jim is twenty- two.
A marriage is also void where the parties are in-
capable of understanding the marriage relation, but even then
it has to be set aside by a court decree during their life-
time; otherwise it is treated as valid.
The law also prohibits one from marrying within the
third degree of kinship. I understand that frequently a man
of the Jewish faith marries his niece, but that is against our
law.
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Once in a while a marriage is voidable and a decree
of nullity can be obtained, but it is most unusual—and it is
never granted except in cases of fraud which goes to the very
essentials of the marriage relationship.
Mrs. Grant, you* 11 have to let Esther and Jim work
out their own salvation or destruction. Neither of you can
set their marriage aside and if it is ever broken it will be
via the divorce courts for one of the seven causes which our
state recognizes.
Let's hope that that day will not come.
Sincerely and sympathetically,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 207, 2.1-7;
Com. v. Ashley, 248 Mass. 259;
Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385;
Parton v. Horvey, 11 Gray 119.
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When _a Wife is Entitled to Support by her Husband
Dear Laura,
The trial is all over and the jury returned a ver-
dict for Edgar. The poor old man doesn't have to lose his
home to pay for the expenses of his wife's long last illness
and death. Edgar was petrified and he had great difficulty
on the stand in getting the lawyer's questions, but all un-
consciously he won his own case.
The plaintiff's attorney had built up a beautiful
case with Annie's ma and Annie's pa, and Annie's sister and
Annie's brother-in-law. Each and every one had testified in
great detail to a home coming one hot afternoon in July, for
were they not all with Annie on that momentous day— that day
when weak and silly Annie no longer enamoured had returned to
the old roof as a dutiful wife should do. They testified to
finding Edgar raking hay in the front yard, to tear-stained
and loving Annie getting out of the car and tugging her heavy
suit case with her, and of Annie placing the suit case on the
ground and going up to Edgar and saying, "Edgar, I've come home
to stay." There was no lack of harmony in their stories.
They all agreed on the hay, the Ford car, the position of Edgar,
the words of Annie, and the mute testimony of a suit case,
evidence of real repentance; and they all agreed that he would
have her not.
It was during cross-examination that Edgar won his
case. The opposing attorney had stressed the July day, the
hay, the driving in of the Ford, and to all Edgar had given a
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scared consent. Then came the attorney* s telling point "And
Annie got out of the car with her suit case?"
"Hey," said Edgar.
"And Annie got out with her suit case?"
"Her what?" says Edgar,
"Suit case," thundered the attorney.
"Lord no," says Edgar, "she never had one."
And that moment it was all over. The picture of a repen-
tant wife returning home and being coldly thrust out was gone.
It is true that a man must support his wife at home
or abroad unless she is away from him because of no fault of
his but if she leaves him of her own volition because other
fields seem more attractive she cannot expect support nor can
those who do support her collect from the husband.
There was no question but Annie went away of her own
volition but the plaintiff had hoped to establish that it was
the fault of the poor old man that she stayed away until re-
turn was too late. Evidently the jury did not agree with them
for they brought in a verdict for the defendant and once more
Edgar putters about the old house secure in the knowledge that
he has a roof over his head. I was sorry for the old people
for they could illy afford the expense which had been theirs.
I was glad for Edgar; and I know you* 11 be too, for I remember
that you talked a lot with him the year you spent in town.
Sincerely,
Sturbridge v. Franklin, 133 Mass. 503.
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The Rights of The Adopted Child
Dear Frances,
I was much interested in calling with you on "Cousin
Josephine** last week and in meeting Sylvia. What a marvellous
woman Miss Valentine is. Her ninety odd years sit lightly on
her shoulders—I could not realize that that tall, aristo-
cratic, splendid woman had lived so long beyond her three
score years and ten. The devotion between the older and the
younger woman was very beautiful. Little did Miss Valentine
realize thirty years ago when she took five-year-old harum
scarum Sylvia into her heart and home that the day would come
when Sylvia would be to her a tower of strength. I was glad
to hear her say that all she had would be Sylvia*s.
I wonder where you got the idea that children were
only adopted by married people. Any one may adopt any person
younger than himself and such adopted person has the rights
of a natural born child as far as the adopting parents *s prop-
erty is concerned. Sylvia will take all of Miss Valentine *s
estate upon her decease if she passes out without a will.
Thank you for taking me with you.
Devotedly,
Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243;
Gallagher v. Sullivan, 251 Mass. 552.
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If Not Adopted, What Then?
Frances dear,
Of course I remember "Cousin Josephine" and Sylvia
and I was sorry to hear of her passing and more than surprised
to learn that Sylvia had never been legally adopted. It is
indeed fortunate for Sylvia that Miss Valentine left a will
otherwise she would have found herself penniless as far as
Miss Valentine's property was concerned. There is still one
unfortunate thing of which Sylvia probably has not yet thought,
and that is the inheritance tax. If she had been legally
adopted she would inherit the $10,000 exempt from taxation but
now she takes under the will as any other stranger and will be
obliged to pay the state the inheritance tax which will amount
to several hundred dollars. All very nice for the government
but not as nice for Sylvia.
How unfortunate that Miss Valentine did not adopt
her even in these recent years. Any single person, as I wrote
you before may adopt a person younger than himself. If married
people are to adopt it must be with the consent of both husband
and wife. The procedure in the Probate Court is very simple.
An adopted child inherits in the same way as a natural
born child from the adopting persons and from their lineal de-
scendants but does not take from their lineal or collateral an-
cestors. For example had Sylvia been adopted by Miss Valentine
and she had died without a will Sylvia would have taken all her
property but had Miss Valentine's brother died intestate Sylvia
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would not be considered as a niece and could not take as an
heir of his. Had Sylvia been adopted by a married couple
and they had had children she would take from them as a
sister. Sometimes we say that an adopted child has a double
inheritance for she always takes from her own family as well
as from the adopting person or persons. Certainly Sylvia
deserved to be adopted. Financially for her it means onl>
the loss of several hundred dollars but if there had been
no will it would have meant a crushing blow. Why is it that
people who are so finely educated are often so ignorant on
these every day matters.
All love,
Davis v. McGraw, 206 Mass. 294;
Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A» Domicil--the place where one either actually or constructively has
his permanent home.
I Three kinds of domioil ; the domicil of origin; the domicil of
choice ; constructive domicil
.
1. No person is ever without some domicil. Each retains his
domicil of origin until he acquires a new one.
2. No person has more than one domicil at a time.
3 . To change a domicil there must have been physical presence
in the new domicil and intent to remain permanently,
a. The expression of intent and the physical change need
not come together.
II Evidence admissible to prove domicil : residence; place of busi-
ness; presence of one^ family; assessment and payment of
taxes; exercise of the right to vote.
B. Void Marriages.
I Statutory Provisions
1. Consanguinity and affinity . Marriage between those related
by blood or affinity within the third degree is prohibited.
2 Polygamous marriage
.
G. L. 207, s. 4. A marriage contracted while either party
thereto has a former wife or husband living is void.
3. Mental incapacity.
Must be so great as to prevent a general understanding of
the nature of marriage
.
4. Insufficient age.
No person is oapable of contracting a valid marriage until
he or she has reached the age of consent (14 for
males and 12 for females). Statutory age is 21 for
males and 18 for females.
C
.
Divorce.
I Seven Causes for Divorce.
1. Adultery.
Voluntary intercourse of a married person with one not
the husband or wife
.
2. Cruel and abusive treatment .
Massachusetts has adopted the phrase "cruel and abusive
treatment." Cruelty is defined as such wilful mis-
conduct "as shall cause injury to the life, limb or
health, or create a danger of such injury, or a
reasonable apprehension of such danger."
Massachusetts applies the test of the effect of
the acts and not their character.
3. Desertion.
The voluntary separation of one spouse from the other
without the other's consent or justifying fault,
intended to be permanent and continuing for the
statutory period of three years.
4. Gross and Confirmed Habits of Intoxication .
Drunkenness to constitute a ground for divorce must be
gross and confirmed and continue long enough to
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render living together intolerable, and the habit
must exist at the time of the filing of the libel.
5. Neglect to Provide .
By statute the neglect must be gross, wanton and cruel.
No divorce if the wife fairly provides for herself
by her own labor.
a. The one libel which can be brought only by the
wife.
6. Imprisonment.
Ground if in a Massachusetts prison, jail, or house of
correction for a term of five years or more
.
7. Impotency.
Cause by statute in Massachusetts if the condition
existed at the time of the marriage unknown to the
libellant
.
II Defenses to a Divorce Action .
1
.
Connivance .
The corrupt consenting by one spouse to an offense by the
other
.
a. Connivance implies more than mere consent, desire,
intent j it involves action which facilitates
the commission of the act.
2. Condonation.
The forgiveness of a marital offense which constitutes a
ground for divorce
.
a. Always on the condition that the wrongdoer shall
not again commit the offense. If the condition
is broken the original offense revives as a
ground for divorce
.
3. Recrimination.
A counter charge in a divorce suit to the effect that the
one seeking the divorce has been guilty of an offense
constituting a ground for divorce.
a. It is immaterial whether the offense was committed
before or after the offense charged in the libel.
4. Provocation.
Where the conduct of the person bringing the action con-
tributed to or caused the wrongful act complained of,
though the conduct was not of such a character that
a divorce could be obtained because of it.
a. Probably used in Massachusetts only in cases of
desertion or cruel and abusive treatment.
5. Collusion.
Any agreement between husband and wife to obtain a divorce
by an imposition on the court.
a. Effected by suppression of the facts, or by intro-
duction of false or fabricated testimony.
b. Although it must be specially pleaded it may be
pleaded through amendment because it frequently
takes place after the case has started.
6. Insanity.
If the guilty person was insane at the time the act com-
plained of was committed, no divorce could be granted.

G Let ters to Those Who Travel .
I The Common Carrier and His Problems.
II Inns of yesterday and today.
III Outline again.
Actua Dei nemini facit injuriam
Failure of performance when the Act of God's
the cause,
Is pardoned, where the duty's one required
by the laws,
But the Act of God though rendering impossible
an act,
Does not excuse the maker of an absolute
contract
.
Latin Maxims
Foster
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With Aeroplanes
Dear Allen,
The experience through which you have just been
suggests to me that new law is in the process of the making,
and I am not sure how the cases will be decided in the fu-
ture, but I should imagine that the time would come when aer-
oplanes would be classed with railroad trains and electric
cars as common carriers. When that time comes to pass the
Colonial Aeroplane Corporation will find itself in the posi-
tion of an insurer.
By an insurer I mean one who is liable although ap-
parently without any negligence. The common carrier of olden
days was in a position where he could very easily defraud the
public. If goods were placed in his hands for delivery to
some distant point he was transporting those goods over roads
infested with robbers and if the transportation was not in-
terrupted by such individuals, it was always within the com-
mon carrier' 8 power to create a few for himself and when he
reported loss to his patron, the patron was quite without
evidence to prove his words untrue for the only witnesses
that the patron could get would be men in the employ of the
carrier and because they valued their positions they would
hardly reveal any wrongdoing on the part of the transporting
company. For that reason it was found necessary to place a
very heavy burden upon the carrier and he became in the eyes
of the world an insurer of all goods entrusted to his care
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and therefore if the goods were not produced in good season
he would be liable for the lost articles. Gradually he was
permitted to set up four defenses and thus escape his in-
surer's liability. If the goods were lost because of an act
of God, because of the fault of the shipper, or the inherent
vice of the goods, or because of the capture by a public en-
emy, then he was excused from responsibility. If one reads
the cases one is impressed that many things are blamed to God
for which He is hardly responsible, but an act of God may be
said to be any force over which man has no control, therefore
a fire caused by a flash of lightening, a sudden freeze, a
calming of the breeze, a tornado, a flood, might be reason
for the carrier to escape responsibility. Again if the ship-
per himself were at fault if he packed the goods in such a
way as to cause deterioration or if he were unwilling to pay
the necessary refrigeration charges, he could hardly be in a
position to hold the carrier liable. If the goods were being
transported from one country to another when a state of war
existed, and were seized by belligerent forces, the carrier
was excused as he was if goods were destroyed because of
their inherent characteristics, the tendency of fruit to de-
cay, a frightened animal may injure itself by kicking, and
under such circumstances if there is no blame to be attached
to the carrier there should be no responsibility. Outside of
these four places, however, the common carrier's insurance
liability was established for years and it still exists to
this day unless it is cut down by some special contract

233
between the carrying company and the individual using their
service.
Your predicament is an unfortunate one. You tell
me that you were going over to New York on the Colonial Line
and that the aeroplane apparently left the field successfully
that in a few moments something seemed to be wrong with the
engine and that the pilot was finally obliged to take a nose-
dive into the harbor and that as a result your baggage went
overboard. Your only opportunity to recover from the aero-
plane company if the aeroplane company is not a common car-
rier, and I am well satisfied that it is not at this time,
would be to prove negligence, and it looks to me as if you
would have much difficulty in establishing negligence under
the circumstances. Traveling by aeroplane is very delightful
but it does not yet give to one the security which you can
feel when traveling by railroad or railway and until such
time as the aeroplane companies are classified as common car-
riers one must realize that they will be liable for loss only
upon proof of negligence.
Sincerely yours,
Wilson v. Colonial Airport, 278 Mass. 420.
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All About Freight and Baggage .
Dear Leon,
You ask me to write you further concerning the in-
surance liability of common carriers--what it is, to what
it extends, and when it extends, and so on. As I understand
the law, the common carrier is an insurer of freight from
the moment it comes into his possession for immediate trans-
portation and this insurance liability continues until the
goods reach the point of destination. Possibly it continues
beyond that time, depending upon custom and the contract be-
tween the parties. When I say freight I am referring to any
goods which are shipped for the purpose of transportation
and for which service pay is given.
The insurance liability also attaches to baggage
which an individual has for the purposes of the journey and
which he has entrusted to the care of the company. It is
rather interesting to note the articles which have been con-
sidered as fit for the journey. There is the tragic case
of the woman who had come from the other country and had
brought with her as her most treasured possession a feather
bed, and when she reached her destination in the middle
V/est, unfortunately it was missing. The feather bed was
not considered as an article fit for the journey and was
not therefore baggage, and if it was not baggage the company
was not liable except upon proof of negligence and no negli-
gence was established. The question has some times arisen
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concerning money in one's trunk. If that money was taken
with the expectancy that it would be used upon the journey
then up to a reasonable sum it would be recoverable. What
would constitute a reasonable sum is of course a question
for the jury, but an amount as large as $300 has in the past
been allowed. I recall a case in which an individual test-
ified that he had started out with C8Q0 in his trunk but he
revealed the fact that the $800 was intended to set himself
up in business in the distant city and so he lost out be-
cause it could not be classified as baggage.
If you keep your suit case with you it is then
under your control and there is no insurance liability what-
ever upon the road. They would only be responsible in case
of loss if negligence could be shown. I recall the case of
the man who left his valise by his seat and went into the
smoking car. Upon his return some hours later the valise
was missing but he could hardly recover from the road for
his own negligence was most apparent.
Truly yours,
Levins v. N. Y.N.H.&H.R.R. , 183 Mass. 175;
Dunlap v. International Co., 98 Mass. 371;
Kinsley v. Lake Shore R.R. , 125 Mass. 54;
Ailing v. B. & M. R.R., 126 Mass. 121.
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Cutting Down Insurer' s Lia.bility
Dear Leon,
Charles Clark returned from abroad a few weeks ago
on the Cunard line and when he landed in the United States
his trunks were missing. At first he was quite undisturbed.
Were not common carriers insurers of baggage, liable for its
loss without proof of negligence? I told him yes, but that
today carriers were able, because of lower rates offered, to
cut down their liability greatly, and we would need to know
his contract.
He bought his ticket in Liverpool—and there the
contract was made, and today I learned that that ticket on
the reverse side states that there will be no liability on
the company for loss of baggage from any cause whatsoever.
England allows its common carriers to exempt themselves from
liability even upon proof of negligence and English law gov-
erns his case.
Here a common carrier can cut down his liability,
but he cannot escape all liability where he has been negli-
gent .
Charles Clark is furious. He says he never read
the stipulation. That fact helps his case not at all, for on
the front of the ticket is the word "over," suggesting mate-
rial of value on the reverse side and he is chargeable with
it.
Life is not so simple after all.
Sincerely,
Forseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., supra.
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The Passenger Identified and Pigeon-holed
Dear Leon,
You ask rae when an individual is a passenger and
when he is not a passenger'. I do not wonder that you become
confused. Let me endeavor to give you a number of situations
in which one would really be a passenger and as such entitled
to the very highest degree of care. You tell rae that at the
time of the accident you were about to board a car and that
you were struck by a projecting trolley. Unfortunately you
had not placed your foot upon the step or your hand upon the
rail, and I fear that you cannot be classified as a passenger
and that you cannot recover from the elevated road. The neg-
ligence which you would establish, if you could establish
any, would be slight and as an individual waiting for a
street car the road would be liable to you only on proof of
ordinary negligence— a degree of negligence more serious than
slight negligence.
One is not a passenger while waiting at a post for
a car or while transferring from one car to another upon the
highway, but one is a passenger if he is in the subway wait-
ing for a train. Likewise, one is a passenger if he is in a
station waiting for a train. However, one is not a passenger
while in the South Station until such time as he stands upon
the platform adjacent to the rail upon which his train goes
out. This is because the South Station is owned by a Holding
Company and serves more than one railroad line. One may be
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a passenger while standing upon a rear platform of a train
but one is not a passenger if he boards a moving train until
he reaches a place of safety. One is not a passenger if
traveling upon a free pass, but an employee who is allowed
passes over the road will be justified in believing that such
passes are a part of his compensation and that therefore he
is not traveling gratis, he is a passenger.
The street car companies and railroad companies owe
to passengers the highest degree of care and for that reason,
although they are not insurers, they are liable upon proof of
the slightest negligence. You have always been told that a
master is liable for the torts or wrongdoings of his servant
committed within the scope of his employment, but when I talk
of common carriers to ray students I remind them that the word
"scope" is not broad enough and such carriers may be liable
for torts committed within the course of their employment.
There is a case which will help you to remember
this point. It occurred on the Needham line some years ago
when there was only one set of tracks with the various neces-
sary turnouts. One day the conductor had picked up a dead
hen and, in a spirit of mischief, as he passed the other car
on the turnout he threw it at the conductor on the out-going
car. Unfortunately his aim was poor and the dead hen hit the
lady passenger instead. You can imagine her ire and also her
discomfort. It would be most difficult to say that the con-
ductor was acting within the scope of his employment, that
is, about his master's business,, but notwithstanding that
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fact the street railway company was liable because he was
still within the course of his employment, he was still
aboard the inbound car.
You have taken a very sensible view of the matter;
under the circumstances you would really be foolish to at-
tempt to recover from the company. Technically you were not
a passenger and the best thing to do is to forget the injury
as speedily as possible and think of pleasanter things.
Honestly, though perhaps disappointedly, yours,
Bilodeau v. Fitchburg St. Ry., 236 Mass. 526;
Deagle v. N.Y.N .H.&H.R.R. , 217 Mass. 23;
Fraiser v. N.Y .N. H.&H.R.R. , 180 Mass. 427.
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Common Law and Statutory Liabili ty of Innkeepers
Dear Laura:
Last week I stopped at the Fillebrown House in
Kingston. I had not been there for more than ten years, but
the atmosphere of the place fascinated me. I thought of the
days when it was an old inn, for it dates back into the early
1700' s. The hugh fireplace in the dining room will take a
five-foot log and you can stand inside of it and look up
through the immense chimney to the sky above. In imagination
I saw the old tavern again, saw the horses in the ancient
stable, saw the travelers put up for the night enroute from
Providence to Boston. What fascinating stories of other days
could be told by some of these ancient houses.
I imagine that there was a bar in that old dining
room and that many a weary guest was refreshed by food and
drink, and then found himself, sleeping the sleep of the
just, in one of the many upstairs rooms. Do you realize that
the innkeepers in the olden days were like common carriers,
insurers of the possessions of their guests as long as those
guests were travelers?
Remember that a traveler was interpreted to be an
individual who received both food and shelter in an inn and
if his possessions were taken from the room during the night
and while he was asleep the innkeeper was forced to make good
even though he was in no wise responsible for the loss, but
this was only true if the guest was a traveler. We have some

241
interesting cases deciding persons to be or not to be trav-
elers. The man whose wife was not very well, and who moved
with his family to the village inn for the winter, was not
so classified and for loss of his possessions recovery could
only be had on proof of negligence. On the other hand the
army officer who with his wife remained in the hotel until
such time as orders should come for a change, did aualify as
a traveler.
Once again we are hearing about taverns and inns,
but the ancient day is gone forever. They may now shelter
noisy groups who are seeking new thrills and new methods of
excitement but their times of dignity and genuine use are
practically over. The fast train and the automobile have
destroyed their need.
By statute, today, innkeepers are no longer insur-
ers and if while in the hotel one's valuables disappear while
under his control the maximum amount which he may recover
from the proprietor will be but $300 unless he had placed
those valuables in the hotel safe. If so, then he might re-
cover as much as $3,000. Again we find that by statute if
the loss has been due to a fire or armed forces that the com-
mon carrier liability even to $300 does not exist except upon
proof of negligence. These changes have come with improved
methods of transportation; the need is no longer as great and
so it follows that the responsibility is also lessened.
You who travel so widely—north, east, south, and
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west—may sometime think on these things on your journeys.
To me they make life more fascinating!
Devotedly yours,
Hall v. Pike, 100 Mass. 495;
Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186;
Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 497.

243
COMMON CARRIERS
A. Common Carrier Law.
I The common carrier and his calling.
1. A common carrier is one who undertakes for the public
generally to transport goods or passengers from place to
place for hire
.
2. Two distinguishing elements of the status of a common
carrier
:
a. The public nature of his business.
b. The extraordinary responsibility which he assumes by
law for the destruction or loss of the goods, and
for injuries to passengers.
II The Carriers Liability.
1. Goods to which the liability attaches .
a. It attaches to freight- -any goods for whose carriage
there is consideration.
(1) If one send a dangerous substance vdthout giving
notice of its character, not only is the
carrier not liable for its destruction, but
the sender is liable to the carrier if damage
is caused to him.
b. It attaches to baggage which is property which person
in like standing with the passenger might reasonably
take for the purposes of the journey.
(1) The samples of a travelling salesman are not
baggage, and the carrier is not liable for bhe
loss of such good b. It makes no difference
that the baggage master knew that such goods
were checked.
(2) In regard to personal effects carried by the
passenger on his person or within his imme-
diate control, the carrier is liable only for
loss or destruction because of its negligence,
and the passenger's contributory fault bars
his recovery.
Ill Liability for loss or destruction of freight or baggage .
1. A carrier is liable without proof of negligence for the
loss or destruction of freight or baggage; it is a quasi
insurer
.
a. Exceptions to the above rule ; Not responsible if
loss was caused by:
(1) An act of God. "An act of God may be defined
as the action of an irresistible physical
force not attributable in any degree to the
conduct of man and not in reason preventable
by human foresight, strength or care."
(2) The inherent vice of the goods.
(3) The fault of the shipper.
(4) Act of the public enemy.
(a) The public enemy must be a belligerent
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force engaged in military operation in
time of -war.
IV Liability to passengers .
1. "It is the duty of the carrier of passengers for hire to
use the highest degree of care consistent with the nature
and extent of its business, not only to provide safe and
suitable vehicles for their carriage, but to maintain
all such reasonable arrangements for control and super-
vision both of the passengers and of its own servants as
prudence would dictate to guard its passengers, while
they occupy that relation, against all dangers that are
naturally and according to the usual course of things
to be expected. It is bound to select and employ a suffi-
cient number of competent servants to me^t any exigency
which, in the exercise of that high degree of vigilance
and care to which it is held, it ought reasonably to
have anticipated. And its duty to use all proper means
and precautions to protect its passengers against in-
juries caused by the misconduct of other passengers,
such as under the circumstances might have bee^- ntici-
pated and could have been guarded against, is no less
stringent than the obligation to prevent misconduct or
negligence on the part of its own servants."
2. A carrier is liable to a person whom it is carrying over
the tracks of another railroad company, or to a passen-
ger at a station of another company which was being
used by this carrier,
3. For injury to a passenger by the act of a servant, the
carrier is liable if the servant is acting in the car-
rier^ business whether the act is within the scope of
the authority or not.
4. The carrier* s liability for injuries to passengers caused
by other passengers is founded upon negligence.
V l.hen the carrier's liability begins.
1. As to goods.
a. Liability begins as soon as the goods are received
under an immediate duty to put them in transit.
2. As to passengers.
a. With respect to railroads, elevated structures and
subways, a person is deemed a passenger from the
time he entered upon the premises of the carrier
in a proper manner with the intention of becoming
a passenger.
b. As to street cars operating in the public highway the
rule seems to be that a person does not become a
passenger until he is in physical contact with the
vehicle, in the act of getting on.
VI Yfaen the carrier's liability terminates
.
1. As to goods .
a. Generally liability continues until delivery.
b. YJhere the goods are not to be delivered personally,
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or to a designated place of business, the rule in
Massachusetts is that when the goods arrive at the
point of destination and are unloaded the car-
rier's liability ceases and the carrier is liable
thereafter only for negligence as a warehouseman.
c. vVhere delivery is to be made at a designated place,
the liability as insurer continues until delivery
or tender at that place
•
d. If goods are being transported over connecting lines,
the Massachusetts rule is that each carrier is a
carrier over its own line and a forwarding agent
at its terminus at which its liability as common
carrier ceases; this is presumed to be the contract.
(1) In case of loss in shipments over connecting
lines it was presumed that the loss occurred
by the negligence of the last carrier.
e. By the interstate commerce law, the Cormack Amendment,
a carrier undertakes a through shipment, so the
above rule applies only in case of intrastate ship-
ments .
2. As to passengers .
The passenger status continues until he has had an op-
portunity by safe and convenient means to leave the
premises of the carrier.
VII Limitation of liability .
1. As to goods.
a. In Massachusetts a common carrier may by special con-
tract cut down the insurer's liability and may
stipulate to be liable only for loss or destruction
caused by negligence. A contract cutting off all
liability is void as against public policy.
b. If goods are shipped upon a stipulation that they are
at an "agreed valuation" or "value asked and not
given," such a stipulation is valid.
c. A stipulation that notice shall be given and that
claims for damages shall be made within a fixed
time is valid if the time fixed is reasonable,
d. If the stimiV.tion is valid in srbstance and is con-
tained in a "bill of lading or other contract it
is binding on the shipper whether he reads it or
not.
e. Where the stipulation is in a mere receipt or upon a
voucher ticket or in a notice, the Massachusetts
rule is that the shipper knew or assented to it in
order to be bound.
f . Under the interstate commerce act if a stipulation
limiting liability is posted in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission it is binding whether the shipper knew
it or not. This applies only to interstate
shipments
.
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2. As to passengers.
a. A carrier may not exempt himself from liability for
injuries caused by his negligence, if the passenger
was a passenger for hire; however, if in considera-
tion of such an agreement a passenger is permitted
to ride elsewhere than where passengers are en-
titled ordinarily to be carried, such a stipulation
is valid.
(1) G. L. Ch. 159, s. 3, prohibits a common carrier
from requiring persons leaving by a particular
door to do so at their o-wn risk.
b. "Where a passenger is carried free, a stipulation
that there should be no liability is valid in this
state
.
c. The rule as to the validity of stipulation against
liability in passes issued to employees is as
follows: If the employee was injured during the
time of his employment his rights are those of em-
ployee against employer.
(1) If the employee was injured on his own time the
validity of the stipulation depends on the
question whether the pass was a free pass or
issued as part compensation.
VIII Innkeepers .
1. The liability of innkeepers, those who receive travellers
for board and lodging, is like that of common carriers;
they are liable as insurers for loss or damage to the
property of guests, unless caused by an act of God, by
the public enemy or by the fault of the guest except as
this liability has been modified by statute,
a. G. L. Ch. 140, s. 10, as modified by the Acts of
1924.
(1) An innkeeper shall not be liable for losses sus
tained by a guest except of wearing apparel,
articles worn or carried on the person, per-
sonal baggage and money for travelling pur-
poses and personal use, nor for these for an
amount exceeding $500. If money, jewels, or-
naments, etc., are deposited with the inn-
keeper, and they are lost he is liable up to
^3, 000. By section 11 of G. L. Ch. 140, in
case of loss by fire or ove rv;he lming force,
an innkeeper is liable only for negligence.

H Letters for the close of all things .
1 The will—and still we speak,
1. For further consideration.
The boast of heraldry, the pomp of pow'r,
And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave,
Await alike th' inevitable hour.
The paths of glory lead but to the grave.
Gray's Elegy in a Country Churchyard*
"So surely as the berry indicates the soundness
of the root, the flower of the bulb, so does man's
last will tell of the goodness or foulness of the
heart which conceived it. The cankered root sends
up only a sickly germ, which brings forth no fruit
in due season; whilst the wine that maketh glad
the heart of man, the oil which maketh him a cheer-
ful countenance, and the bread that strengthens
his heart, have burst from roots which mildew has
marred, nor worm fretted."
From "Curious Wills" by Harris.
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Requisites of a Valid Will
Dear Laura,
It is the anniversary of Bessie Shuman's death, and
I imagine it is a day very like that other day—clear, cold,
with a suggestion of frost. Do you remember how they found
her at the foot of the cellar stairs with the hammer, the
nails, the cellar window, all "bearing mute testimony that up
to the end she had been busy about many things?
Do you remember the two days' auction? The horror
of it will ever remain. I can see that auctioneer now at the
end of the second day trying to get rid of her framed Normal
School diploma, I could have screamed when he tore that di-
ploma from its frame and cast it aside. The frame went for
fifteen cents. Ruthlessly that bit of paper, one of her
choicest possessions, was trampled under careless feet, and
why? All because she didn't know enough to have her will
witnessed.
Her will was carefully and well drawn. She had
gone into minute directions as to the disposition of her
property. Everything was taken care of from the house to its
humblest contents, but there were no witnesses and it could
not stand unless the next of kin were all willing to release
their rights. Think of it—there were twenty-one first cous-
ins, s,nd all but two consented to the will, but they, two
brothers, who had rarely seen her must have their legal
rights. It was a bit of life's irony that they both died
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before the final disposition could be made.
I vowed years ago that if I had fifteen cents I
would take care of it by will and it would be a will that
would stand, an instrument signed by me and witnessed by
three witnesses, no one of whom was a beneficiary or the hus-
band or wife of a beneficiary under the will. It will not
be necessary for the witnesses to know that they are witness-
ing a will. All they need to see will be my signature and
that I'll be sure of by signing when they can see me sign a,nd
I'll be sure they sign after I do and where I can see them
sign. It won't be necessary that they sign in the presence
of each other for my presence only is of importance. I shall
choose my witnesses with some care and be satisfied that if
the world would dub me crazy after my departure that they
will testify, if the need arises, to my entire sanity on the
day I placed my signature on that important document—the
paper which will help me a bit to live on in the minds and
thoughts of those whom I have called friends.
Devotedly,
Whitney v. Twombley, 136 Mass. 145;
Barnes v. Chase, 208 Mass. 490;
Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238;
Hawkes v. Hawkes, 230 Mass. 11.
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Codicils and Their Effect
Mother dear,
Nellie Ames bustled into the office the other day;
and I knew that grandfather's collar button was doubtless
to be left to someone else. I was right. She wanted to
change u a few little items in the will." So we drew another
codicil. This is the fifth. May the courts forgive me I
I told her that the next time it would have to be
a new will; she really is will minded, and--a nuisance.
A codicil is all right, but any good thing can be
overworked. The first time she made one was the day she
announced she had just written a letter disposing of a few
personal effects. I tried to explain that the letter was
no good because it had been written after the execution of
the will and was not mentioned in the will. She brightened
up and said, "Oh, just draw the will over again," but I had
no intention of giving hours to that task just then for a
relative who never considers that to maintain an office re-
quires money.
So, brightly I suggested a codicil. What was that?
Oh, just a little will, signed and witnessed as any will, an
instrument which brought the will down to date, and which
could be used to incorporate the letter, and which revoked
the will and prior codicils only so far as it stipulated.
She fell for the idea at once, md she has been falling ever
since
.
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My mind is firmly mad© up that the next time she
comes it will cost her twenty-five dollars.
Relatives are pests sometimes, aren't they?
Devotedly,
Wainwright v. Tuckerman, 120 Mass. 232;
Brimmer v. Sohier, 1 Cush. 118;
Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273.
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The Promise to Make a Will
Dear Miss White,
I: other told me last night when I got home of your
recent call at the house, and of your grave problem. Unfor-
tunately it was too late for me to drive over to see you, and
I am leaving in about a half hour for Boston, and will not be
down for another week. However, I'd like to get information
into your hands promptly, and then, through the week, you can
think the problem over, and if you still think you want my
help I'll see you over the next week-end.
We have spoken of you so many times when we have
seen you at Church and Grange affairs, and at the Farmers 1
Club with Mr* Harris. He was so feeble, and your devotion
and care of him could not have been finer had you been his
own daughter. We surely were all deeply shocked and sur-
prised when we learned upon his death that everything he had
was to go to a distant cousin in Connecticut. Rumor has it
about town that she hardly knew him, never did for him, or
in any way merits his property unless the tie of blood jus-
tifies such disposition. Time was, when people honestly be-
lieved that if the:/ could trace e blood relationship that
they were entitled to all earthly possessions, but we have
travelled away from that ancient fallacy, and most of us say
with reverence, "if we can't choose our relatives, thank God
we can choose our friends."
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Mother says that you went to Mr, Harris forty years
ago, giving up the opportunity to marry and have a home of
your own, because of his promise to you that if you would take
care of him as long as he lived, that all that he had should
be yours. Mother didn't ask you, however, if you had any
writing to that effect, and I am afraid that : r ou haven't. If
you have, our pathway would be easy, and I could assure you
that everything would be yours regardless of the will or the
arguments of any blood relatives. Beyond question, your under
standing was that he would make a will in your favor, and all
the elements of a valid contract are present except one.
Since May 17, 1888, such a contract to make a will to be en-
forceable must be in writing, and without a writing you could
not succeed. On the other hand that doesn't mean that you are
going to lose everything. Mother says that through the years
you have not received any regular pay, that he has bought the
supplies, given you a dollar now and then, or bought things
for you, and that most of the money which you have had has
come from working on the cranberry bog during the fall, and
in screening berries in the immediate months that followed.
I marvel that you were able to care for him and the house,
and still earn a little on the side for yourself, but we all
know that you did.
Even though you cannot sue his estate because of
the broken contract to make a will, there is no reason why
you cannot put in a bill for a reasonable sum each week for
services rendered during the forty years. There isn't a
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court in Massachusetts that would not say there was not an
implied contract there on which you could recover. Have you
not rendered him a benefit all of those years? Have you not
rendered it expecting to he paid? Didn't he know that ;you
expected pay sooner or later? If he didn't intend you to be
paid, hasn't he been a long time silent on the subject? I
know your answer is yes to every one of these four questions,
and I have no hesitation in telling you that you can recover
a judgment that will eat up the major portion, if not all,
of his property. Why, if you were to have but $5 a week for
all you have done, that would mean $260 a year, and for forty
years there would be a debt of $10,400. I don't know how
large an estate he left, but I doubt if it exceeds $10,000;
does it?
Shall we talk this over more fully next week-end?
Sincerely yours,
Emery v. Burbank, 163 Maes. 326;
Sughrue v. Barlow, 233 Mass. 468;
Reade v. McKe?gue, 252 Mass. 162.
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The ..itness a_ Beneficiary
Dear Anne,
Did I dream it or did I hear you tell Grace today
that you had left her in your will the opal ring she has
ever admired? If I'm not mistaken, Anne, Grace was one of
the witnesses to that will, and if she is, and there are but
two others, she would lose the bequest. If I am right get
another witness on that will.
No person can take under a will who is a witness
to the will unless there are three other witnesses not sim-
ilarly situated. It is also true that a husband or wife of
a beneficiary who served as one of the three witnesses would
prevent the other spouse from receiving; under the will.
Formerly on the above facts the will would fail,
and the person die intestate (without a will), but since 1921
the will is good, but the legacy is lost.
Sincerely,
Sullivsn v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 474;
Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 10 Allen 155;
Crowell v. Tuttle, 208 Mass. 445.
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The Will Revoked
Dear Mrs. Vickery,
You write me that conditions have changed and you
think it wise to do without a will, and to let your property
go to your next of kin. That is an easy thing to do.
The will may he revoked by "burning, tearing, can-
celling, or obliterating" with the intent to revoke it. Burn
it up, tear it up, write "cancelled" across its face, or
scratch out your signatures and the signatures of the witnesses
and ipso facto the desire is accomplished.
There are other ways provided in the statute, but
they do not apply to your case, so I hasten to send this note
to you, that you may destroy the will and forget that you ever
had one
•
Truly yours,
Perkes v. Perkes, 3 B- rnsw^ll & Adolphus 489;
Burton v. Wylde, 261 111. 397;
Bailev v. Bailey, 5 Cush. 245;
Meyerovitz v. Jacobovitz, 263 Mass. 47.
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Marriage and the .ill
Dear Margaret,
Your letter today telling me that you made a will
before marriage startles me. Unless that will recites that
you made it in contemplation of your marriage to Mr. Mortimor,
it is no earthly good, for it was revoked by your marriage.
I know that you have property you want to dispose
of, and I am writing because I feel that you may care now to
make a will. With Junior and Hope to think of, I imagine
that a new will would be more satisfactory anyway.
A woman asked the other day if she could cut off
her husband in her will, and I had to tell her that that was
not possible, but if she chose to cut off her children she
might. Imagine, Margaret, wanting to cut off one's husband
and youngsters.
If a child is left out of a will there is a pre-
sumption that he has been forgotten, and unless the presump-
tion is overruled, he takes the same share he would have taken
had the parent died without a will. There are places where a
child would rejoice in being cut off.
A recent case arose in which the black shee^ of the
family claimed he had been overlooked in his mother's will,
but evidence was introduced that his picture had hung over
his mother's dressing table for twenty-three yeai i s--and it was
decided that he was not forgotten.
The old idea that a child must be left a dollar, is
erroneous, but it is wise to mention him and thus negative
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the idea that he may have been forgotten.
This is really an interesting subject, hut I must
not write longer.
Good night,
In re: Steiner's will, 152 N. Y. Sup. 725;
Ingersoll v. Hopkineon, 170 Mass. 401;
Paine v. Price, 184 Mass. 350-
Yerxa v. Youngman, 241 Mass. 253.
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The Widow Oho Obje cts to Her Husband' s Will
Dear I.Irs . Grey,
It is possible for you to waive your husband's will
and to obtain a maximum amount of $10,000 outright, and a
life interest in $5,000 more. Mr. Grey ! s estate of $45,000
above expenses would have descended one-third to you, and two-
thirds to his children had he died without a will, so your
share would have been $15,000, but of that you can only take
$10,000 in your own right. The will which left the estate
to charity will be cut down by .^10,000, and from $5000 more
you will have the interest, but after your death, the $>5,00Q
will pass to the designated charity. The boys, unfortunately,
inasmuch as they are mentioned in the will, have no additional
right
.
If a man leaves a will where there are no children,
and the wife desires to waive it, she figures the amount
coming to her by thinking in terms of the first five thousand,
and one-half the remainder: e.g. an estate of $45,000 means
$5,000 plus $20,000 for her, or a total of 325,000. But
again, of that sum she only takes the first $10,000 outright
and the interest in the balance, in this case, $15,000.
Do you still feel that you care to exercise your
right?
Respectfully yours,
Boynton v. Boynton, 266 Mass. 454;
Pinkerton v. Sargent, 102 Mass. 538;
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If the Beneficiary Predeceases the Testator
Dear Jack,
Your mother was to have been a beneficiary under
her aunt's will, and the aunt has but recently passed away.
Jack, the $2,000 comes to you, and I am so happy for you,
because I know to what good use you will put it. It will
solve the educational worries under which you have been so
courageously struggling. I know that even yet you don't be-
lieve your good fortune.
There is a statute in Massachusetts which provides
that in case a legatee predeceases a testator, as where your
mother passed on before this great-aunt, that if the legatee
was a blood relative having issue, that the issue will take
the share bequeathed to the legatee, but if the legatee is
not a blood relation, or if a blood relation she does not
have issue, then her share lapses. By that I mean it will
fall into the rest and residue clause if there is one in the
will, or if not, it will go as intestate property to the next
of kin of the deceased person.
Your mother was a blood relative, you are her issue;
therefore, the $2,000 comes to you and I rejoice in your
having it.
Sincerely yours,
Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196.
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Concerning Bills Owed by Deceased Persona
Dear Laura,
Your letter telling me of the unfortunate situation
in which your aunt finds herself makes me wish so much that
I could help.
You write that her brother borrowed $2500 of her
two years before his death, that he died in October 1928, that
his wife was appointed executrix under bis will the following
month; and that she constantly promised to meet the obliga-
tion and never did.
Dear lady, I am sorry, but we have a lav/ in
Massachusetts that a creditor who has a claim against the es-
tate of a deceased must start suit within one year from the
date of the appointment of the executor, or be forever barred.
There is only one chance, and I will investigate
that one when I come to Boston, but I imagine it is worth-
less. If by any slip the executrix failed to publish or post
the notice of her appointment as required by the court, then
creditors would be able to assert rights for a period of
twenty years after the date of the appointment. This is the
only hope. I wonder if the court orders had not been carried
out so that rights still exist if any property could be dis-
covered with which to meet the obligation. These are things
which make one furious
.
Regretfully yours,
Wells v. Child, 12 Allen 333;
Leach v. Leach, 238 Mass. 100;
Modified by Statute of 1S33.
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Without .a Will
Dear Frances,
Whether one shall make a will or not is to be deter-
mined by those who would take his property upon his decease.
While your mother lived, I told you not to make a will, for
I knew that if you predeceased her, you would want her to
have everything, and without a will she would get it as your
next of kin. On the other hand, if you had made a will and
not remembered the sister and your deceased brother's child,
it would have hurt perhaps
.
Today you should make a will. For with your
mother's passing, Louise and Leonard's son are your next of
kin, but inasmuch as you don't want the property to go to
that son, you can only take care of the situation by a will.
If a man is married and without children, he makes
a great mistake not to make a will, for if he has next of
kin then after the first five thousand dollars which ^oes to
his wife, one -half the remainder would go to that individual,
no matter hov; far removed he was, and the other half to the
wife. It does not seem fair to the surviving spouse.
It is wise for every person to think through his
situation, to know as far as possible where his property
would go, and then to act accordingly.
Let's take care of your situation right away. None
of us will die any sooner because of the will.
Lovingly,
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 130, s.1-3.
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THE WILL
A. General Information.
I Requisites of a Valid Vlill.
1. Testator must be of full age—the day before the 21st
birthday satisfies this requirement.
2. Testator must be possessed of a sound mind and not subject
to undue influence
.
a. A person has testamentary capacity who understands
that a will is a disposition of property to take
effect after death, and who is capable of remember-
ing generally his property and the objects of his
bounty.
(1) The mere fact that a person suffers from insane
delusions does not as a matter of law deprive
him of the power to make a willj it is only
when the insane delusions affect the manner in
which he disposes of his property that he is
deprived of testamentary capacity.
b. A person has the right to make a will which is con-
trary to the principles of justice and humanity,
unnatural and unjust, and as long as it appears
to be the expression of a sound mind the court
must uphold it.
c. The proponent of the will must allege and prove
soundness of mind in Massachusetts. If there is
no contest there is a presumption that the tests.tor
was of sound mind and all that is required is the
proof of due execution by the evidence of one
wi tne s s
•
d. A will obtained by undue influence is not valid.
(1) The burden of proof on the issue of undue in-
fluence is on the person alleging it.
(2) Mere solicitation, persuasion, or appeals to
the testator's judgment or affections do not
amount to undue influence
.
3. Testator must be possessed of testamentary intent at the
time of the execution of the will.
a. The animus te standi must exist either at the time the
will is signed or at the time it is acknowledged
in the presence of the witnesses.
b. Parol evidence is admissible to show that the will
was made without testamentary intent.
4. There must be legal execution of an instrument in writing.
a. It must be signed by the testator, or by a person in
his presence and at his direction.
(1) It is not necessary that the witnesses know the
instrument to be a will.
(2) The signature of the testator must be visible
whether seen or not by the witnesses.
(3) It is not necessary that the witnesses should
see the testator sign, nor is it necessary
that they should sign in the presence of each
other
.
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(4) It is necessary that the testator intend that
the will, his signature to which is witnessed,
shall take effect as a will when it is sub-
scribed to by each of the three witnesses.
II Competency of Y/itnesse3. Any person of sufficient understanding
shall be deemed to be a competent witness to a will, notwith-
standing any common law disqualification for interest or
otherwise j but a beneficial devise or legacy to a subscribing
witness or to the husband or wife of such subscribing witness
shall be void unless there are three other subscribing wit-
nesses who are not similarly benefited thereunder.
1. The competency of a witness is determined as of the time
of his attestation of the will; if he later becomes
incompetent the will would not be affected.
2. Under the Statute any one who receives a beneficial
devise or legacy under a will is a competent witness
but such legacy or devise fails. Apparently the husband
or wife of such a beneficiary is a competent witness
and likewise the gift will fail.
III Miscellaneous Information.
1. Property disposed of by will.
a. All real and personal property which would descend
to heirs and next of kin in case the individual
died intestate .
b. Land or other property acquired after a will is made
will pass under the will unless a different inten-
tion is plainly manifested.
2. Contract to make a will.
a. A contract to make a will must be evidenced by a
writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 6. L.
Ch. 259, s. 5.
3
.
Incorporation by reference
.
a. One may incorporate into his will by reference any
other existing documsnt, but in order to accomplish
this result the will
(1) Must refer to the document in question in clear
terms as an existing document, and
(2) The document must have been in existence at the
time of the execution of the will.
b. Oral instructions cannot be incorporated into a will.
IV Revocation of a Will. No will shall be revoked except by
burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating it with the
intention of revoking it by the testator himself or by some
person in his presence and by his direction; or by some other
writing signed, attested and subscribed in the same manner as
a will; or by subsequent changes in the condition or circum-
stances of the testator from which a revocation is implied
by law. G. L. Ch. 191. s. 8.
1. Note that there are three general ways in which a will may
be revoked;
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a. By destruction—burning, tearing, cancelling, or
obliterating.
b. By a subsequent -writing executed in the same manner
as a will.
c. By a subsequent change in the condition or circum-
stances of the testator from which a revocation is
implied by law.
2. By destruction.
a. If the testator changed his intention to revoke before
completing the act of mutilation to the extent and
in the manner originally intended, the will is not
revoked.
b. The destruction of a will due to a mistake of fact
will not operate as a revocation, because lack of
intent to revoke
.
c. If the testator requests another to destroy his will
and the other fraudulently pretends that he has
done so, there is no revocation.
3. By a subsequent writing.
a. If the revocation is accomplished by a subsequent
instrument in writing, the statute requires it to
be signed, attested and subscribed in the same
manner as a will.
b. A Codicil.
(1) The most common form of such a subsequent writ-
ing is a codicil.
(2) A codicil revokes a will only so far as it ex-
pressly does so or by necessary implication.
(3) A valid codicil will reaffirm and republish
a void will as of the date of the execution
of the codicil, but in order to reaffirm and
republish a previous void codicil it must ex-
pressly refer to such codicil.
4. By a subsequent change in condition or circumstances.
a. The marriage of a person shall act as a revocation of
a will made by him previous to such marriage , un-
less it appears from the will that it was made in
contemplation of such marriage . G. L. Ch. 191, s. 9.
b. By statute, if a testator omits to provide in his
will for any of his children or for the issue of a
deceased child they take the same share of his
estate which they would have taken if he had died
intestate unless
(1) They have been provided for by the testator
during his lifetime, or unless
(2) It appears that the omission was intentional.
(3) Children bom after the will was made have the
benefit of this statute. Their omission
operates as a pro tanto revocation of the will,
(a) Illegitimate children do not come within
the statute providing for omitted children
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in a will
.
(A) Illegitimate children inherit from the
mother and any of the maternal ances-
tors, but not from brothers and sisters
who are legitimate children of the
mother, or from the mother's collat-
eral kindred.
(4) Adopted children have a double inheritance,
inheriting through the natural parents and kin-
dred and also from adopting parents and stand
in the same relation to their legal descendants,
but to no other of the kindred; e. g., the
adopted daughter inherits from the son of the
adopting parents
.
c. A decree of divorce and settlement constitutes an
implied revocation of wills theretofore made.
Y Legacies and Devises Defined:
1. General legacies.
a. A general legacy is one payable out of the general
assets of the estate. A residuary clause is con-
sidered as a general legacy or devise.
2. Speoific legacies.
a. A gift of some definite, specific thing capable of
being designated and identified.
3. Demonstrative legacies.
a . One of a certain amount or quantity, the particular
fund or property being pointed out from which it is
to be taken or paid. It is a general legacy from
a specific fund or from a specific lot of personal
property. If the fund or property disappears or is
inadequate, the legacy, being general, is payable
out of the general estate of the testator.
VI Lapsed legacies.
1. At common law if a legatee or devisee predeceased the
testator the legacy or devise lapsed.
2. By statute if a devise or legacy is made to a child or
other relation of the testator, who dies before the
testator, but leaves issue surviving the testator, such
issue shall, unless a different disposition is made or
required by the will, take the same estate which the
person whose issue they are would have taken if he had
survived the testator.
a. Neither a brother-in-law, step-son, nor a wife is
such a relation.
b. If a legacy is given to a number of persons as a
class, and not named as individuals, and they are
not relations of the testator, the surviving members
of the class take the whole gift in case of the
death of one
.
c. But if the gift is given to them as named individuals,
and they are not relations, the share of the
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deceased lapses,
d. The general rule is that lapsed legacies and devises
fall into the residue, but if there is no residuary
clause, the lapsed gift will be disposed of as
intestate estate. Likewise, if a residuary devise
or legacy lapses, the residue will be disposed of
as intestate property.
VII Construction of Wills.
1. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills, to which
all other rules must bend, is that the intention of the
testator shall prevail, provided that it is consistent
with the rules of law.
2. The presumption is that a will speaks from the death of
the te stator
.
3. Where two parts of a will are irreconcilable, a clear and
unambiguous provision, coming later in the will, controls,
as being more likely to express tine final intention of
the testator.

I Miscellaneous Letters
The fundamental basis for the need and the opera-
tion of Courts and the practice in them is age
old. In the 13th Century, St. Germaine, the
notable writer said— in addressing those about to
embark upon the sea of opportunity in the law
—
"As a light is set in a lantern, that all that is
in the house may be seen thereby; so Almighty God
hath set conscience in the midst of every reason-
able soul, as a light whereby he may derive and
know what he ought to do. Wherefor as much as it
behooveth thee to be occupied in such things as
pertain to the law, it is necessary that thou ever
hold a pure and clean conscience. And I counsel
thee that thou love that which is good, and fly
from that which is evil, that thou do to another
as thou wouldst should be done to thee; that thou
do nothing against truth; that thou live peaceably
with thy neighbor; that thou do justice to every
man, as much as in thee is, and also that in ever-"
general rule of the law thou do observe and kee;
equity. And if thou do thus, I trust the lantern,
that is thy conscience shall never be extincted."
That doctrine is as sound today, as it was in the
16th Century.
A lawyer must know everything. He must know law,
history, philosophy, human nature, and if he covets
the form of an advocate he must drink of all the
springs of literature, giving ease and elegance to
the mind and illustrations to whatever subject he
touches
.
Charles Sumner.
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7/hen We Have a. Right to a Jury Trial .
Dear TIalter:
You surely have a new experience ahead of you if
you are going to serve on the Plymouth County jury for the
first time. I think that it will be an experience which you
will not soon forget and I hope that you will come away with
the feeling that law after all isn't wholly crooked and that
jury service ought not to be a farce. There is a good deal
of discussion today about doing away with the jury and I am
not at all sure but that the tendency is in that direction.
Jury service is a very ancient institution which,
with the passing of the Constitution of Clarendon in the
reign of Henry II, began in England in 1164. Even at that
time a jury consisted of twelve men, but the juries of that
day might well be designated as neighborly juries, that is,
men were selected who Knew the parties and the situation
involved in the case. It was their duty to go out into the
countryside to discover the unknown facts.
For centuries witnesses were not used in trials,
and if a man should come forward with a desire to testify
in behalf of the plaintiff or defendant he would find him-
self indicted for the crime of maintenance. In an old Year
Book written in the reign of Henry VI there is a statement
made by one of the Judges that "If a man comes into court
out of his own head to testify he shall be found guilty of
maintenance and punished for it." It was not until the reign
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of Elizabeth in 1563 that witnesses in the modern sense
could be summoned into court, and with her reign the jury
began to take on a more modern character.
Many people feel that there is a Constitutional
provision which permits to every person the right of jury
trial. That is not so. Our Constitution grants a jury
trial only in cases of Federal crimes, and in the Declaration
of Rights which accompanies the Massachusetts Constitution
there is a provision that in all cases not otherwise provided
for there shall be a right of jury trial. However, in our
courts of Equity there is still no absolute right to a trial
by jury. In most cases it is granted only in the discre-
tion of the judge because of the development of Equity
through the ages. The first Equity Courts were presided
over by the Chancellor of the Exchequer who was known as the
keeper of the King's conscience. You can appreciate that to
have twelve men and true sitting on the conscience of the
King is ridiculous, so to this day a jury trial is not to be
found in Equity courts except upon those issues brought into
the Equity court from the common law court, and in issues
where, in the discretion of the judge, a jury trial would be
more equitable.
Our Superior court, into which you are going, is
the great court of jury trial. As you know, there is no
jury in the inferior courts, but the man does not have to
start his case there, and the defendant can always ask to
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have the case removed to the Superior Court in order that he
may have the advantage of a jury. Juries find the facts in
the case and link up the facts with the law as it is stated
to them by the court. Inasmuch as the Supreme court handles
only questions of law and not of fact, it follows again that
there is no jury in the Supreme court.
Today, unless the Plaintiff and Defendant ask for
a jury trial in the Superior court it is not granted, and an
individual is held to have waived his right to jury trial by
failing to ask for it.
I think you are going to have a very interesting
experience. Personally, I believe that women should sit
upon juries as well as men and I think there is a duty on
our public school systems to inspire the growing young to a
desire to serve his community by impartial, honest, upright,
jury service. To be called upon the jury should be consid-
ered an honor and a challenge to one's integrity and char-
acter, and our schools should tremendously encourage this
feeling. I shall be very much interested in your reaction.
Truly yours,
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Privileges Accorded to Witnesses .
Dear Mr, White:
You are certainly learning some law with your jury
experience. So you were surprised to know that conversation
between husband and wife cannot be revealed in court? That
is correct. So many times in court I have seen an attorney
question a wife as to what her husband told her on a given
occasion and have seen the judge interrupt to ask her if some
one had been present during the conversation. If her reply
is in the affirmative she is allowed to give the conversa-
tion, otherwise, it is excluded.
There are certain witnesses who, under some con-
ditions, are privileged. There is an absolute privilege as
to private conversation between a husband and wife, and even
though both parties should desire to reveal the conversation
it is not permitted unless there was some third person pres-
ent who really understood and was paying attention to the
conversation. W« have several cases where husband and wife
have talked in the presence of children and the conversa-
tions have been admitted on the ground that the children
were old enough to pay attention to the conversation and to
be interested in it. A similar situation has arisen where
men and their wives have been talking in public places, as
for example in depots, in tones loud enough to attract the
attention of other people in the station, under which cir-
cumstances their conversation ceases to be private and can
I
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be revealed.
To the rule that private conversation of husband
and wife cannot be admitted there is one exception, and that
arises when there is a criminal action for non-support or
desertion in which case the wife can testify as to what the
husband said at the time he left, to establish the fact that
the desertion was intentional and wilful. It is also true
that even in civil cases either may testify as to 7Jhat he or
she did because of a conversation with the other, although
they must not reveal the exact words of the conversation.
It is interesting to note that epithets and abusive terms
are not considered conversation, and can be revealed on the
witness stand. This is only one of the many interesting
privileges which through the ages have been accorded to wit-
nesses. Watch for others during your work and we will
discuss them more at length if you care to do so.
Ever yours,
Com. v. Terengo^ 234 Mass. 56;
Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51;
Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150.

J Letters to my Co-Workers .
Let reverence for the law be breathed by every
American mother to the lisping babe that prat-
tles on her lap. Let it be taught in schools,
in seminaries, and in colleges. Let it be writ-
ten in primers, spelling books, and in almanacs.
Let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed
in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of
justice. And, in short, let it become the
political religion of the Nation.
Abraham Lincoln.
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The Attitude of the Teacher.
Dear teacher who dreads the subject:
Is not the first requisite of success, faith in
one's subject and faith in one's ability to make that subject
vital to others? To have such faith, one must believe in the
importance of his work and be fired with enthusiasm. Emerson
has truly said that nothing great is ever achieved without
that spark of celestial fire. Is it possible to be enthusi-
astic if one is teaching law? Decidedly, yes.
Its very antiquity makes it honorable. Become
steeped in its background, tell your students the stories of
its beginning. Common law, equity law, the story of the law
merchant, modern statutory law—it is a story filled with ro-
mance and adventure, and there is no high school youth who
cannot be fired to loyalty by its rehearsal. Show that after
all, law is but crystallized public opinion, that it was un-
necessary as long as Robinson Crusoe was on his lonely isle,
but that as soon as his man Friday appeared its need was
apparent. Don't let your student feel that laws are the
weapons of the oppressors, to be broken as speedily as possi-
ble; show them that lawmaking is the gift of the ages, a
sacred torch which they must carry on. It has been said that
where there is no vision the people perish; well might it be
said that when there ceases to be respect for law and order a
nation 1 8 history is written.
We are living in an age when crime is rampant, when
chicanery and graft face us on every hand, and the hope of
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America lies in the youth of today, the men and women of to-
morrow.
Unless teachers guide aright where can we expect
leadership? I don't believe that we are going to the dogs,
and I do believe that the heart of civilization is still
beating vigorously, that its feet are still marching on and
up, and all this in spite of the newspapers which picture
muck and filth and crime on every hand. But every teacher of
law who takes the subject as a sacred gift and unites with
its teaching, character, may play a part in bringing the
brighter day more quickly and in salvaging individual lives
which otherwise may be sacrificed in the march. Take your
law class and yourself on a pilgrimage.
Enthusiastically yours,
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Mental Discipline Through the Study of Law ,
Dear teacher who would read further:
Yesterday, I tried to make you enthusiastic in my
field but there are other things I would give you.
Not only will your enthusiasm lead you to tell
your classes the story of early beginnings, but you will
show them and your co-workers that here is a subject which
leads in mental discipline . We were brought up on the be-
lief that geometry and advanced mathematics taught us rea-
soning power, logical development, in short how to think—
a
tremendous need in superficial thinking America.
You are familiar perhaps with the Dippy Dicky
pictures in the Boston Globe . Some years ago Blondy found
his friend Dicky the picture of despair and he asked him the
cause of his depression. Dicky informed his friend that for
the sixth time he had received word that he had failed to
pass the Massachusetts Bar Examinations. "What can be the
matter?" asked Blondy, Tt I can't think," replied Dicky,
and with light dawning Blondy replied, "I guess that is
right." What a picture that is of our American people! We
either can't think or don't think. All honor to any subject
which will help the American need, but why must it be an
abstract subject like solid geometry? Why might it not be a
subject which will give us definite knowledge or our rights,
duties and liabilities, knowledge which may save us money
and heartaches in the years to come.
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On a certain tombstone in Plymouth County appear
the words:
Here lyeth one, deny it if you can
Who, tho a lawyer, was an honest man,
Heaven* s gate to him is open wide
But shut, alas, to all the tribe beside.
Why do we laugh? Because we at once recognize a common
truth. But after all, why are certain lawyers able to take
advantage of their clients? Because in this particular
field, men and women are as babes in arms. They sign papers
without reading their contents; they are ruled by sentiment
in this field rather than by reason. Yet, there is nothing
difficult in this subject. Outstanding material may be
given freely and understandingly to our young people, and
they, and through them their homes and their friends can be
protected. Let knowledge grow in this field from more to
more. And let me tell you something else; at the same time
your students are gaining in practical, everyday knowledge
which will protect them not only in business, but in their
social and home contacts they are learning to think
straight
.
to travel from point A to B. and then to C, a
training as invaluable as that gained in the mathematics
class and one much more practical.
For girls, this training is doubly desirable.
Women are always said to be intuitive. Is it not true that
frequently the girl gets the answer before the boy? But
isn't it also true that she is covered with confusion if she
is asked to give reasons for the hope that was within. Law
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leads as no other subject leads in clean-cut thinking,
in the development of an orderly mind, in the choice of
an exact vocabulary.
Some years ago I served on a committee whose
Chairman was an English professor, a graduate of Oxford,
a man whom I much admired, but I shall never forget the
surprise I felt when I heard him read the report of the
committee's work. Frankly, I felt as if I were listening
to a recital of accomplishments in which I had had no part.
Was he a member of the Ananias Club? After a time light
dawned, the report was the result of his training, an
imaginative mind let loose in the field of expression.
He should have studied lawl
Continued in our next,
Ir
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Ethics Taught Through Law .
Dear serious teacher:
Again law is a worthy subject to present to the
youth of America for its correct teaching will give much of
ethics and character building and in the present reactionary
age its importance cannot be too greatly stressed. In the
year of 1919 I was teaching in a nearby high school. Law
had been discontinued and I was told that the instructor who
had then departed had used the course to develop a training
school in crime. He had told the youth of that high school
of the paternal attitude of the law for youth and had told
it in such a fashion that boys had gone forth to practice
his teachings, and so well had they done it that the mer-
chants of the community had risen in arms.
The rights of infants to avoid contracts can be
taught to bring about just such a result as this, or it can
be taught in such a way as to give youth reverence for a
state which car js to safeguard its minors; it can be taught
so as to arouse in that youth a hatred for a person so small
and contemptible as to break faith with the state and to use
the protection for purely selfish ends.
Once more law training has a financial value. It
teaches an individual to recognize when he has a legal prob-
lem and to appreciate the old adage, "He who has himself for
a lawyer has a fool for a client. ft It prepares for the in-
creased pay envelope and the position higher up. Those of
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you who are teachers of law will recall the case involving
the Maryland Fire Insurance Company in which, if the ste-
nographer had known enough law to have written "Upon receipt
of your check your premises will be covered/* she would have
saved her concern many thousands of dollars, and might she
not have aided herself financially?
Lastly, the study of law has an educational and
cultural value. Bring this thought home to your colleagues
in the classical department who sometimes have the impres-
sion that "Wisdom alone doth dwell with us."
For that attitude we are somewhat to blame. Omit
the word "Commercial." "Commercial" is a word long associ-
ated with inferiority, and I am delighted to see it disap-
pearing. The omission of it is going to make possible the
subject taking its rightful place throughout all depart-
ments. Does the boy who is to be the preacher, the teacher,
or the doctor need a working knowledge of the law less than
the business executive? Does the girl who is to be a home-
maker need it less than the girl in the office or in the
factory? That is ridiculous. There are those who believe
it should be taught to boys, but not to girls. Those people
are fifty years behind the times. Don't they know that
women buy eighty-five per cent of all the goods that are
bought in America and that therefore eighty-five per cent of
the sales contracts are entered into by women alone. Think
it over.
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All these points I would share with my students
early in the course. I must have their enthusiasm to add
to mine if I am to make "the iron to swim." Here is a sub-
ject that gives a wealth of background, which prepares for
statesmanship and the handling of national problems. If
the attitude of my teacher of law is right, more than half
my battle is won, for with the right spirit and the will to
do and venture, new methods will open up.
More anon,
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THE UTTER BARRISTER AND THE
IMPORTANT TREATISE
An Utter Barrister was Sincerely Attached to a
Charming Young Person, who Reciprocated his Regard.
But as his Professional Takings were Negligible,
and the Charming Young Person's Relatives Mani-
fested no Desire to Provide an Income for Two, the
Utter Barrister Pelt that his Engagement was Likely
to he a Long One* He was Accordingly Somewhat
Dejected. Why Solicitors should be so Coy he did
not Understand. For (though a Modest Man) he was
Compelled to Admit that he was of Good Appearance
and Marked Intellectual Ability. Whilst Engaged
in the Soothing Occupation of Smoking Gaspers the
Utter Barrister was Struck by a Bright Idea. To
Seize Pen and Paper was the Work of a Moment. To
Draft an Eloquent Advertisement for Insertion in
the Public Prints was the Work of Another. Week
by Week During the Ensuing Twelve Months the World
was Informed that the Utter Barrister had in Course
of Preparation a Treatise in Nine Volumes; Three
Concerning the Laws (Statutory) of England, Scot-
land, Northern Ireland, the Irish Free State and
the British Dominions Beyond the Seas; Three De-
voted to Public and Private International Law, Con-
flict of Laws, Jurisprudence and the History of
Legal Tribunals; and Three Containing a Complete
Digest (Correlated, Analysed and Indexed) of all
Reported Cases on Contract and Tort since the year
1685. The Price (Payable by Instalments) was to
be Twelve Guineas Net; Thin Paper Edition, Four-
teen Guineas Net. As the Year Advanced The Word-
ing of the Advertisement was Slightly Altered, and
the Treatise was Declared to be MIn the Press,"
"About to be Published," and "Shortly to Appear."
The intelligent Anticipations of the Utter Bar-
rister were Realised. Managing clerks Flocked to
his Chambers in such Gratifying Numbers that at
the Beginning of the Long Vacation he was Enabled
to Lead the Charming Young Person to the Hymeneal
Altar with the Full Approval of her Close-Fisted
Relations. Did the Nine Volumes Appear in Due
Course? They did Not. On his return from the
Honeymoon the Utter Barrister, with the Assistance
of the Press Agency, Broke to the Public the News
that Owing to the Carelessness of a Domestic serv-
ant the Manuscript of the Great Work had been
Destroyed and that its Publication was Indefinitely

Postponed, Pilled with Sympathy for the Utter
Barrister in this Appalling Misfortune, the Solic
itors of the Metropolis Redoubled their Atten-
tions, and the Utter Barrister was so Overwhelmed
with Work that he was Shortly Compelled to apply
for a Silk Gown.
Moral .--Write a Book.
Forensic Fables.











